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Abstract
This dissertation examines the notion of illocutionary force and whether it is embeddable
by examining the syntax, semantics and pragmatic effects of a range of root-like embedded
constructions. Though illocutionary force has long been considered a property exclusive
to root clauses, the examination and analysis of English embedded inverted questions and
other quasi-quotational constructions cross-linguistically show that this is not the case.
The contributions of this dissertation are three-fold: a refined definition of independent
illocutionary force; a syntax for non-root complement clauses that carry independent illo-
cutionary force; and a model for the discourse that captures the effects of these clauses. I
also work towards understanding how the instantiation of independent illocutionary force
in such constructions leads to their restricted distribution.
Illocutionary force may be represented both lexically and through syntactic processes
such as verb movement. I argue that verb movement to Forceo is an interface operation—
it occurs in syntax but is directly linked to a specific discourse interpretation. Building
on Krifka (2014), illocutionary force is the expression of who takes responsibility for as-
serting or responding to a proposition or set of propositions, according to a given modal
base. When illocutionary force is independently expressed on an embedded clause, the
perspective holder and responsibility taker(s) are unambiguous and not mixed. In con-
trast, standard embedded clauses may be ambiguous as to who takes responsibility and
may contain multiple perspectives.
Clauses with independent illocutionary force have an expanded C-layer that is nonethe-
less smaller than that in true root clauses. An Illocutionary Act head selects for the em-
bedded ForceP, determines illocutionary force and, obliquely, determines the restricted dis-
tribution of quasi-quotational constructions. A range of facts show that quasi-quotational
constructions are truly embedded but are not direct objects of the matrix verb. Instead,
they are in close apposition with a nominal direct object. This structure accounts for
the properties of quasi-quotational constructions as entities that refer to a conversational
move proffered in the relevant discourse, following Roberts’s (1996, 2012) Question Under
Discussion framework.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Attempts to answer questions about illocutionary force and embedded root phenomena
are prone to relying on logic which self-satisfies. An embedded root phenomenon is such
because it is restricted to root clauses, except for the cases in which it is embedded.
Illocutionary force is marked in clauses except those which have no illocutionary force.
This dissertation takes a group of constructions which I will refer to as quasi-quotational
constructions. They are cross-linguistically very similar as they feature a range of embed-
ded root phenomena in addition to a range of other characteristics, such as opacity to
extraction and resistance to extraposition. I will show using a range of syntactic and in-
terpretive tests what it means for these constructions to be both embedded and root and
how this apparent tension obtains. This tension will be resolved by showing that only a
specific subset of properties typically restricted to root clauses are embeddable and that
this can be explained by examining how different properties effect change on discourse and
the relationship between discourse participants. Moreover, I will build on the speech act
phrase tradition growing out of Speas & Tenny (2003) by focusing on a subpart of this
phrase, which I will call the Illocutionary Act phrase (IAP). I propose that the IAP is
the highest possible projection in the embedded clause and that it encodes independent
illocutionary force in that clause, along with information about the discourse according to
which the embedded clause should be interpreted.
Chapter 2 contains a review of speech act theory from the philosophical tradition and
its embedding into linguistic theory. I will also examine recent refinements of the concept
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of discourse participants as syntactic objects and of the concept of illocutionary force,
particularly in embedded contexts. Recent examinations of left-peripheral phenomena
such as discourse particles, their interpretation and their distribution have been useful
in teasing apart how different types of speech act introduce different responsibilities for
the discourse participants. However, I argue that it is necessary to look further into
the utterance, into intrasentential syntax, to fully understand what it means to represent
discourse participants in syntax.
Chapter 3 introduces the main datum of interest in this dissertation, namely the em-
bedded inverted question in English dialects. Embedded inverted questions are a variant
form of speech report which share some characteristics with indirect speech reports and
others with direct speech reports. Their pragmatic utility arises from their ability to repre-
sent expressive and not-at-issue information from the original speech act without enforcing
a verbatim requirement and that they presuppose a particular question under discussion.
Their characteristics will be examined in detail and experimental results will be discussed.
Chapters 4 and 5 provide a structural analysis of the embedded inverted question.
Chapter 4 focuses on the head of the IAP, how it encodes illocutionary force and its cate-
gorial status as a modal verb that also has n-like, specifically determiner-like, properties.
The internal argument of the IA head is the embedded clause. I also propose that the
IAP, due to the determiner-like properties of the IA head, ultimately is an entity rather
than a proposition. Chapter 5 examines the external argument of the IA head, which is a
complex of a situation pronoun and a perspectival monster operator. Data will be provided
to support this analysis from a range of constructions in the Germanic and Romance lan-
guage families whose characteristics show striking similarities with the English embedded
inverted question. Along with other perspective-shifting phenomena, including embedded
imperatives, this data suggests that the embedded clauses in these quasi-quotational con-
structions are referential in terms of their structure—the extra determiner-like functional
projection—and their interpretation. Furthermore, the differences between two emerg-
ing groups in the family of quasi-quotational constructions will be discussed, specifically
that one group of constructions is evaluated according to the original discourse context
(embedded inverted questions and recomplementation clauses) while the other exhibits
16
perspective disambiguation in which the speaker is marked as the perspective holder, not
the matrix subject (German and some Mainland Scandinavian embedded verb second).
How quasi-quotational constructions affect the discourse into which they are introduced
is also modelled, using a modified version of Farkas and Bruce’s (2010) approach to the
Question Under Discussion framework.
Chapter 6 extends the investigation of the embedded inverted question to examine its
restricted distribution, raising questions about how it combines, semantically and syntacti-
cally, with the matrix clause. I will show that the embedded inverted question is non-root
but not selected by the matrix verb, in keeping with a recent line of scholarship questioning
the syntactic relationship between clauses and the elements which dominate them. Instead,
the IAP, which is the type of a nominal, is in close apposition with the true complement
of the matrix verb—a null content nominal. Questions about the availability of quasi-
quotational constructions in a given language will also be discussed along with speculation
on reasons why certain languages such as Mandarin Chinese and Cuzco Quechua seem not
to have quasi-quotational constructions.
Conclusions will then be drawn and areas for future work identified.
The questions posed here are not new, but by careful examination of embedded inverted
questions and their similarities with better known embedded root phenomena insights
emerge that help tease apart problems which have endured for some time, such as what it
means to have independent illocutionary force and what that might entail for a clause, for
the role that it plays within a discourse and for the discourse participants in terms of the
commitments it demands of them. It also shows that, despite the important advances made
by Hooper & Thompson (1973), assertion per se is not the key concept in understanding
embedded root phenomena but rather who takes responsibility for the information in a
clause and whose knowledge a clause is evaluated against.
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Chapter 2
Representing Discourse
Participants: The History of an
Idea
2.1 Introduction
For a long time, the basic unit of language studied in generative linguistics has been
the sentence, made up of clauses. Much study has focused on, and made great strides
in understanding, the relationship between arguments in a clause, how these roles are
codified and marked, and how complex sentences fit together. However, the role of a
sentence in discourse is a much more recent consideration and one which is much less
well understood than intra-sentential factors. In particular the way in which a given
sentence encodes its role(s) within discourse has fallen in and out of fashion as a topic of
scrutiny in generative linguistics. In the last twenty years, serious scholars in generative
linguistics have moved towards considering utterances—or at least, sentences containing
non-propositional material, rather than propositions alone—as a basic unit of language.
That is to say that non-propositional content has been taken more seriously as interacting
with the core proposition of the sentence rather than being simply an add-on, parenthetical
option.
This has not necessarily been the case in other disciplines, which have long taken non-
propositional material into account in the consideration of utterances, principally because
of a difference in emphasis. Where generative linguistics has focused on relationships
and processes within sentences alone, other fields such as philosophy and other linguistic
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frameworks have focused on communication, from the expression of speaker intent to the
construction of discourse. Taking philosophy as an example, Searle (1969) asserted that
speech acts—sentences within the context of a discourse—are the basic unit of linguistic
communication, and that they come with specific types of intentional behaviour attached.
Searle argues that a study of speech acts is a study not only of Saussurian parole, use
of language, but also of langue, the language itself, because, Searle claims, meaning and
context have a bidirectional relationship. He says:
For just as it is part of our notion of the meaning of a sentence that a literal
utterance of that sentence with that meaning in a certain context would be
the performance of a particular speech act, so it is part of our notion of a
speech act that there is a possible sentence (or sentences) the utterance of
which in a certain context would in virtue of its (or their) meaning constitute
a performance of that speech act.
Searle (1969, pp.17-18)
In short, sentences may not have a one-to-one relationship with speech acts, but the
meaning of the sentence is not independent of the effect the utterance of that sentence has
in the discourse.
However, whilst it is important to consider meaning as being part of a discourse, it
is also important to draw distinctions between the kinds of information recoverable from
context and inference, and the kinds of information encoded within the language itself.
To put it another way, which aspects of meaning are found within narrow syntax? Al-
though Chomsky has long maintained that language is not essentially for person-to-person
communication and that speech acts are not crucial for comprehending the meaning of a
sentence (Chomsky 1998, pp.22-23), the fact that it has been used for communication for
many millennia suggest that it is plausible that some communication-related elements have
become part of the functional lexicon.
It is clear that there are elements of language that relate to the discourse context,
but that are interpreted consistently in given syntactic contexts regardless of the speaker’s
conversational aims. For example, point of view is represented through deixis, sequence
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of tense phenomena, sentential particles, adverbs, honorific marking, allocutive agreement
and many other lexical and functional means. Take as an example the case of allocutive
agreement in Souletin Basque (Oyharc¸abal 1993, Miyagawa 2012). In declarative root
clauses, the verb is marked for agreement with the addressee in the discourse: affixes exist
for singular male addressees, singular female addressees and high-status addressees. There
is no allocutive agreement in the case of plural addressees:
(1) a. Pettek
Peter.erg
lan
work.abs
egin
do.prf
dik.
aux-3.s.abs-2.masc.alloc-3.s.erg
“Peter worked.” (to a male addressee)
b. Pettek
Peter.erg
lan
work.abs
egin
do.prf
din.
aux-3.s.abs-2.fem.alloc-3.s.erg
“Peter worked.” (to a female addressee)
c. Pettek
Peter.erg
lan
work.abs
egin
do.prf
dizu¨.
aux-3.s.abs-2.form.alloc-3.s.erg
“Peter worked.” (formal, to a higher-status addressee)
d. Pettek
Peter.erg
lan
work.abs
egin
do.prf
du.
aux-3.s.abs-3.s.erg
“Peter worked.” (to plural addressee) Miyagawa (2012, p.82)
Allocutive agreement is true second-person agreement in that it is in complementary dis-
tribution with second-person subject/object agreement—allocutive agreement “loses out”
and is impossible in clauses with second-person subjects and objects. It is also closely
linked to the expression of C, such that when C is spelled out as a complementiser, allocu-
tive agreement is impossible. On the basis of allocutive agreement being “true” agreement,
Miyagawa (2012) shows that there must be some representation of the addressee in the
syntax to act as the goal for which the allocutive agreement probe searches. As such,
discourse participants are said to be represented in syntax and this representation does
not interact with the conversational aims of the speaker, though exactly how the addressee
is expressed depends on the discourse context (for the gender/status of the addressee, for
example).
The aims of this chapter are as follows: I will discuss the first wave of speech act theory
in both philosophy and linguistics in the 1960s and early 1970s and why the enterprise
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died out, at least in generative linguistics (Banfield (1982) notwithstanding). I will then
examine the re-emergence of discourse-related projections in syntax with the advent of the
cartographic approach to syntax and ForceP, followed by the resurgence of proposals that
there is a dedicated speech act projection in syntax. Certain key terms and the reasoning
behind them will also be discussed in this section. In particular, I will consider what it
means for a sentence to have ‘illocutionary force’ and what types of ‘force’ exist in natural
language.
2.2 Early speech act theory: the philosophers
The speech act theorists of the 1960s made a big impact on the study of language from
a philosophical point of view. The recognised “father” of speech act theory, J.L. Austin,
investigated how words are used to provoke actions or to perform actions in and of them-
selves. In this way he focused neither on the truth-conditions of a sentence nor how its
meaning is affected by context, but how sentences can be used to effect change in the
world. He did, however, look to separate out layers within a sentence to determine the
relationship between the sentence in isolation and in discourse.
To achieve this, Austin (1962) proposes a distinction between locutionary, illocutionary
and perlocutionary acts. Austin’s focus lay on the middle category, illocutionary acts,
as they lay between the plainly grammatical category of locution and the plainly social
category of perlocution. He claimed that this three-way distinction, in particular in the
introduction of the idea of illocutionary acts, would be superior to his earlier work on
the difference between constative utterances—utterances which say something, such as
statements and assertions—and performative utterances—utterances which do something,
such as promises, bets, warnings. Austin noted that the constative-performative distinction
did not distinguish between an utterance such as “The bull is going to charge” in terms of
its simple meaning and in terms of the ways in which the speaker may choose to deploy
such a sentence (Austin 1962, p.98). He therefore suggests that in uttering a sentence (a
locutionary act), there is always an illocutionary act performed too, which he characterises
as “the performance of an act in saying something as opposed to performance of an act
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of saying something.” (Austin 1962, pp.99-100; original emphasis). This assertion alone
leaves a lot of room for ambiguity, and it is not clear in isolation what the difference is
between performance in saying something and performance of saying something. Austin
elaborates on the difference between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts in the following
words and using the following examples:
Locutionary Illocutionary Perlocutionary
Description
“uttering certain
sounds which one
knows to be words
bearing a definite
sense and making
definite reference to
something” (1962,
pp.92-93)
communicating the
“force” of a utterance,
the action which is
performed in uttering
said utterance
bringing about an ef-
fect on the hearer
Example
Speaker to me:
“Shoot her!” (1962,
pp.101-102)
The speaker urged /ad-
vised/ordered/. . . me
to shoot her
I was persuaded to or
made to shoot her
Table 2.1: Categories in Austin’s Speech Act Theory (based on Austin 1962)
Based on the above table, the locutionary act is principally concerned with reference and
so is concerned both with the structure of the sentence and its utterance in an appropriate
context. The illocutionary act is concerned with the speaker’s points of view and intentions.
Once again, structure and lexis as well as context are at play, though Austin is clear that
the composition of the sentence does not bear on which kind of illocutionary act a sentence
may perform. The perlocutionary act is concerned with the effect of the utterance made
by the speaker on the addressee and as such is demonstrated by subsequent actions in
the discourse and discourse context rather than being linked to any particular structure
or lexical choice on the part of the speaker exclusive of context. Austin strongly claims
the expression of illocutionary force to be conventional, meaning that it is based in the
sentence structure and the interpretation the speech community attaches to that structure
rather than context. He also claims that an illocutionary act constitutes an action over
and above that of simple utterance.
But what is the nature of this action? How is the range of possible actions constrained?
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Austin illustrates the line between illocutionary acts (the force of the utterance act itself)
and perlocutionary acts (the effect of the act on the hearer) by examining whether or not
the act can be described using explicit performative formulae. As examples, he notes that
whilst “I argue that” or “I warn you that” are perfectly possible, “I convince you that” or
“I alarm you that” are not. Though Austin uses the English lexicon as the basis for these
claims, it is a fair assumption that similar distinctions exist in other languages. Moreover,
this suggests that argument or warning operators are possible language but alarming or
convincing operators are not. A prediction that this approach does not make is that a
language that lacks a given lexical item or operator does not necessarily lack the ability
to encode that act, though it might require periphrasis of some kind or the repurposing of
another structure. However, Austin’s own examples suggest that using lexical entries to
motivate types of illocutionary act may not be the most convincing evidence. A speaker
can just as much fail to argue or warn something as they can fail to convince or alarm,
whilst it is difficult to see how questioning or ordering acts can fail to occur if direct means
are used. For these reasons, the need to more finely differentiate between acts instantiated
by grammatical means and those that are dependent on convention to be accepted in a
given discourse is apparent; in short, convention is not fine-grained enough as a concept to
refine our understanding of different types of illocutionary force.
It is tempting to suggest that Austin’s three types of speech act are arranged in some
kind of hierarchy based on the amount of material in them which is not context-dependent,
but this would be to misrepresent Austin’s ideas. It is not the case that something is
“added” to the locutionary act to produce the illocutionary act, or to the illocutionary
act to produce the perlocutionary act, but they are intended to be understood as levels
which occur simultaneously on the production of a given utterance. This leads to the
kind of criticism put forward by scholars such as Cohen (1964) that it is unclear what
the role of the illocutionary act in Austin’s system in comparison with the locutionary and
perlocutionary acts. It is intuitively clear that the speaker’s intentions, desires and so forth
are as real as the effect of the utterance on the hearer, but Austin’s classes do not quite
manage to distinguish between the two. For example, Austin’s class of expositives in table
2.2 appears to conflate speaker intention and effect on the addressee by use of terms like
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clarifying—that may be the speaker intention but it is also contingent on the addressee
actually finding that the situation is clarified for him or her.
It is also interesting that, although Austin asserts that there is a conventional, syntax-
internal aspect to illocutionary acts, he abstracts over syntactic differences in determining
his classes of illocutionary acts. He claims that asking (typically expressed with an in-
terrogative clause) and informing (typically expressed with a declarative clause) are both
types of ‘expressive’ expositive act. Austin’s classes of illocutionary acts are listed below:
Class Description Examples
Verdictives
“typified by the giving or a
verdict[...], giving a finding as
to something - fact or value
- which is for different rea-
sons hard to be certain about”
(p.151)
acquit, convict, find, read it
as, reckon, put it at, make it,
assess, characterize, diagnose,
analyse, describe
Exercitives
“the exercising of powers,
rights, or influence” (p.151)
appoint, vote, order, urge, ad-
vise, warn
Commissives
“typified by promising or other-
wise undertaking; they commit
you to doing something (origi-
nal emphasis, pp.151-152)” and
“the declaring of an intention”
(p.163)
promise, undertake, covenant,
contract, intend, plan, agree,
consent, oppose
Behabitives
“include the notion of reaction
to other people’s behaviour [...]
and of attitudes and expressions
of attitudes to someone else’s
past conduct or imminent con-
duct” (p.160)
apologise, thank, deplore,
commiserate, resent, wel-
come, bless, toast, dare, defy,
challenge
Expositives
“acts of exposition involving
the expounding of views, the
conducting of arguments and
the clarifying of usages and of
references” (p.161)
affirm, deny, ask, remark, in-
form, testify, accept, concede,
postulate, interpret, analyse, il-
lustrate, mean
Table 2.2: Classes of illocutionary acts (Austin 1962)
Criticisms of Austin’s characterisation of illocutionary force and his classes of illocu-
tionary acts abound: Cohen (1964) notes that if illocutionary force can be represented
so easily in the content of the utterance, then there appears to be no specific role for
illocutionary force as a concept separate from the utterance and its content. This is a
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criticism repeated in more recent literature such as Zanuttini & Portner (2003), who see
clause type, often conflated with illocutionary force1, not as a single syntactic feature but
as a function of the presence of combinations of other independently motivated syntactic
features. It is important that Austin attempts to constrain the kinds of illocutionary act
that may occur in natural language, but the problems in his work lie in trying to explain
why the acts in table 2.2 should be the basic categories. A more extreme version of this
criticism is found in Graham (1977), who considers it “a curious fact that Austin and his
commentators tend both to give verbal recognition to the diversity of illocution and still
to see a general account of it” (p.108, original emphasis) in light of the fact that Austin
recognises the possibility of thousands of different types of illocution based on performa-
tive verbs in the dictionary. This is where Austin’s reliance on English performatives to
construct his metalanguage poses problems: if illocution is so heavily based on the lexicon
of a language then it must vary greatly depending on the verbs available in said language,
and will also differ greatly between languages. For example, the fact that there is no one
verb in English encoding the meaning “try-to-persuade” and taking a CP complement does
not mean that this cannot constitute a type of illocutionary force in another language2.
Finally, although Austin is insistent on the fact that the illocutionary act is “constituted
not by intention [...] but by convention” (Austin 1962, p.127; original emphasis), such
convention is principally social convention. The illocutionary acts that he identifies cannot
necessarily be performed simply “in” saying something, despite what Austin insists (1962,
p.122)—instead they must be performed in saying that thing within the relevant speech
community, making an important observation about the power of performative acts within
structures of authority. Searle (1989) remarked upon this some years later, noting that
the kinds of acts dubbed illocutionary acts by Austin largely depend on some kind of “in-
stitutional notion” (to use Searle’s term). This means that the saying of the utterance is
not enough, but that extra-linguistic institutions and social rules are also necessary if one
is to achieve true illocutionary uptake (Austin’s term), meaning that the illocutionary act
1Of course, distinguishing between clause type and illocutionary force is a crucial step which will be
addressed in chapter 4.
2Note that Austin distinguishes between illocutionary and perlocutionary force using the non-
performative verb “persuade”, on the basis that a speaker can only aim to persuade, where only an addressee
independently can achieve being persuaded
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will actually take effect.
In summary, Austin’s work addresses the constative-performative problem principally
by showing that the former kind of utterance is just one type of the latter—that all ut-
terances ‘do’ something and some sentences may do multiple things depending on speaker
intention, effect on the hearer and use in context. However, by relying on overtly per-
formative sentences for his metalanguage, the distinctions that Austin draws between his
levels of speech act are not yet fine-grained enough, such that the general account towards
which he strives remains elusive.
Inspired by Austin’s insights, John R. Searle addressed many of the issues raised by
and proposals put forward by Austin in works spanning several decades. As noted in the
introduction to this chapter, Searle suggests that speech acts are the basic unit of linguistic
communication and that they are defined by specific types of intentional behaviour. As he
says in his 1979 work:
“I believe that speaking or writing in a language consists in performing speech
acts of a quite specific kind called ‘illocutionary acts’. These include mak-
ing statements, asking questions, giving orders, making promises, apologizing,
thanking and so on. I also believe that there is a systematic set of relationships
between the meanings of the words and sentences we utter and the illocutionary
acts we perform in the utterance of those words and sentences.
Searle (1979, p.58)
Searle, like Austin, envisages illocutionary acts as an action performed by the speaker
through language and does not assume that an illocutionary act must have a given effect
in order to be successfully performed. Furthermore he links illocutionary acts to syntax
and semantics more closely than to pragmatic effect. He elucidates this further:
[T]he speech act or acts performed in the utterance of a sentence are in general a
function of the meaning of the sentence. The meaning of a sentence does not in
all cases uniquely determine what speech act is performed in a given utterance
of that sentence, for a speaker may mean more than what he actually says, but
it is always in principle possible for him to say exactly what he means.
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Searle (1979, p.18)
Searle therefore assumes that the derivation of the sentence determines to some degree
the possible or at least the basic speech act(s) which the given sentence may constitute,
suggesting a dependency between something in the syntax and the availability of a given
speech act. Interestingly, Searle is clear about which aspects of syntax and semantics
are not affected by the transition from sentence to speech act; he notes in Searle (1979)
that predication and reference are separate from speech acts, as they remain the same
regardless of ordering, questioning, stating, wishing, and so on. Searle also rejects Austin’s
distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts—the idea that illocutionary acts are
independent of the composition of the utterance—which suggests that Searle attributes a
greater role to syntax and semantics in the formation of speech acts than does Austin. He
distinguishes between sentences, reference and speech acts as separate acts in the speaking
of an utterance as follows (Searle 1969, pp.23-24):
(2) a. uttering words (morphemes, sentences) = performing utterance acts
b. referring and predicating = performing propositional acts
c. stating, questioning, commanding, promising = performing illocutionary acts
Searle explicitly claims that the above acts are intrinsically linked; he notes that when (2c)
is performed, characteristically the speaker is also performing (2a) and (2b). Searle also
says, however, that propositional acts, i.e. (2b), cannot be performed alone (Searle 1969,
p.25).3
This suggests that (2a), an utterance act, can be performed alone, and raises the ques-
tion of what this would look like. Searle suggests in his essay of (1989) that it is perfectly
possible to utter a sentence without intending to communicate its content. He uses an
anecdote about getting stuck at the Yugoslavian border and becoming frustrated with the
border guards who did not speak English—by subsequently vocalising his frustration in
English, Searle was not possibly communicating anything through the utterance itself,4 as
3There is some evidence that this is not the case, for example the case of conjunct clauses in languages
such as Plains Cree (Algonquian). This will be touched on in chapters 3 and 6.
4Of course, Searle will have communicated plenty through his tone of voice, gesture and so forth in this
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he knew the border guards could not understand him, though he was uttering sentences
(Searle 1989, pp.143-144). It is not clear whether this anecdote applies here, however, not
least because in voicing his frustration Searle will almost certainly have been making ref-
erence to, for example, the border guards specifically, and probably predicating all manner
of things with regards to them; it is simply that the guards do not receive the meaning of
the referring terms and the predicates that Searle—presumably entirely grammatically—is
uttering. Arguably, Searle is in fact performing a propositional act in this utterance, but
no illocutionary act. It is not therefore clear why Searle makes the distinction between
(2a) and (2b).
It is interesting that Searle does not, in the first instance, consider the performance
of perlocutionary acts as an integral part of issuing an utterance. Searle, like Austin,
characterises perlocutionary acts as the consequences wrought upon the hearer by the
speech act. This is supported by a later essay (Searle 1989) in which he categorically
divorces the notions of representing an idea and communicating it, but does not have
much bearing on his earlier work.
In terms of illocutionary force and how it might be represented, Searle (1969) asserts
that any “semantic” distinction between types of speech acts should have some kind of
syntactic analogue. He notes that an illocutionary force indicator and the ‘propositional
indicator’ (or clause typer) may be one and the same element, though he does not assume
that a syntactic illocutionary force marker must be present in every sentence, mainly
because because the types of illocutionary force indicator that he identifies are so varied:
from intonation to word order, stress to verb mood (Searle 1969, pp.30-31). It is important
to note that the conflation of illocutionary force and clause-typing has been assumed in
much of the more recent literature: Rizzi (1997) proposes the projection ForceP in the left
periphery of the clause primarily (despite the name ForceP)5 for the purpose of clause-
situation, but the compositional meaning of the utterances made will not have been transmitted to the
non-Anglophone guards.
5It is not clear exactly why ForceP came to be the name for clause-typing position. Rizzi (1997) states
that he uses the label ‘Force’ in keeping with Chomsky (1995). There is only a brief reference to Force
in the latter work which is as follows: “Declarative C is one of the force indicators and therefore must be
present for interpretation at the C-I interface” (Chomsky 1995, p.292). There is no further elaboration
about what a force indicator is. Returning to Rizzi, he basically equates Force with clause type because
he claims that Force and Fin are one projection unless forced to separate by activation of the focus-topic
layer and because the possible Force heads he proposes include categories like relative and comparative. As
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typing, but it has also been and continues to be referred to in the literature as the locus of
illocutionary force because the spell-out of the Force head in the form of a complementiser
in Indo-European languages largely correlates with a lack of independent illocutionary force
(though there are many counterexamples to this). More recent work such as Han (1998)
and Coniglio & Zegrean (2012) challenges this, however, as I will in this dissertation.
Working from the assumption that illocutionary force is syntactically encoded, Searle
suggests that if all illocutionary acts can be reduced to a small number of basic illocu-
tionary types, then “it would [...] seem somewhat more likely that the deep structure of
a sentence would have a simple representation of its illocutionary type”, rather than hav-
ing ‘illocutionary act rules’ of a more conventional type attaching to “some output of the
combinatorial operations of the semantic component” (Searle 1969, p.64). At this point in
his work, Searle lists 8 types of illocutionary act: request, assert, question, thank, advise,
warn, greet, congratulate (Searle 1969, pp.66-67). This is despite recognising that the prin-
ciples of distinction between acts are so various (Searle 1969, p.69) and that one or more
illocutionary acts may be performed through the same utterance, despite the sentence only
encoding at most one illocutionary force indicator6 (Searle 1969, p.70).
Ten years after his 1969 work, Searle produced in 1979 a taxonomy of illocutionary
acts based on a system of principled distinctions and a clearer definition of what consti-
tutes illocutionary force. An illocutionary act breaks down into the illocutionary point,
which contributes to but is not the same as illocutionary force, which is the second element
(Searle 1979, p.3). For Searle, the illocutionary point consists of the discourse participants
involved and how they interact. Illocutionary force “results from several elements”, such
as the strength of the statement, relative position/status of speaker and hearer and dif-
ferences in propositional content such as tense (Searle 1979, pp.3-8). He therefore divides
up illocutionary acts not based on communicative predicates in English, as Austin (1962)
does, but by illocutionary point (Searle 1979, p.27), in part because some verbs are distinct
from each other not in terms of illocutionary point, but other features of the illocutionary
such Rizzi’s conceptualisation of Force is strictly linked to types of clause rather than overall illocutionary
effect of the kind discussed by Searle and other speech act theorists.
6Presumably this applies to cases in which the illocutionary force indicator is not overtly spelled out,
though this is not made clear. This kind of ambiguity, and such ambiguity between illocutionary types can
be avoided, is examined in Woods (2016).
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act. He provides the example of insist versus suggest, which are distinct in terms of the
strength they afford to the same act, i.e. assertion. The criteria for the different categories
in Searle’s taxonomy include the discourse participants are involved, a sincerity condition
which relates to how the proposition is expressed and a directional fit between world and
words. Searle’s categories are therefore as follows:7
Act Formula Description Examples Austin (1962)
Assertives `↓ Belief(p)
“commit the
speaker [. . . ]
to something’s
being the case”
(p.13)
say, state,
assert, in-
sist, boast,
complain
Expositives
(Verdictives)
Directives ! ↑Want(H does A)
“attempts [. . . ]
by the speaker to
get the hearer to
do something”
(p.13)
ask, or-
der, invite,
advise, dare
Exercitives (Be-
habitives)
Commissives C ↑ Intend(S does A)
“commit the
speaker [. . . ]
to some future
course of action”
(p.14)
promise,
vow, pledge
Commissives
(with some ex-
ceptions, e.g.
intend, shall,
favour)
Expressives E∅(P )(S/H and property)
“express [a]
psychological
state about a
state of affairs
specified in the
propositional
content”(p.15)
thank,
condole,
apologize,
deplore,
welcome
Behabitives
Declarations Declaration l ∅(p)
a successful
declaration
“brings about
some alteration
in the status
or condition of
the referred to
object[s]”(p.17)
declare,
promise
(note the
overlap with
assertives;
assertive
declarations
= Da ↓l
Belief(p))
Exercitives, Ex-
positives
Table 2.3: Categories in Searle’s Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts (1979)
Searle succeeds in laying out specific criteria for his classes of illocutionary acts based
7The arrows represent the fit between words and worlds: ↓ represents word-to-world fit, ↑ represents
world-to-word fit, and l represents bidirection word-to-world fit.
30
on aspects of communication independent of lexicon. However, he does not avoid overlap
between the categories, later claiming that assertions are derived from declarations. An
example of the “assertive declarative” he proposes is a cricket umpire’s pronouncement
“You are out”. This is a declaration in that it causes the batsman to be out of the game
(which cannot be logically falsified), but it is also an assertion because the umpire may be
unconsciously mistaken in believing the batsman to be out, for example if the ball did not
actually come off the batsman’s bat, making his statement logically false. In this particular
case, it seems that the assertion (the umpire’s stated belief that the batsman is out, which
may or may not be true) actually gives rise to the declaration (the utterance of specific
words which result in the utterance being unfalsifiable). This problem is compounded
when we consider the formulae Searle proposes. Recall that assertives are formulated as:
(3) `↓ Belief(p)
And declarations as:
(4) D l ∅(p)
Searle proposes the alteration of three factors to achieve an assertive declaration:
(5) Da ↓l Belief(p)
The first change is the addition of the subscript a, which “indicates the illocutionary point
of issuing an assertive with the force of a declaration” (1979, p.20). It is not explained
what “declarative force” is as compared with a declarative illocutionary act; presumably
it is the fact that the addressee takes on a specific role with respect to the speaker. This is
because a successful declaration requires authority from the speaker, such that, taking the
cricket example, an utterance of “You are out!” by a player from the opposing team can
only be an assertion rather than a declaration because only an umpire has the authority
to deem a player “out”. Hence an assertive declaration has declarative force in that the
utterer of an assertive declarative must have authority within the given situation.
What then does it mean for the illocutionary point of this utterance to be assertive,
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yet still classed as a type of declaration? This is represented by the presence of both
word-to-world fit (as in the assertive) and bidirectional word-world fit. However, this is
tautological; the world must already be a particular way for word-to-world fit to apply,
but the l representing the declarative suggests that this is not so. To take up the cricket
example again, the umpire cannot simply declare “You are out” at any time during the
match and make it so - those words must be uttered in response to an event of ‘getting
out’ which has already happened in the world, or more correctly, an event which has
already been perceived as an act of ‘getting out’ by the umpire to have happened in the
world. As such, assertive declaratives are always word-to-world fits. Arguably that is
true of all declaratives, as even those that are referred to as ‘pure’ declaratives such as
“You’re fired”—such utterances tend to be uttered in response to some event in the world.
However, the fact holds that it is the uttering of the words “You’re fired” that make it
so, just like a bride and groom are not married until the words “I declare you husband
and wife” are uttered, even if the rest of the ceremony and festivities have taken place.
Despite the appearance of a bidirectional fit in assertive declarations, these declaratives
are a formal confirmation of what is—a description, and therefore an assertive act—but
with declarative force in the sense that a certain relationship must hold between speaker
and addressee. Therefore, I suggest that these cases are not declarations modified to be
assertives, but assertives which are modified to be declarations.
Given his five groups of illocutionary act, Searle states that “if the distinctions marked
[between the five groups] are of any real significance, they are likely to have various syntac-
tical consequences” (Searle 1979, p.20). However, Searle focuses principally on embedded
cases, basing these syntactic differences on the kinds of complements selected by the perfor-
mative verbs he uses to illustrate the types of illocutionary act. In so doing, he implicitly
adopts a stance similar to Ross (1970) which assumes a silent performative verb above
every uttered sentence. His brief description of the syntactic differences between different
types of act is as follows:
(6) a. Assertive verbs select an S or small clause
b. Directive verbs select an S with a second person subject and periphrastic future
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which is then deleted (following the contemporary theory of Equi NP deletion;
the selection of S)
c. Commissive verbs select an S with a first person subject and periphrastic future
which is then deleted
d. Expressive verbs require transformation of a VP with first or second person
subject into a gerundive
e. Declarative verbs also select S or small clauses or nothing at all, themselves
constituting the entire utterance (e.g. “I resign”)
Apart from the fact that the silent performative verb analysis has fallen out of favour,
Searle’s analysis misses out several salient facts. For a start, questions (either explicitly
performative or otherwise) fall into the category of directives, yet Searle ignores that many
valid directive verbs also select an S, such as ask and enquire. In the case of declarations he
also moves from expressing explicit performative sentences such as “I promise that Henry
will be here next Wednesday” to sentences such as “War is hereby declared”, which is in
the passive voice, complicating the analysis. He also attracts the same criticism as Austin
by relying on the English lexicon and grammar.
Austin and Searle both made important inroads into better understanding how an ut-
terance has layers of meaning and use; Austin argued for a level of meaning between the
proposition and the effect of an utterance on the hearer, while Searle opened up a new ap-
proach to illocutionary force by uncovering the importance of the discourse participants and
their relationship in determining illocutionary force. However, their analyses, particularly
Austin’s, focus more on developing a metalanguage to illustrate these levels of meaning
rather than looking to explain why certain types of illocutionary force are available in lan-
guage while other conceivable possible forces are not. As a result, other philosophers such
as Cohen (1964) and Graham (1977) have rejected the concept of illocution as unhelpful
in philosophy, though the latter suggests that it might yet be a useful linguistic concept.
I will now turn to that field, linguistics, to examine how the concept of speech acts and
illocutionary force have developed when different linguistic data is considered.
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2.3 Linguists on speech acts and representing speech
2.3.1 Ross (1970) and Fillmore (1975)
Influenced in particular by the work of Austin and his proposal that every illocutionary
act contains a performative verb in some form (Austin 1962, p.32), Ross (1970) suggested
that speakers and addressees were covertly represented in syntax, at least in the context of
performative verb constructions. He proposed this to account for a range of phenomena,
most notably cases of reflexive pronouns which are grammatical despite lacking an overt
antecedent, as in the following examples (from Ross 1970):
(7) a. This paper was written by Ann and myself (p.228)
b. As for myself, I won’t be invited (p.232)
Ross also presents evidence from deleted arguments. He claims that in some dialects the
following examples are acceptable and that the dropped arguments implicitly relate to a
first-person discourse participant:
(8) a. Sid is coming w´ıth8 me/us/*you/*him (p.236)
b. A friend of mine/of ours/*of hers is going to drop by (p.238)
Ross presents two possible solutions to this problem. His first solution, based on the
behaviour of performative verbs, is that there is a phonologically null performative verb
above all declarative sentences. The subject of this verb is first-person and the object
second-person (Ross 1970, p.252). This is a purely syntactic solution which does not rely
on semantic or pragmatic principles and which only extends to affirmative declarative
clauses.
(9) I’ll be there = (e.g.) I promise you that I’ll be there.
His second solution, which he terms the ‘pragmatic analysis’, rests on an early interpre-
tation of the syntax-discourse interface. Ross suggests that elements “in the air”, i.e. in
8The accent here represents prosodic emphasis which often occurs in this construction.
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the discourse context, are available antecedents just like any element in the deep structure
(Ross’s terms) and, by extension, relations between these elements “in the air” and those in
the syntax are constrained by the same kind of hierarchical rules which constrain syntactic
relations. Ross suggests that the pragmatic analysis might be preferable to the syntactic
analysis as the former does not have any of the ‘tension’ of the latter in terms of matrix
clauses being technically embedded beneath the covert performative phrase. It is unclear
exactly how Ross conceives of the relationship between the speaker and addressee in this
case; whether a predicate such as promise is one of the elements “in the air” or that some
other more ‘core’ relationship holds.
However, Ross asserts that any elements called upon from the context would have to
be “hierarchically grouped to form a structure which is exactly the same as that of a
normal clause in deep structure” (1970, p.255). Although it would be possible to take
elements from context as antecedents, it might not be possible to order them hierarchically
as would be necessary to ensure the correct antecedent for a syntactic element. Therefore,
an account of this kind could not be purely pragmatic but would have to call upon syntactic
principles to form the necessary hierarchical structure. Though no kind of account was
proposed by Ross or his contemporaries, the Discourse Representation Theory proposed
by Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) to cope with cross-sentential anaphora could be used
to achieve these kinds of aims, if it is assumed that there is still some kind of structured
covert performative, albeit not one that directly embeds the overt utterance.
This was rejected by Fraser (1974), Gazdar (1979), Leech (1983) inter alia for a number
of reasons: not all performative verbs have first-person subjects and second-person objects;
there is no one-to-one mapping between utterances and types of speech act (as highlighted
by Searle (1979)); it is possible to stack performatives, posing further problems for the in-
terpretation of the subordinate clause, in particular deeply embedded subordinate clauses.
It is also unclear how Ross’s hypothesis would apply to acts other than declarative acts,
in particular acts in which the addressee appears to be more prominent than the speaker
such as interrogatives and imperatives, and how it would extend to other languages which
may have different lexical inventories or different ways of structuring speech acts.
Take languages in which the speech act is not determined by the verb, such as Navajo
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(Dine´-Bizaad, Athabaskan). Navajo has a matrix attitude verb nisin, which determines
the attitude holder and the time relative to which the embedded clause is evaluated but
not the kind of attitude that that person holds at that time. Instead, the attitude held,
either an attitude of thinking or one of desiring, is determined by some element in the
embedded clause (Bogal-Allbritten 2016). The kinds of elements which interact with nisin
to specify its meaning include discourse markers (10a), tense markers (10b) and evidential
markers (10c):
(10) a. [Mary
Mary
hooghandi
home.loc
sida´
3subj.be.impf
laanaa]
prt.wishful
nisin
1subj.att.impf
“I wish Mary were at home.” Bogal-Allbritten (2016, p.91)
b. Mary
Mary
[Kii
Kii
’atoo’
stew
yił ’adooyi˛i˛ł]
3obj.3subj.stew.fut
n´ızin
3subj.att.impf
“Mary thinks Kii will eat stew” OR “Mary wants Kii to eat stew”
Bogal-Allbritten (2016, p.161)
c. Kii
Kii
[nahałtin
ArealS.rain.impf
sha’shin]
probably.indir-evid
n´ızin
3subj.att.impf
“Kii thinks it is probably raining”/“Kii thinks it must be raining”
Bogal-Allbritten (2016, p.157)
Moreover, nisin can be interpreted in two ways in the case of coordinated clausal com-
plements. In (11), two separate interpretations for nisin are available for each conjunct
even though it is only represented once.9 Similarly, (12) does not result in a contradiction
because the complement clauses with future marking are ambiguous between attitudes of
thinking and desiring:
(11) Alice
Alice
[Bill
Bill
Kinła´n´ıgo´o´
Flagstaff.to
’´ı´ına´]
3subj.move.perf
do´o´
and
[bich’i
3obj.to
desha´a´ł]
1subj.go.fut
n´ızin.
3subj.att.impf
“Alice thinks Bill moved to Flagstaff and she wants to go see him.”
Bogal-Allbritten (2016, p.145)
9Bogal-Allbritten (2016) shows extensively that the dual interpretation of nisin available in (11) is not
due to a second elided copy of nisin, as gapping and right-node raising structures require that the elided
element has the same interpretation as the overt element.
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(12) Context: Kii is supposed to help his father put up a fence this afternoon. If it
rains, Kii will not have to work. So, Kii wants it to rain. However, Kii looks
outside and see that the sky is clear so he believes it is not going to rain.
[Kii
Kii
[nahodoołti˛i˛ł]
ArealS.rain.fut
n´ızin]
3subj.att.impf
’a´kondi
but
[[doo
neg
nahodoołti˛i˛ł
ArealS.rain.fut
da]
neg
n´ızin].
3subj.att.impf
“Kii wants it to rain but he thinks it won’t.” Bogal-Allbritten (2016, p.170)
Navajo provides evidence that the type of a speech act, or at least, a reported speech act,
is not necessarily determined by a higher predicate, but by elements internal to its own
structure. It is also suggestive that illocutionary force, such that it pertains to the desires
and knowledge of the discourse participants, is not only a pragmatic or lexical notion but
may also be marked syntactically.
Lewis (1970) takes a similar approach to Ross from a philosophy of language standpoint,
though he formulates Ross’s intuitions about a covert performative quite differently. Using
the term “paraphrased performatives”, Lewis suggests that the utterance of a sentence can
be captured by a proposition—and hence a semantic object—of the type “The speaker
tells the addressee P.” He recognises that this is problematic in that it means that P
would be interpreted as true whenever it is uttered by a speaker to an addressee, so to
counter this, he assumes that all types of speech acts other than assertions are paraphrased
performatives (i.e. speech acts without clear-cut truth values). Whilst this might initially
seem undesirable, I will show that a split between assertions and other types of speech act
is apparent across languages. It will also become clear that languages behave differently in
terms of the types of speech acts that they can embed, so Lewis’s intuition can be upheld
to some degree. It is also interesting to consider how the fact of paraphrased performatives
resulting in a semantic object means that there is little to stop them from being embedded,
questioned in their own right, and referred to. Once again this will be shown to hold to
some degree, but, as Krifka (2014) notes, such semantic objects are more restricted in their
distribution than Lewis’s account would predict.
Moving away from the problematic proposal that a covert predicate exists, the concept
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of speakers and addressees as points of reference is considered less contentious and was
made use of by Fillmore (1975) to examine deixis in natural language. Though he focuses
on explicit markers of deixis such as demonstratives, Fillmore notes that linguistic deixis
extends far beyond spatial and temporal reference points to the encoding of personal,
discourse and social relations between the interlocutors, though not all of these points are
necessarily marked in grammar. Fillmore espouses a “mental projectionist” approach in
which the interlocutors essentially project their imaginings of situations onto sentences in
order to make sense of certain (implied) linguistic features (see also Ruthrof (2015) for an
extension of this view). In this way Fillmore proposes a similar, if more extended, view to
that of Ross’s pragmatic proposal; mental representations of interlocutors and discourse
contexts are a crucial part of making sense of utterances in context.
2.3.2 Considering quotation: Partee (1973) and others
Another route taken by linguists interested in the representation of point of view is to
examine different types of quotation and their properties.
Partee (1973a,b) presents early ideas about how a sentence’s syntax and semantics can
differ from other almost identical sentences just on the basis that the former is or is in
part a representation of a speech act. Her (1973a) work focuses on the semantics of verbs
that take clausal complements and she makes a distinction between ‘standard’ verbs of
communication such as say or tell, which take propositions as objects, and ‘manner’ verbs
of communication such as holler or giggle, which take sentential objects (Partee 1973a,
p.327). She distinguishes between the two types of objects by noting that the meaning of
sentential objects comprises not only the combined meaning of the constituent parts, but
also some notion of the form the sentence as it originally appeared. She says;
Linguists have [. . . ] accepted the tenet that the meaning of a sentence should
be a function of the meanings of its parts, and have, I think, tended to construe
that tenet rather narrowly. [. . . ] The interpretivists have been arguing against
such a view, and I think that my arguments to the effect that the object of
believe is a sentence rather than a proposition tend in the same direction. This
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alternative view may perhaps be represented by the tenet that the meaning of
a sentence is a function of the form and the meanings of its parts. (I believe
that the earlier formulation could be read in this way, but sometimes is not.)
Partee (1973a, pp.331-332; original emphasis)
Partee further develops her ideas on the importance of form in her paper on quotation
(1973b); she argues that direct speech reports do not add to the meaning of the overall
sentence through their own meaning, but through their surface form. However, aspects of
the quotation, for example indexicals, can interact with other parts of the ‘host’ sentence,
suggesting that the quote is more than simply a phonological string. Interestingly, direct
speech reports (or parts thereof) can be reduced to little more than dummy speech sounds,
as Rooryck (2001, p.162) and Sudo (2013, p.4) note:10
(13) John said, “I just can’t stand it anymore, it is too much, and blah blah blah.”
(14) John-wa
John-top
“dare-dare-no
who-who-gen
baka-ga
stupid-nom
ki-ta
came-past
to”
quote
itta.
said
‘John said, “The stupid so-and-so came.”’
Rooryck (2001) suggests that (13) is an example of a direct speech report wherein the
speaker is not particularly interested in (re)conveying the exact propositional content of
John’s speech but focuses on what Rooryck calls “John’s longwindedness”. Similarly, in
(14), Sudo notes that wh-doublets such as dare-dare (‘who-who’) are only permitted in
direct speech reports and one of their functions is to express an attitude held by the one of
the attitude holders in the sentence, much like “blah blah blah” in (13). In this case, the
wh-doublet shows that “the attitude holder, John, has a depreciative attitude towards the
embedded subject” (2013, p.4). Devices also exist that can be added to the host clause that
reinforce faithful reproduction of the original speech in the quote, in particular pronominal
‘this’ or manner marker ‘thus’. Neither marker is compatible with indirect speech reports.
Other ways in which sentences marked as direct speech reports differ from other sen-
10Typically, sentences like John-wa Bill-no baka-ga ki-ta to itta (“John said that Bill came”) are ambigu-
ous between interpretations as direct and indirect speech reports. However, (14) can only be interpreted
as a direct speech report precisely because of the presence of dare-dare, according to Sudo (2013, p.4).
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tences or clauses include the use of structures that are not part of the grammar of the
quoter (15) and first-person pronouns that are coindexed with third-person DPs (compare
(16a) and (16b):
(15) Charles said, “I can speak English better than youse all can,” proving that he
could not. Partee (1973b, p.416)
(16) a. [npi The man who is talking to you] commands you: “Give mei/*himi some
money!”
b. [npi The man who is talking to you] commands you to give himi/*mei some
money. Baker (2008, p.127)
Direct speech reports also exhibit an opacity to extraction and semantic binding that is not
found in indirect speech reports (cf. Quine (1960), Fodor (1970), Partee (1973b), Schlenker
(1999) and Oshima (2006) inter alia), as illustrated in (17)-(21) adapted from Sudo (2013,
pp.1-2).
(17) Long-distance wh-movement
a. *Whati did Dave say “Mary should have read t i?”
b. Whati did Dave say that Mary should have t i?
(18) Long-distance NPI licensing
a. *John did not say “Bill ever committed a crime.”
b. John did not say that Bill ever committed a crime.
(19) Long-distance semantic binding
a. *John told nobody’si mother “Mary likes himi.”
b. John told nobody’si mother that Mary likes himi
(20) De re readings
a. #John told me “The man drinking a martini is a beautiful woman.”
b. John told me that the man drinking a martini is a beautiful woman.
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(21) Dependent plurals
a. #The first-years’i tutors all said “Theyi are the smartest student.”
b. The first-years’i tutors all said that theyi are the smartest student.
Based on these facts, it is clear that direct speech reports stand in an interesting position
with regards to their host clause: they are opaque to most syntactic and semantic opera-
tions, yet the quotation or parts thereof can serve as antecedents for pronouns in the host
clause; they need not be faithful reproductions of the propositional content of the original
utterances but may be forced to be so by elements in the host clause; it is expected that the
form of the quotation is a (more-or-less) faithful re-presentation of the original utterance
in terms of indexicality and voice, though quotations alone license dummy speech elements
such as “blah blah” and wh-doublets of the kind found in Japanese. While direct speech
reports are root-like, they still differ from true root sentences in terms of being defined as
both uttered by the original and by a reporting speaker. Moreover, the precise nature of the
syntactic relationship between speech reports and host clauses remains unclear. Finally, as
Partee (1973a) shows, it is not a clear distinction between direct speech reports on the one
hand and indirect speech reports on the other; there is variation in both, suggesting that
indirect speech reports are not limited to propositional content out of hand, and that there
may be a role played by different types of matrix predicate in determining the extent to
which the original speaker’s expression and the form of the original speech may be repre-
sented without resorting to direct speech reports and the restrictions they entail. However,
Partee does not discuss the structural implications of her proposals, despite appearing to
imply that indirect speech reports that express something of the form of the original are
in some way structurally larger (Partee 1973a, p.335).
2.3.3 Returning to Ross? Banfield (1982) and Giorgi (2010)
The question of the structure of reported speech, in particular the idea that sentences are
actually dominated by some projection relating to the point of view (PoV) expressed, re-
emerges in the work of Banfield (1982). Banfield claims that there is a projection above the
sentence that she labels the E(xpressive) projection, and that this projection permits the
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adjunction of exclamations, topicalisation and PP imperatives such as off with her head.
She claims that the E projection is exclusively available in root and direct speech contexts
as it reproduces expression rather than just propositional content (Banfield 1982, p.41).
The E projection is also responsible for the assignment of first-person PoV and temporal
deixis, hence indirect speech reports that have no E cannot introduce speaker-oriented
elements and any indexicals contained within the report must be evaluated with respect
to the PoV of the E projection rather than the matrix clause arguments (Banfield 1982,
pp.56-57).
Banfield also examines the literary phenomenon of Free Indirect Discourse (FID) in
which the speaker is absent, so the E-layer must orient to the self, i.e. the internal PoV
of the character narrating the story. Banfield notes that while FID is similar to direct
speech in that the speaker of the utterance is not the PoV of the E in FID, there are many
similarities between FID and indirect speech, particularly in terms of the kinds of elements
and grammatical markers that are blocked in both FID and indirect speech. For example,
she argues that in (22a), the illocutionary adverb honestly is not readily interpretable with
a third-person PoV despite the literary character superseding the writer. In contrast, the
epistemic adverb in (22b) is interpretable with a third-person (literary character) PoV
(examples from Banfield 1982, p.117):
(22) a. Honestly, she was so pleased to see him - delighted!
b. Certainly, she was so pleased to see him - delighted!
This contrast between first- and third-person selves is related to Banfield’s conceptualisa-
tion of direct and indirect quotation. To use direct quotation, she says, “is to ‘donner la
parole’ to the original speaker”, hence the first person is used. Indirect speech, however,
represents only the content of the speech and not the way in which it has been delivered
(Banfield 1982, p.62). Like FID, indirect speech is expressed in the third person. FID also
lacks imperatives (Banfield attributes this to the lack of an underlying ‘you’ or addressee),
and forms of direct address such as vocatives (Banfield 1982, pp.113-114). FID differs from
indirect speech in that the first-person is completely absent as it is incompatible with a
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third-person ‘self’ of the kind represented in the E projection of FID.
I will show in this dissertation that Banfield’s insights, while both useful and pioneering
with respect to understanding FID, are not quite precise enough. Firstly, there’s an element
of stipulation about the proposal because it is not clear why the E projection cannot be
embedded other than because embedded clauses differ from root clauses. Secondly, Giorgi
(2010) highlights that the matrix subject’s perspective is not only syntactically represented
but interacts with the speaker’s perspective, and I will show that there are constructions
that are clearly embedded yet still permit direct speech-like elements such as speech act
adverbs, topicalisation and imperatives. A range of data in chapters 3, 4 and 5 show that
the divorce between ‘speaker’ and ‘self’ applies to more contexts than just FID (cf. also
Broadwell (1991)).
A much later assessment of FID was made by Giorgi (2010), who, like Banfield, analyses
the mode as a divorce between the speaker and the self or PoV being communicated. Giorgi
demonstrates that the the temporal coordinates of the speaker are contained on C, the
leftmost projection in the sentence, allowing a bidirectional relationship to hold between
syntax and pragmatics. The availability of both speaker and subject perspectives allow for
double access readings of sentences such as (23):
(23) John said that Mary is pregnant.
= Mary is pregnant at the time John spoke
= Mary is pregnant at the time of this utterance
Double access readings are not allowed in all languages—Chinese, Japanese and Russian
do not have double access readings—but only in those languages in which, Giorgi claims,
the speaker’s temporal coordinates are present in the syntax. This allows the present tense
event to be evaluated twice: according to the coordinates of the matrix subject and those
of the speaker.
Furthermore, even though past tense morphology in the matrix clause marks informa-
tion about the speaker’s location in time, it can be used to represent a future event relative
to the speaker when in the embedded clause, given the coordinates of the matrix clause:
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(24) Context: Uttered on Friday
Maria will say on Sunday that Mario was here on Saturday
Even though the event of Mario being here is a future event for the utterer of (24), the
past tense is used to express the event because it is in the past relative to the matrix
subject Maria, the temporal coordinate on T being determined by the matrix subject.
Following Giorgi & Pianesi (2001, 2004), she claims that speaker and subject must share
responsibility for the content expressed in an embedded clause, hence grammars cannot
permit purely indexical (i.e. speaker-oriented) temporal reference in embedded contexts.
However, in languages in which double access readings are available, such as English and
Italian, the speaker’s coordinate can be reset to the subject’s temporal location, in order
to achieve the availability of past tense morphology in sentences like (24) even though the
utterance event precedes the embedded event: the event is still evaluated twice but only
with respect to the matrix subject. Subsequently, (23) can also be read with respect to the
matrix subject alone, as a reading is available in which Mary is not pregnant at the time of
the utterance, but was when John spoke. Giorgi does not propose a definitive explanation
for how the speaker coordinate is reset, but suggests that there is some kind of link to
counterfactuality, given that temporal coordinates are reset in cases in which the event in
the embedded clause has not yet happened or no longer holds.
With respect to FID, Giorgi also proposes a shift from speaker coordinates to subject
coordinates, but of a slightly different kind; instead of equating the speaker’s position
with the subject’s, in FID the subject is promoted to speaker. This does not affect the
indexicality of the pronouns in FID; in fact, third-person pronouns here signal the divorce
between the speaker and the PoV being communicated. Giorgi notes that all first-person
pronouns identify speakers, but the reverse does not necessarily hold (Giorgi 2010, p.190).
She further claims that “[i]t looks like they [third-person pronouns in FID, RW] cease to be
real indexicals, in that the context that is relevant for their interpretation is not provided by
the actual utterance event, but by the literary created context” (Giorgi 2010, p.191, original
emphasis). Moreover, the necessary use of past tense in FID highlights dependencies
between the availability of the speaker’s coordinates and certain morphosyntactic features
44
such as present tense marking. Giorgi follows Banfield in proposing that FID clauses are
not embedded under a matrix clause oriented to the speaker, but that they are subordinate
to an “informational layer” that triggers a shift from speaker to subject PoV (Giorgi 2010,
p.210). Once more the mechanism of this is left unexplained.
To summarise, Giorgi claims that the speaker is abstractly represented as a bundle of
features on C, of which she focuses on the temporal feature. This feature (or its absence)
conditions the kinds of tense morphology and temporal indexicals that may appear in
embedded clauses and the kinds of interpretation a given sentence can have. Moreover, this
feature can be shifted in certain contexts, which has the effect of limiting the availability
of certain types of morphological marking. Hence, variability in intrasentential syntax is
evidence that a syntactic representation of the speaker is present.
Finally, a similar kind of proposal that addresses not temporal but relational deixis in
the CP is that of Tsoulas & Kural (1999). Tsoulas and Kural, motivated by the obser-
vation that the reference of indexicals shifts according to the utterance context, propose
that indexical pronouns are bound variables. Not all indexicals shift; Tsoulas and Kural
identify ‘I’, ‘you’ and temporal expressions such as ‘now’ or ‘today’ as examples of indexi-
cals that shift, in contrast with third-person pronouns and deictic expressions such as ‘that
day’, whose reference does not change. They propose that the reference of shifting indexi-
cals is established through an operator-variable relationship between (for example) covert
speaker and addressee operators and first- and second-person pronouns as variables.
They show that high adverbs take scope over variables to give a generic reading, which
shows that indexicals do not refer directly in the same way that names do. Furthermore,
the presence of covert speakers and addressees can account for PoV phenomena on re-
lational nouns; for example in the sentence “Sue saw Mom at the airport”, ‘Mom’ can only
refer to the mother of the speaker (and possibly addressee, if speaker and addressee are
siblings), but it cannot refer to Sue’s mother (Tsoulas & Kural 1999, p.555). It must there-
fore be bound by a representation of the speaker (and addressee), such as the operators
proposed by Tsoulas and Kural.
Tsoulas and Kural note that these operators will be syntactically represented above
matrix CP, though they are not explicit about where or how they fit into the structure.
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They also do not state whether the operators are always present or whether they only
occur in certain types of sentences.
2.3.4 Speech acts in syntax: the revival
Although scholars like Banfield and Giorgi propose some abstract representation of speak-
ers in the syntax, Ross’s (1970) ideas re-entered mainstream linguistic thinking through
the work of Speas & Tenny (2003). Speas and Tenny envisage a syntactic representation
of speaker and addressee operators motivated by a desire to bring together the intuition
that discourse participants are required in the syntax with established restrictions on the
role of pragmatic forces within grammar. The syntactic representations of the participants
and the utterance are related via a speech act head, which is a kind of three-place predi-
cate. As justification for a hierarchically-organised representation of discourse participants
they present indexical-shift phenomena in languages such as Slave´ (Athabaskan) and overt
representations of speakers and addressees such as the overt addressee pronoun in Mupun
(West Chadic, Frajzyngier (1985)). Although they refute Ross’s idea that certain speech
acts are tied to certain clause types on the basis that illocutionary force and clause type
are not in a one-to-one relationship, they propose that speakers and addressees stand in a
different hierarchical relationship to each other in interrogative as opposed to declarative
sentences.
The structure they propose to introduce speaker and addressee into syntax makes use
of Cinque’s (1999) MoodSpeechAct projection. This projection is supposed to be overt in any
language that contains overt clause typing such as interrogative morphemes and sentence
particles (Speas & Tenny 2003, p.317). They propose that the head of MoodSpeechActP
selects for three arguments, namely the speaker as external argument, with the addressee
and utterance context as objects in an extended Speech Act shell structure. They
state that the roles associated with these objects are not primitive, but are defined by their
structural position. The structure for a declarative clause is illustrated in (25), with the
structure for an interrogative clause in (26).11
11Note that, according to Speas & Tenny, the CP is introduced lower in the structure, beneath Evalua-
tiveP and EvidentialP.
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(25) sap
speaker sa
sa SAP
utterance context SA
SA hearer
(26) sap
speaker sa
sa SAP
hearer SA
utterance context SA
SA thearer
According to (26), in the interrogative clause, the hearer is moved to a higher position in the
tree analogous to dative movement of the indirect object in double-object ditransitives. The
result of these differing structures is that the hearer is more prominent than the speaker in
interrogatives. Their motivation for this is that the addressee must be the nearest argument
to the rest of the clause in order to bind elements that orient to the discourse participants,
which “flip” in interrogatives. An example of interrogative flip is the case of adverbs that
orient to the speaker in declarative sentences but to the addressee in questions:
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(27) a. Seriouslyspeaker, I love playing rugby.
b. Seriouslyaddressee, do you love playing rugby?
This proposal, whilst sparking a large body of recent literature, has also been subject to
considerable criticism. Ga¨rtner & Steinbach (2006) examine the proposal from the point
of view both of minimalist assumptions and older work on speech act theory. They note
the following points (amongst others):
(28) a. Simpler, non-shell structures are discarded early on without discussion and
reasons for this are not clear;
b. It is not clear what motivates the dative-like movement necessary to derive
the interrogative from the declarative structure;
c. Speech act theory has not converged on a satisfactory classification of speech
acts: is the postulation of an SA head therefore enough to explain the variation
between different types of speech act?
d. The concepts of speaker, hearer and message are conceptual necessities for
communication anyway: why should they lie within narrow syntax?
e. Possible conceptual problems if the SA head is required to be responsible
both for feature checking (expression of illocutionary force) and separate li-
censing of overt morphology (on evidentials, pronouns or other items). This
is uncommon in contemporary syntactic theory;
f. Furthermore, the hearer argument does not c-command the utterance
context in declaratives, meaning that it cannot bind any variables contained
within the utterance context, suggesting that second-person pronouns
will be uninterpretable in declaratives.
Further to this, if this conceptualisation of speech act participants as a three-place predicate
is to hold, we might expect that the hearer will be the goal, and so the higher of the
two objects in the structure, with the utterance context as the theme (cf. Bruening
(2010)), but this is only the case in the interrogative structure and not in the declarative
structure.
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In short the criticisms against Speas and Tenny’s ideas focus on the complexity of the
structure and the motivation for promotion of items within it, as well as questions over
how it actually interacts with the main clause below it. However, Speas and Tenny’s work
highlights data that suggests that some contextual factors do have syntactic reflexes, and
as such should be accounted for in narrow syntax. Furthermore, they were the first to
constrain possible classifications of speech act types in syntax according to configurational
factors, and extended Ross’s work away from simple declarative performative sentences.
Since 2003, there has been a persistent body of work focusing on illocutionary force
that has built on the advances made by Speas and Tenny. This work has concentrated on
simplifying the structure in accordance with the rules and restrictions present in narrow
syntax, as well as looking to identify overt realisations of the proposed SA head. Un-
surprisingly, the efforts of different scholars and their differing priorities have resulted in
a proliferation of similar but subtly diverging structures and claims about the potential
power of the SA structure. These newer conceptualisations are discussed in two groups
below: firstly, those conceptualisations that look to determine the identity of the speech
act head(s), and secondly, those that develop the details of interaction between the speech
act phrase and the clause.
2.3.4.1 Discourse particles as speech act heads
The most fruitful lines of enquiry with regards to the identity of the speech act head have
involved analyses of discourse particles in a range of Indo-European languages.
Hill (2007) examines the behaviour of sentence-initial particles in Romanian such as hai
(‘come on’). Rejecting the traditional analyses of such particles as interjections separate
from the clausal spine, Hill shows that hai has a much more restricted distribution, that
it only seems to be available in certain clause types and that it interacts structurally with
exclamative and vocative DPs. It also inflects, suggesting that it is in some respect a verbal
element with the ability to select arguments, but it does not match the criteria necessary
for classification as a lexical or an auxiliary verb. Consequently, Hill proposes that such
particles that interact with certain clause types are the head of the SA projection, which
projects a shell-like structure to accommodate all three arguments (speaker, hearer and
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then the utterance in ForceP). The structure she proposes is as follows:
(29) SAP
RoleP
speaker
SA’
SA
hai
SAP
RoleP
hearer
SA’
SA
thai
ForceP
. . .
The reader will note that it is minimally different from the structure proposed by Speas
& Tenny (2003): the utterance context of Speas and Tenny has been jettisoned for
direct selection of the utterance by the speech act head and there is no movement of
the arguments, though there is upwards movement of SA analogous to V-v movement in
the verbal complex. Hill also elaborates upon the syntactic identity of the arguments,
proposing that they occupy some DP-like RoleP.
Haegeman (2014) takes a similar route in her work on discourse particles in West
Flemish. She also examines their distribution with respect to vocatives and their po-
sitioning within the sentence, as she works with both sentence-initial and sentence-final
particles. Her analysis differs from Hill’s in that she proposes that multiple SAPs are pos-
sible. This permits the inclusion of particles with different interpretations within the tree.
She suggests that the higher SAP establishes discourse relations between speaker and ad-
dressee, whereas the lower SAP “consolidates” and reaffirms pre-existing speaker-addressee
relations (Haegeman 2014, p.135). Furthermore, she suggests that representation of the
speaker is not automatically given, in particular in the cases in which standardly clause-
initial discourse particles appear in final position. Haegeman suggests that these particles
are in some sense unaccusative, that they do not allow an external argument and hence
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the utterance itself is promoted into the (empty) specifier of the highest SAP. Haegeman’s
structure therefore differs from Hill’s as shown in (30).
(30) PartP
Spec Part’
Part
ne´
PartP
VocDP Part’
Part
ne´
CP
Haegeman and Hill both focus on verb-based particles that are distributed in a restricted
manner, both with regards to the main clause and with regards to other peripheral ma-
terial that identifies the addressee, namely vocative DPs. It is not clear, however, that
Haegeman’s (2014) work sheds much light on interactions between discourse particles and
syntax of the main clause rather than just representing relationships between discourse
participants that are ostensibly interpretable based on context alone. As this dissertation
will show, however, there are more directly grammar and clause-related phenomena that
can shed more light on the nature of the relationship between a proposed speech act head
and the interpretation of the main clause itself.
A similar proposal has also been developed by Martina Wiltschko and colleagues in a
series of works (Lam 2014, Wiltschko et al. 2015, Wiltschko 2015, to appear). Wiltschko
and colleagues claim that there are three separate projections in a speech act layer that
is the interface between the syntax of an individual utterance and the discourse. Their
primary motivation, like Haegeman (2014) is to distinguish between different meanings
of homophonous particles and to determine ordering restrictions between particles. They
conclude that the three projections in the speech act phrase above ForceP are as follows:
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(31) Call on
Addressee
prt Ground
Addressee
prt Ground
Speaker
prt ForceP
Force TP
. . .
Wiltschko et al. (2015)
The Call on Addressee layer is the topmost layer and particles merged here express a
request for a response from the addressee. This is a point of divergence from Haegeman’s
work on West Flemish that Wiltschko and colleagues support using the early stages of
experimental evidence from Canadian English (Wiltschko et al. 2015). The next layer, the
Ground, is split into two. The Addressee layer is the point of merge for particles that ex-
press something about the Addressee’s state of knowledge with respect to the clause. The
Speaker layer is closer to the clause and expresses something about the Speaker’s state
of knowledge with respect to the clause. The ordering of Addressee and Speaker here is
different from the approach taken by Haegeman & Hill (2013) and derives both from the
ordering of particles (cf. Lam (2014) for Cantonese) and the intuition that the speaker is
somehow closer to the utterance she makes than the addressee (M. Wiltschko, p.c.). Note
also that, unlike in Speas & Tenny (2003), Haegeman & Hill (2013) and related works,
Wiltschko and colleagues do not suggest that the discourse participants are represented
as referential DPs in the structure, but are represented at a rather more abstract level
in terms of their belief sets. They also build on earlier work by examining which parts
of the articulated speech act layer might be available in embedded contexts; given the
unavailability of Call on Addressee particles in embedded clauses—they obligatorily scope
over the matrix clause—it is thought that this layer is unembeddable (S. Thoma, p.c.).
Other scholars such as Zu (2013) have explicitly linked the lack of allocutive agreement in
embedded clauses in Basque and Jingpo to the lack of specific speaker and addressee
projections in embedded clauses; claiming that the full SAP itself is a root phenomenon.
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Yet others, like Miyagawa (2012), attribute the availability of SAP in embedded clauses to
selection phenomena; in Japanese, nonfactive verbs that embed the nonfactive complemen-
tiser to and express a genuine speech act (as opposed to a mental state) select for SAPs
rather than ‘plain’ CPs.
Although arguments for SAP based on discourse particles show the importance of
representing PoV in language and the recent experiment-based claims by Wiltschko and
colleagues show ever more refined conceptualisations of the function of discourse particles,
it is still unclear to what extent this kind of evidence sheds light on the relationship
between putative representations of discourse participants and core syntax. While all these
authors argue convincingly that discourse particles are part of everyday natural speech,
they are so heavily dependent on context that they do not clearly illustrate the nature of
the representation of speakers and addressees, nor how these representations vary or stay
stable crosslinguistically.
2.3.4.2 Speech act projections: part of the clause
With regards to the extent to which the syntactic representations of speaker and hearer
impact on syntactic phenomena in the main clause, opinion varies across scholars and
across languages.
Miyagawa (2012) follows closely in Speas and Tenny’s footsteps by proposing a syntactic
relation between the representation of the hearer and nominal agreement. He examines
allocutive agreement in Basque and honorific agreement in Japanese and claims that the
syntactically represented addressee is the antecedent for this agreement. To do this he
adopts Hill’s (2007) SAP structure in which both the speaker and the hearer c-command
the utterance, and proposes that the allocutive probe on C (as already determined by
Oyharc¸abal (1993)) moves up through the speech act heads to c-command its goal, the
hearer. Moreover, by c-commanding everything in the structure other than the speaker,
Miyagawa claims that the allocutive probe (which determines the verbal morphology) also
has access to the correct information about the relationship between the speaker and hearer
with respect to politeness, though it is not explained exactly how this is so. Miyagawa
goes on to draw parallels between Basque allocutive agreement and Japanese politeness
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agreement in order to show that the SAP as he conceives of it can in principle be embedded.
However, it can only be embedded in very restricted situations, specifically only under
Hooper and Thompson’s (1973) Class A verbs, which includes verbs such as say and tell.
Miyagawa notes that typical analyses of “root” phenomena such as topic-marking claim
that they are also available under Class B verbs such as think and suppose and under
Class E semifactive verbs such as realise, but that his analysis shows a split between true
root phenomena (such as politeness marking) and phenomena that are merely restricted
in embedded contexts (such as topic-marking). Whilst the details of Miyagawa’s analysis
may be up for debate, and the mechanisms not entirely clear, his observation that analyses
of root phenomena have depended on somewhat circular logic is an important one that
will be further examined in this dissertation.
Leaving root phenomena behind, Sundaresan (2012) focuses on truly intrasentential
interpretive phenomena, specifically the orientation of the anaphor taan in Tamil. Taan
can be analysed either as referring to the subject of a main clause or to the subject of a
directly superordinate clause that contains a speech verb selecting the taan clause. An
example is shown in (32).
(32) Seethai
Seetha.nom
[CP Mayaj
Maya.nom
[CP taani,j
self.nom
kiíambiraaíu˘nnu˘]
leave.pres.3-fem-sg.comp
sonnaaíu˘nnu˘]
say.pst.3-fem-sg.comp
nenettaaí.
think.pst.3-fem-sg
“Seethai thought that Mayaj said that shei,j was leaving.”
Sundaresan (2012, p.232)
Sundaresan specifically examines the nature of the arguments projected in SAP. She pro-
poses that SAP selects only for two arguments; one representing the point of view (PoV)
in SpecSAP and the other being the utterance. She proposes that the PoV argument is a
deficient DP denoting a variable that has no φ features. As such this argument in SpecSAP
cannot interact directly with the anaphor taan itself, but interacts with a Persp(ective)P
above taan that contains a pronoun responsible for binding taan. Without entering into
the specifics of Sundaresan’s analysis with regards to PerspP, she argues that only the
discourse participant who provides the PoV for the utterance should be syntactically rep-
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resented. She does not explore the availability of SAP or its structure in any other types of
clause. It appears that the greatly impoverished nature of the external argument of SAP
proposed by Sundaresan exists in order to avoid the problem of why this argument is not
overtly spelled out and why it does not interfere with the determination of phi-features on
indexical pronouns in the clause SAP c-commands. However, this leaves questions over how
the argument in SpecSAP is coreferenced with any other argument; moreover, independent
motivation for the PerspP structure above the anaphor is unclear.
2.4 Root phenomena and illocutionary force
Another aspect of the discussion about discourse participants and their role in syntax
revolves around the expression of speakers’ emotions and discourse aims. This relates
to the earlier discussion about quotation insofar as the presence of expressive material
seems to be blocked from embedded clauses and as such is only oriented to an entity other
than the speaker when found in a quoted clause. However, there exists a long tradition
of scholarship into the status of embedded root clauses that seems to feature expressive
elements in embedded contexts, which leads to the ever tricky question of the nature of
illocutionary force.
2.4.1 Hooper and Thompson (1973)
Building on Emonds’s (1969) work on root transformations, Hooper & Thompson (1973)
show that a range of syntactic structures claimed to be unavailable in embedded contexts
were in fact possible, but their distribution was restricted. These structures include neg-
ative preposing, VP preposing, locative inversion, topicalisation, adverb dislocation and
tag questions amongst many others. Hooper and Thompson noted that these structures
with restricted distribution are characteristic of a certain kind of sentential force or empha-
sis more generally, subsequently proposing that the restrictions on the syntactic structures
listed above are determined by a semantic notion of assertion. This is because the discourse
effects associated with these syntactic structures, for example emphasis, are incompatible
with clauses that are not asserted such as as presupposed, imperative or interrogative
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clauses.
Hooper and Thompson define assertion as follows:
The assertion of a sentence is its core meaning or main proposition. [. . . ] The
assertion of a sentence may be identified as that part which can be negated
or questions by the usual application of the processes of negation and inter-
rogation. It is usually assumed that all assertions are speaker assertions [. . . ],
however, [. . . ] some embedded statements have the characteristics of assertions.
Hooper & Thompson (1973, p.473)
The original formulation of assertion by Hooper and Thompson, therefore, does not
mention illocutionary force, although the term was already in use in philosophy. They
link assertion to declarative clause types and appear to set assertion against questions,
conditionals and exclamations in their conclusion, though they do not explicitly rule out
the possibility of assertion in other types of clause.
The next stage of their work consists of dividing verbs that take that-clauses as com-
plements into five classes. These classes are defined as follows, with a few examples in each
category for illustrative purposes:
A (nonfactive) B (nonfactive) C (nonfactive) D (factive) E ((semi)factive)
say suppose be (un)likely resent realise
report believe doubt regret find out
exclaim think deny be sorry discover
claim imagine be (im)possible be surprised know
Table 2.4: Hooper and Thompson’s (1973) classes of verbs
Hooper and Thompson show that there are syntactic and semantic correlations between
the types of verbs that allow Emonds’s root transformations, the notion of assertion, and
verbs that are compatible with complement preposing. In brief, verbs from classes A, B
and E permit (most) root syntactic structures12 and the presence of two readings (asserted
and non-asserted) in the case of the semifactives in class E.
12Some variation is present. For example, tag questions depend on whether the verbs themselves consti-
tute an assertion—Hooper and Thompson claim that class A verbs do, blocking tag questions, but class B
verbs do not.
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Hooper and Thompson are careful to show that presupposition and assertion do not
form a binary distinction; a non-presupposed clause is not automatically asserted. Their
entire piece is careful in its consideration of each root phenomenon across the five classes
of verbs and they are perhaps not guilty of the mistake made by many scholars following in
their footsteps of treating the concept of “embedded root phenomena” as a homogeneous
group of structures. However, some of their argumentation is circular as noted by Green
(1976); assertion is defined in some cases as the availability of a given root phenomenon
when the former is supposed to predict the latter. Moreover, their work leaves a lot of
questions open: what is the nature of assertion, particularly in respect to clause type and
illocutionary force? Is factivity the most useful notion to use to distinguish between the
five verb classes, or indeed any linguistic behaviour? And is assertion (and hence root
phenomena) always and solely speaker-related?
2.4.2 Splitting hairs? Split CP hypotheses and splitting Force from Type
The body of work on embedded verb second (EV2) in the Germanic languages has proved
a particularly productive field of enquiry that has both raised and tried to answer the kinds
of questions listed above. I will not go into great detail about this background on this here,
as the list of references is long, there already exist comprehensive reviews of the literature
(in particular Heycock (2006)) and the construction will be more closely examined in this
dissertation. A dedicated effort was made in the 1990s to reduce EV2 to a syntactic
phenomenon as no single semantic concept seemed to accurately predict its distribution
(Vikner 1995), resulting in a variety of scholars proposing split CP structures to account
for both Germanic EV2 (cf. Iatridou & Kroch (1992), inter alia) and cases of embedded
subject-auxiliary inversion (McCloskey 2006). However, it is impossible to ignore the fact
that EV2 and similar phenomena cannot be reduced to a matter of syntactic selection.
The exact conditions governing EV2 patterns remain elusive and many approaches rely on
concepts such as assertion, presupposition and factivity, as in works by Wechsler (1991),
Holmberg & Platzack (1995), Julien (2009, 2015) to name just a few. These kinds of
accounts are under pressure given work by Wiklund et al. (2009), Wiklund (2010) and
Heycock et al. (2012) that shows that semifactive predicates are not as resistant to EV2 as
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was initially proposed. However, with the advent of a refocusing of scholarship on clause
types towards to the question of illocutionary force, a new approach (with its own new
problems) is emerging to try to make sense of concepts like assertion in an independent,
principled way that takes into account both syntactic and semantic concerns.
Green (1976) foresaw this line of scholarship when, in answer to Hooper and Thomp-
son’s work, she noted that some root transformations were available under performative
verbs such as bet, promise and predict. This observation weakened the argument that asser-
tion as defined by Hooper and Thompson was the key predictor of the distribution of root
phenomena. Green proposed a pragmatic explanation for root phenomena according to
which they are licensed “just in case the proposition they affect, and therefore emphasize,
is one which the speaker supports” (Green 1976, p.386) amongst other factors. In work by
Han (1998) and a number of scholars based in Georgetown (Zanuttini & Portner 2003, Port-
ner 2004, Pak et al. 2004, Zanuttini 2008) the question of what it means for a clause to have
a certain type of force is raised. Han and many later scholars, based on Chomsky (1995),
believe that force is syntactically encoded where the Georgetown researchers believe force
to be the cumulative result of a number of syntactic and semantic features being present,
but despite taking different stances on the problem, all these scholars bring the concept
of speaker and addressee commitments and discourse effects familiar from Searle (1969,
1979) into play. In particular Portner’s (2004) characterisation of clause types as marking
different basic sentential forces shows how semantic and philosophical ideas combine to
relate to the syntactic concept of clause type:
Type Denotation Discourse Component Force
Declaratives proposition (p) Common Ground
Set of propositions
Assertion
CG ∪ p
Interrogatives set of propositions (q) Question Set
Set of sets of
propositions
Asking
QS ∪ q
Imperatives property (P) To-do List
Function from
individuals to sets
of properties
RequiringA
TdL(A) ∪ P
Table 2.5: Clause types and basic force (Portner 2004, p.238)
58
One strong argument for the Georgetown point of view and potentially against a syn-
tactic representation of force in C is the fact that embedded clauses seem to lose their
force. At this point we see a distinction between clause type and force, because clauses are
still obviously typed despite being embedded. Han (1998) argues that force is a syntactic
phenomenon and a root phenomenon, hence certain clause types that are more closely
tied to illocutionary force cannot be embedded even if their meaning of demanding or
commanding can be expressed in other ways. Han’s particular clause type of interest is
imperatives, whose meaning can also be expressed through the embedding of subjunctives
or finite clauses containing deontic modality. In suggesting that certain types of embedded
clause are not specified for illocutionary force, Han claims that forceless root clauses are
also possible, though she does not mention specifically what forceless root clauses would
look like, nor the implications of this apparent optionality of force on the encoding of force
and clause type in grammar. Other syntactic accounts for the lack of force in embedded
clauses centre on the idea of ‘weak’ features on C, though again the details of the nature
of such features is usually left vague.
Those who argue for a syntactic encoding of force recognise the need to explain the close
relationship between force and clause type, resulting in analyses such as that by Coniglio
& Zegrean (2012). With the aim of accounting for the distribution of discourse particles
in German, Italian and Romanian, which encode a specific type of force while combining
with a restricted range of clause types, Coniglio & Zegrean (2012) follow Roussou (2000,
p.79), who advocates three C projections, and Haegeman (2006) by arguing that the C
head should be split into separate force and clause type heads. Although the discourse
particles they examine can be left out without affecting the grammaticality of the utterance,
they show clear interaction with clause typing and tense, even carrying person marking in
Romanian. They envisage the splitting of duties between the two heads as follows: while
the clause type head interacts with finiteness, the illocutionary force head encodes the
speaker’s intentions with respect to the discourse.
While Coniglio and Zegrean’s ideas seem a neat way of accounting for the distribution of
discourse particles that cross-cut distinctions between clause types, some problems remain.
In particular the circularity of the argument that illocutionary force markers are only
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available in clauses with illocutionary force is repeated, without making it any clear what
it means for a clause to have illocutionary force, or indeed how it is marked other than on
this (covert) head.
And so we arrive at a similar state of affairs as that arrived at in the previous subsection:
what it means for a clause to have force is an open question, definitions of root phenomena
are difficult to separate from their own behaviour, and our understanding of how all of this
links to discourse concepts is in constant flux.
2.4.3 Taking responsibility: Krifka (2014)
With the aim of clarifying the first two of the above points, Krifka (2014) takes a semantic
approach to the meaning of illocutionary force. Building on work by Szabolcsi (1982) in
which she proposes that illocutionary acts trigger a change in the world in which they are
performed, Krifka proposes that illocutionary force centres on responsibility: specifically,
that the illocutionary force of an assertion is the fact that the speaker is seen to take
responsibility for the truth of the proposition in that assertion. The fact of the speaker’s
taking responsibility for the truth of the predicate is not something which is evaluable at
a given time in a given world, but is instead a change in the world13 both alongside and
independently of the addition of the proposition to the common ground shared by the
discourse participants.14 Crucially, Krifka makes the same kind of distinction as Austin
between the intentions of the speaker and the effect of the hearer. Krifka shows that while
the speaker must take responsibility for an assertion,15 speaker’s belief of the proposition
is not key (hence we have lies and bullshit) and the acceptance of that assertion by the
13This change in the world could be conceived of as a change in a Stalnakerian common ground, though
Krifka does not explicitly say this.
14Note that I will follow Clark & Schaefer (1989), Clark (1992), Ginzburg (1996) and Farkas & Bruce
(2010) throughout this dissertation in assuming that an expressed proposition is not automatically added
to the common ground, but will only be added if the addressee accepts it.
This way of thinking, according to which an assertion is not an addition to but a proposal to update
the common ground, was not explicitly part of Stalnaker’s conceptualisation of the common ground, but
has been made explicit and discussed by the aforementioned scholars since. However, the addition of the
speaker’s taking responsibility for the proposition to the common ground is non-negotiable. This is a
refinement of the suggestion Stalnaker made that the proposition “speaker said p” is added to the common
ground whenever a proposition p is made. More than just the event of saying p is registered, namely the
responsibility that the speaker takes for p in the course of the event of saying p.
15Krifka also shows that speaker belief and evidence are not really an essential part of making an assertion,
due to the fact that lies (false assertions) and bullshit (assertions based on little to no evidence) are still
assertions (Krifka 2014, p.65).
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addressee is not a necessary part of making a successful assertion:16
(33) Believe it or not, I never cheated on you. Krifka (2014, p.65)
Having proposed that assertive illocutionary force is the speaker taking responsibility for
the proposition that she utters and that illocutionary acts effect a change in the world by
marking this momentaneous taking-on of responsibility, Krifka notes that this characterisa-
tion of illocutionary force explains why illocutionary acts are rarely found to be embedded.
Sharing reliable information and taking responsibility for that information could be said
to be the principal aim of communication, hence these aims are not “typically fed back
into the [linguistic] rules to form even more complex expressions” (Krifka 2014, p.76).
In modelling the semantics of illocutionary acts, Krifka introduces an assertion operator
ASSERT which he describes as taking “an index i, an addressee variable y, a proposition
p and a speaker variable x, and yields the value True iff at i, x is liable for the truth
of the proposition p to the addressee y” (Krifka 2014, p.68). In this way ASSERT is
predicate-like in the same way as Speas and Tenny’s (2003) SA head in that it takes three
arguments. It differs from the SA head in that, as Krifka further specifies, ASSERT is a
state predicate which “denotes the state of being liable for the truth of a proposition.” In
making this specification by introducing the index i to the definition of ASSERT, along
with an index-changing operation, Krifka makes a crucial distinction. This distinction is
between the enactment of (another) speech act, which is an event lasting for the duration
of the utterance, and an index change, meaning a momentaneous update of responsibility;
a change of state of the speaker from holding no responsibility for the proposition to being
responsible for the proposition. This distinction refines Speas and Tenny’s (2003) ideas,
which are compatible with the suggestion that an embedded SAP introduces a whole new
speech act with all that that entails of the speaker and addressee into the current discourse,
and reduces the effect of an embedded illocutionary act down to an update in not-at-issue
16Farkas & Bruce (2010, pp.85-86) also deal with this divorce between assertion and addressee acceptance
by proposing that the common ground is not the only set of propositions on which a conversation may be
built, but that each of the discourse interlocutors also has a personal set of propositions to which they
are publicly committed in the discourse. In this way, “agreement to disagree” can be modelled without
affecting the coherency of the common ground.
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content, namely who takes responsibility for the embedded clause. This refinement will be
adopted in the analysis to follow and will be shown to be crucial in capturing the effects
and contributions of an embedded illocutionary act to the discourse in which it appears.
2.5 Conclusion
From discussions of performative verbs via Ross’s performative hypothesis to discussions of
embedded root phenomena, illocutionary force and the encoding of speaker-hearer relations
in syntax are rich areas of philosophical and linguistic interest in which many questions
remain.
Little is fixed in this area of enquiry; although the concept of a silent performative
clause above every sentence has fallen out of favour, the complexity of proposals for what
kind of structure might sit atop the clause increases as the amount of data considered
grows. It is important that the data being considered clearly show an interaction between
discourse participants on the one hand and narrow syntax and syntactic operations on
the other. If discourse participants are silently represented in syntax,17 then we expect
to see the effects of their presence elsewhere in the clause depending on the form the
silent elements take and the kind of relationships they can enter into. Otherwise, we
are proposing to introduce into the derivation something silent with no effects; namely,
something unacquirable. The recent focus on discourse particles that interact with other
aspects of syntax, allocutive agreement, and the left periphery of embedded clauses can tell
us more about where discourse participants and their attitudes may be represented than
Ross’s data on reflexives because the former kind of data are consistent and constrained
by well-formedness conditions in a way that the latter are not. They are also indicative
of effects of discourse participants cross-linguistically, which is to be expected if they are
truly syntactically represented. I am not convinced that discourse particles are the most
revealing of data sets, though they have shown themselves to be useful by starting a
conversation on whether all root phenomena are plausibly to be found in embedded cases.
17Though Speas & Tenny suggest that they may be, in some cases, pronounceable, other scholars such
as SigurDsson (2004, 2011) suggest that they are always silent and only detectable through the syntactic
relations they enter into.
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They also present a principled reason for differentiating between those that may be and
those that will not be embeddable.
The biggest question outstanding that I hope to work towards answering in this thesis
is what it means for a sentence to have illocutionary force: what it means for the represen-
tation of speaker and hearer, what it means for the discourse prominence or interpretation
of the force-bearing clause and how it interacts with clause type. In order to do this I
will focus on a type of embedded clause that seems to feature a range of embedded root
phenomena, that has a different distribution from both root and embedded clauses, and
that cannot in any way be explained through a theory of assertion, given that it features
embedded inverted questions.
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Chapter 3
Embedded Inverted Questions as
Embedded Illocutionary Acts
3.1 Introduction
In this and the following chapter it is proposed that embedded illocutionary acts exist;
that is, clauses which are syntactically embedded but retain independent illocutionary
force. The primary datum which will be examined to support this claim is the embedded
inverted question (EIQ) from a range of English dialects. Other similar phenomena in
other languages, namely embedded verb second in some Germanic languages and recom-
plementation in Spanish and Catalan, will also be examined in the chapters to follow. This
chapter focuses on the syntax and distribution of EIQs. Consideration will also be given
to the pragmatic effects of EIQs in comparison with more familiar forms of speech report
such as direct and indirect speech.
3.2 Key facts on EIQs
EIQs have most famously been studied by McCloskey (1992, 2006) and Henry (1995) in
Hiberno English dialects. They are also used and accepted by speakers of a range of other
British and non-British dialects, including North West England English (Woods 2014b),
Tyneside English (Stringer 2015), African American English (AAE; Green, 2002), Indian
English (Stringer 2015), Newfoundland English (P. Branigan, p.c.) and New York English
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(C. Sailor and B. Pearson, p.c.).1 Their most salient features are the presence of subject-
auxiliary inversion in an embedded clause and the (general) lack of overt complementisers.
Example (1) contains paradigm examples of the EIQ construction, which can contain either
a polar or wh-question.2
(1) a. I asked Jack was she in his class.
b. I wondered how did they get into the building.
Irish English, McCloskey (2006)
EIQs have a highly restricted distribution. They typically appear under interrogative
“bridge”3 verbs like those in (1), but can also appear under say, as illustrated in (2).4
(2) a. They said what did we want to be [. . . ] I said a library lady.
South West England, British National Corpus, text GUM 33375
b. I said did he take precautions [originally said to the referent of ‘he’]
Southern British Eng., BNC, KPR 1065
c. I know Richard Wigglesworth says what the hell do I know about rugby[.]
Southern British Eng., Metro, Weds 30th Sep 2015, p.42
d. Theyj said oo, could wei come over for coffee so wei did [go over for coffee]
Yorkshire Eng., attested 29th Dec 2015
Note that the above examples under say are not from speakers of typical EIQ dialects,
1Note that all of these dialects also feature standard indirect interrogatives without inversion; there is
genuine optionality in these dialects between standard embedded interrogatives and EIQs, given the right
syntactic and pragmatic environment. This includes Indian English, despite the assertions of Bhatt (2000)
that there exist dialects of Indian English that have obligatory inversion in embedded questions and non-
inversion in matrix questions. These claims are refuted in detail by Stringer (2015), to which I direct the
reader.
2All examples in this chapter labelled “North West Eng., attested” and the judgements provided are my
own from my Cheshire dialect, unless otherwise noted.
3As noted by Heycock et al. (2010), the term “bridge” is not an accurate way of labelling verbs that
permit EV2, as this class of verbs is not, in fact, a proper subset of the “bridge” verbs that permit extraction.
However, like Heycock et al. (2010), I will continue to use the term in the absence of a more accurate but
equally concise alternative.
4It is assumed that this is due to the bleached nature of say as a default verb of communication which
can take on the force of the EIQ (cf. Grimshaw (2015)).
5Examples of usage taken from the British National Corpus (BNC) were obtained under the terms
of the BNC End User Licence. Copyright in the individual texts cited resides with the original IPR
holders. For information and licensing conditions relating to the BNC, please see the web site at
http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk. All examples from the BNC are written texts unless otherwise marked.
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but are from southern British English or Yorkshire dialects. The occurrence of EIQs
in typically non-EIQ dialects is not infrequent and speakers of both EIQ and non-EIQ
dialects are frequently unaware of their own use of EIQs. In my experience, speakers of
non-EIQ dialects in particular will often be embarrassed by their production of EIQs if
their attention is drawn to it and will refer to it as “slang” or “lazy English”.
Due to data like (2) and other variations on the EIQ6 that are widely attested and
used in other dialects of English, it is tempting to avoid referring to EIQs as a dialect
construction. However, there does seem to be a divide between speakers of EIQ and non-
EIQ dialects in terms of their acceptance of EIQs when presented with them.7 This of
course has profound implications for our understanding of and the importance we place
upon grammaticality judgement tasks, but this is a well-known limitation of such tasks
which many scholars in linguistics are increasingly sensitive to. As a result, however, I
will continue to treat EIQs in the form outlined in this section as a dialect construction to
reflect this difference in acceptance of EIQs between speakers of different dialects.
Returning to the characteristics of EIQs, irrespective of dialect they are blocked under
factive verbs (as in (3)); a state of affairs reminiscent of discourse-related embedded verb
second (EV2) contexts in German and Mainland Scandinavian.8,9
(3) a. *I found out how did they get into the building.
b. *I usually know who might they hire.
c. *I remember clearly how many people did they arrest.
Irish Eng., McCloskey (2006, p.88)
6See section 6.2.5.
7Data on this can be found in the appendix.
8Although find out is included in (3), it will be shown that semifactive verbs such as discover are less
easy to classify with respect to whether they are compatible with EIQs and EV2. This will be discussed in
detail in chapter 6.
9Although most Germanic languages have some form of verb second phenomenon, not all of them permit
EV2 and it is not a unified phenomenon in those that do. In this dissertation, I will not deal with the
kind of “generalised” embedded verb movement found in Icelandic, Yiddish or Afrikaans, which does not
appear to be licensed by discourse considerations. I will also leave Frisian to one side, as the distribution
of EV2 in this language is notably different from other West Germanic languages, extending to clausal
complements to nouns (de Haan 2001). I will concern myself with EV2 in standard German, Swedish,
Danish and Norwegian in particular. In these languages, EV2 does appear to be discourse-related, in ways
similar to EIQs as I will go on to discuss. However, these languages also differ subtly as to contexts in
which EV2 is licensed and how it is interpreted, which I will discuss in chapter 4.
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Unlike discourse-related EV2, however, EIQs can occur under factive verbs if the matrix
clause also contains interrogativity (4), modality (5), negation (6) or imperative force
(7). EV2 in languages like German is generally blocked under interrogation, negation and
modality and in languages like Swedish such contexts may degrade EV2, even when the
matrix verb is a canonical non-interrogative bridge verb such as say. The distribution of
EIQs strongly indicates that the relationship between the EIQ and the matrix clause is
not one of selection by matrix V because in that case, other operators in the matrix clause
would not interfere.10 The question of what this relationship is will be raised in chapter 6.
(4) EIQs under interrogatives
a. Do we know how were words chosen for the lists? New York Eng., attested11
b. Do you think is it done? Irish Eng., Filppula (1999)
(5) EIQs under modality
a. I wanted to know could they do it for me. AAE, Green (2002)
b. Me mam wants to know was me dad happy yesterday.
Tyneside Eng., Stringer (2015)
c. I needed to see could it be done. North West Eng., attested
d. I can check train times, read twitter and find out who was that guy in that
thing. Tyneside Eng., attested12
(6) EIQs under matrix negation
a. He didn’t know why did they come. Irish Eng., Berizzi (2010)
b. I can’t remember did you want to practise tonight. North West Eng., attested
(7) EIQs under imperatives
a. Go over there and see did they bring my car in. AAE, Green (2002)
b. Find out does he take sugar in his tea. Irish Eng., McCloskey (2006)
10Of course, this also applies to the varieties of EV2 described previously, to which I will return in the
next chapter.
11Naturally occurring New York English data provided by Barbara Pearson.
12Naturally occurring Tyneside English data provided by Laura Bailey.
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Note that all of the examples above also feature complementiser deletion. EIQs are not
compatible with immediately preceding complementisers, just as immediately successive
complementisers are prohibited:
(8) a. *I asked them if would they like a cup of tea
b. *I asked them if if they would like a cup of tea. McCloskey (2006, p.105)
c. *I asked them whether if they would like a cup of tea.
However, a complementiser may co-occur with the EIQ if there is an element in the left pe-
riphery intervening between the complementiser and the wh-word or auxiliary. McCloskey
(2006) suggests that this element must be “substantial”, as in (9a) though syntactically
simple adjuncts may also suffice, as shown in (9b):
(9) a. Patsy asked him if, when he was sent to college, was it for a clergyman or a
solicitor. Irish Eng., McCloskey (2006)
b. I asked him if seriously would he cook dinner tonight North West Eng.
EIQs also have a range of other features which distinguish them from other types of speech
report, though they also share some features with both indirect and direct speech reports.
In common with the former, they show clear, non-selection-related dependencies on the
matrix clause, such as indexicality and Sequence of Tense. In common with the latter, in
addition to subject-auxiliary inversion, they display so-called “root phenomena” such as a
(general) lack of overt complementisers, the presence of speech act adverbs and discourse
particles, and the availability of topicalised arguments. This places EIQs in a hitherto
little studied grey area between indirect and direct speech reports. I will argue that, while
EIQs are syntactically embedded, like indirect speech reports, they actually represent a
perspective shift to the original speaker—the matrix subject—and so can contain not-at-
issue and expressive content which is evaluated with respect to the original speaker and
not the reporting speaker.
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3.3 Characteristics shared with indirect speech
The most salient syntactic characteristics of the EIQ as outlined above are precisely those
in which the EIQ diverges from standard indirect question reports. Indirect question
reports have obligatory complementisers, do not permit subject-auxiliary inversion and do
not allow CP adjuncts such as temporal adjuncts or speech act adverbs.
(10) Obligatory complementisers
a. I wonder if Jamie wants dinner tonight.
b. I asked whether the boat was fixed.
c. *I wonder Jamie will come to the party.
d. *I asked the boat was fixed.
(11) No subject-auxiliary inversion
a. *I wonder if does Jamie want dinner tonight.
b. *I asked whether was the boat fixed.
(12) No high adjunction
a. *I wonder if when he comes home Jamie wants dinner tonight.
b. *I asked if seriously the boat was fixed.
However, there are many other ways in which EIQs do pattern with indirect speech reports.
Firstly, they are phonologically similar in that they both lack “comma” intonation (Emonds
1976) compared with direct speech reports:
(13) a. John asked me if I would go to dinner with him last night.
b. John asked me would I go to dinner with him last night.
c. John asked me, “Will you come to dinner tonight?”
Correspondingly, it seems that the direct speech report in (13c) consists of two intonational
phrases, whereas the EIQ and indirect speech report only consist of one. More sophisticated
phonological analysis is necessary to confirm this but will be left for future research.
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In terms of their syntax, as McCloskey (2006) notes, EIQs are clearly not independent
root clauses preceded by some kind of parenthetical. Firstly, the EIQ can be very deeply
embedded under a non-matrix clause with complex syntax:
(14) a. I don’t think I was ever asked did I see any Provos, Stickies, or anyone.
Irish Eng., McCloskey (2006, p.89)
b. I’ll remember Jo in the voting lobby in her cycling kit and wondering where
did she get the energy.
Yorkshire Eng., attested13
Also, as already mentioned, EIQs can be embedded under negated predicates, which is
incompatible with a parenthetical analysis as parentheticals cannot contain negation:14
(15) I don’t understand what was the utility of it Indian Eng., attested15
EIQs and indirect speech reports also share two particular properties which are indicative
of syntactic embedding and are not dependent on syntactic or semantic selection, namely
Sequence of Tense and dependent indexicals. EIQs and indirect question reports show
Sequence of Tense effects, where direct speech reports do not:
(16) a. Last year, John asked me whether Mary was/*is pregnant
b. Last year, John asked me was/?*is Mary pregnant
c. Last year, John asked me, “Is Mary pregnant?”
Indexicals in EIQs are also dependent on the matrix clause; they are evaluated with respect
to the utterance speaker, not the original speaker. They are therefore like English indirect
speech reports, and unlike direct speech reports, in that they do not show indexical shift.16
13Retrieved 20th June 2016 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/uk-politics-parliaments-36578372.
14Thanks to Anders Holmberg for pointing this out.
15Naturally occurring Indian English data provided by Jyoti Iyer.
16There are many languages in which indexical shift occurs in normal embedded speech reports, but given
that English is not one of them and there is no data to suggest that indexical shift operators are present
in English, I shall assume that the lack of indexical shift in EIQs is indicative of their embedded status
(even cases like Free Indirect Discourse, where the speaker and the attitude holder are not the same, do
not show indexical shifting between matrix and embedded clauses in the sense that a first-person pronoun
in one clause is coreferential with a third-person pronoun in a different clause).
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(17) Shei had considered should shei keep going or not. Scottish Eng., attested
17
(18) a. Johni asked mej if hei could come to see mej this weekend
b. Johni asked mej could hei/k come to see me*i/j this weekend
c. Johni asked mej, “Could Ii come to see youj this weekend?”
d. Johni asked mej, “Could he*i/k come to see mei/*j this weekend?”
In fact, in (18b), whilst the pronoun ‘he’ in the embedded clause could well refer to another
salient male in the discourse, there is a preference for it to refer to John, which I will return
to in section 3.4.
In terms of their syntactic dependencies, EIQs are like indirect questions as they cannot
stand alone, while direct speech complements can.
(19) a. *If he would cook dinner for me.
b. *If he would cook dinner for me - that’s all I asked him!
c. *Would he cook dinner for me.
d. Would he cook dinner for me - that’s all I asked him!
e. “Will you cook dinner for me?”
f. “Will you cook dinner for me?” - that’s all I asked him!
The standalone EIQ in (19c) is ungrammatical and requires a follow-up such as “That’s all
I asked him!”, as in (19d), to save its interpretation. I suggest that this is because without
being related to a specific discourse or act-of-questioning, the EIQ loses its anchoring. This
is partially due to the presence of dependent tense in the EIQ which requires a reference
time in the matrix clause to be evaluated against (cf. Giorgi (2010)). It is also because the
original questioner’s identity must be established for the original context of the EIQ and
any perspectival elements in it to be situated. However, (19d) is reminiscent of another
method of representing speech and thought, namely Free Indirect Discourse (FID), in that
the speaker’s previous thoughts and co-ordinates seem to have completely subsumed her
current ones. Note how (20), in which the ‘speaker’ is represented in the third person, is
17Retrieved from Olympic Sportsday, BBC Sport website, 7th Aug 2016.
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an improvement on (19d), and is familiar as an example of FID’s literary style of thought
presentation.
(20) Would he cook dinner for her - that’s all she asked him!
The ordering of the “introducing predicate”—the expression of the subject and verb of
speech or thought—and the clause containing the thought or speech is fixed in FID. If
an FID sentence appears with an introducing predicate, that predicate must follow the
FID clause—it cannot precede it, though it can intervene in it (Giorgi 2010, pp.205-6). In
contrast, EIQs must appear with a main clause containing an appropriate predicate which
precedes the EIQ and that main clause cannot be parenthetical in the middle of the EIQ.
Examples of the fixed ordering between introducing predicates and FID clauses are in (21)
and examples of EIQs are in (22) and (23).
(21) a. Sarebbe
would
partita
leave.fut
domani,
tomorrow,
penso`.
think.imp.3sg
“She would leave tomorrow, she thought.” FID interpretation
b. #Penso`
think.imp.3sg
sarebbe
would
partita
leave.fut
domani.
tomorrow
“She thought she would leave tomorrow.” Non-FID interpretation
c. Gianni,
Gianni
penso`,
think.imp.3sg
sarebbe
would
partito
leave.fut
domani.
tomorrow
“Gianni, she thought, would leave tomorrow.” Giorgi (2010, pp.205-6)
(22) a. Mary asked me would I leave tomorrow.
b. ?*Would I leave tomorrow, Mary asked me.
c. *Would I, Mary asked me, leave tomorrow.
(23) a. Mary asked John would he leave tomorrow
b. Would he leave tomorrow, Mary asked John. FID interpretation only
c. Would he, Mary asked John, leave tomorrow. FID interpretation only
It is clear that there is a difference in grammaticality between (22b) and (23b), suggesting
that the ordering between introducing predicates and embedded clauses is one way to
distinguish between FID and EIQs. However, there are other effects in FID that are not
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found in EIQs.
FID is used when the mental state being reported is not that of the speaker (or writer)
but of another subject, and the access that the speaker has to this mental state is as
privileged as the access she has to her own mental state. As Giorgi (2010, p.182) puts it,
“[t]he FID device [. . . ] might be taken to promote the subject, that is, the character of
the story, to speaker.” So far, so similar to EIQs. The two constructions diverge in terms
of their temporal indexicality, however: Giorgi notes that in FID, the speaker’s temporal
coordinates are erased from the context and so the subject’s temporal coordinates are
the only anchor for the temporal coordinates in the FID clause. Moreover, the actor to
which temporal indexicals orient in FID can vary: they may be evaluated by a third-
person narrator or another third-person character in the story rather than with respect to
the speaker/writer’s coordinates (Giorgi (2010, p.191) suggests that in this way, temporal
indexicals in FID might be said to cease being true indexicals). In contrast, temporal
indexicals in EIQs may only orient to the reporting speaker, who is always first-person.18,19
This is illustrated by taking the examples in (23) and inserting temporal adjuncts. While
(24a) can only be interpreted with respect to the speaker (the silent “I”), (24b) can have
three interpretations: the same interpretation of the EIQ, which is to be expected if the
anchor is the narrator; an interpretation in which the anchor is the narrator but the story
is set at a different time to the current writing/reading context; or an interpretation in
which the indexicals relate separately to two different third-person characters in the story,
namely the narrator and another third-person character.
(24) Both of the sentences below are spoken/read on 5th May.
a. Mary asked John yesterday would he leave tomorrow.
yesterday = 4th May; tomorrow = 6th May
b. Would he leave tomorrow, Mary asked John yesterday.
yesterday = 4th May, tomorrow = 5th May if anchor is third-person
18The analysis here might correlate with Giorgi (2010) in casting doubt on the idea that tense in English
is pronominal, but I will not explore that claim further here.
19As Giorgi (2010, p.191) notes, first-person appears to be an attractor for temporal indexicality; if
the narrator in a literary text is first-person, temporal indexicals must be evaluated with respect to this
narrator.
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(Mary)
OR
yesterday = 24th December, tomorrow = 26th December if anchor is third-
person (narrator) and the scene happens to be set on Christmas Day
OR
yesterday = 4th May, tomorrow = 6th May if anchor is third-person
(narrator) and the scene happens to be set on 5th May
Note that the re-anchoring of perspective in FID clauses, as in EIQs, does not extend to
the anchoring of indexicals, which still orient to the speaker (or writer). In FID contexts,
outside of direct representations of speech, all indexicals are third-person.20 First-person
narration in literary contexts is a separate case again, in which the subject (the first-
person narrator) and his coordinates, temporal and indexical, wholly replace those of the
speaker/writer. This three-way split is illustrated by the differences in acceptability of
root phenomena in the three constructions; FID is more restricted in terms of the root
phenomena that it permits than EIQs, but first-person narration is even more permissive
than EIQs. An example of the restrictions on FID was noted in Banfield (1982, p.117),
repeated in (25), where she notes that some high adverbs, but crucially not the speaker-
oriented speech act adverbs, are permitted in FID from a third-person perspective. We
have already shown this not to be the case in EIQs, and this is illustrated again in (26),
along with a case of first-person narration in (27).
(25) a. Certainly, she was so pleased to see him - delighted!
Certainly = third-person perspective
(Banfield’s (8)b, p.117)
b. Honestly, she was so pleased to see him - delighted!
Honestly = a non-explicit first-person perspective
(Banfield’s (8)a, p.117)
20Note that there is a subtle difference between FID and EIQs here: while EIQs can appear with exclu-
sively third-person arguments, it is strongly preferred for an EIQ to contain at least one argument which
is either first- or second-person.
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(26) I asked her honestly did she think she would ever get away with it.
Honestly = “her” (third-person) perspective
(27) Honestly, always was, ver-near divorce proceedings every time I went out with
Emdy for a Campari after the country dancing. . .
BNC, B38 186 (imaginative written prose with first-person narration)
So although FID clauses are very similar to EIQ clauses in that they promote the per-
spective of the subject in some way, they are different in terms of the extent to which the
subject’s perspective replaces that of the speaker. We can note that the kinds of contexts
in which EIQs are seemingly used on their own or utterance-initially usually turn out to be
contexts which favour FID and first-person narration, such as voicing introspection as in
(28a), which can be interpreted as promoting an inner self over the speaking self, or when
the speaker pronounces a question as if from the point of view of their interlocutor as in
(28b).
(28) a. Would he cook dinner for me? I often ask myself this question.
b. Would he cook dinner for me? Ask me one that I can answer!
So can EIQ clauses can appear in utterance-initial position? No—what looks like an
EIQ in sentence-initial position is in fact an example of FID, which resembles an EIQ
due to its sequence of tense and lack of indexical shift. However, the extent to which the
subject’s perspective is promoted differs in EIQ and in FID: as we saw in (24), in FID the
subject’s temporal coordinates completely replace those of the speaker which is not the
case in EIQs, yet EIQs permit a wider range of root phenomena than FID contexts.
In summary, EIQs are like indirect speech reports in that they cannot be fronted to
sentence-initial position. There are cases which look like sentence-initial EIQs, but these
are in fact cases of FID, which are easily confused due to the many similarities they often
share.
Relatedly, EIQs pattern with indirect speech reports in that they do not have the
verbatim entailment associated with direct speech reports. However, consider the following
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examples in the context in which Oedipus uttered the following precise words: “Will the
Sphinx be waiting at the gates of Thebes?”
(29) a. Oedipus asked if a monster would be waiting at the gates of Thebes true
b. Oedipus asked if the Sphinx would be waiting at the gates of Thebes true
c. Oedipus asked would a monster be waiting at the gates of Thebes false
d. Oedipus asked would the Sphinx be waiting at the gates of Thebes true
e. Oedipus asked, “Will a monster be waiting at the gates of Thebes?” false
f. Oedipus asked, “Will the Sphinx be waiting at the gates of Thebes?” true
As the examples in (29) show, while EIQs do not entail that the content of the embedded
clause is a verbatim reproduction of the original speech act, they are subject to a semantic
de dicto restriction insofar as it is not possible to substitute the DP ‘a monster’ for the
DP ‘the Sphinx’ salva veritate.
This effect is further demonstrated in the examples below, in which Oedipus does not
know that Jocasta is his mother. The context is one in which Oedipus uttered the following
precise words: “Will Jocasta come for dinner tonight?”
(30) a. Oedipus asked if his mother was coming for dinner tonight true
b. Oedipus asked was his mother coming for dinner tonight false
c. Oedipus asked, “Will my mother come for dinner tonight?” false
In brief, Oedipus’s knowledge dictates that which is permitted in the EIQ, regardless
of whether that aligns with how things are in the world or with the speaker’s knowledge.
In a similar vein, the matrix subject’s self-knowledge is key; the appropriate pronouns
are obligatorily interpreted with a de se reading in EIQs:21
(31) Indirect speech report: John asked if the photos of himself had appeared in the
newspaper
a. OKJohn asked if the photos of him, John, had appeared in the newspaper
21Thanks to Jeremy Hartman for drawing my attention to this.
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b. OKJohn asked if the photos of a man (who happens to be John) had appeared
in the newspaper
(32) EIQ: John asked did those photos of himself appear in the newspaper.
a. OKJohn asked if the photos of him, John, had appeared in the newspaper
b. #John asked if the photos of a man (who happens to be John) had appeared
in the newspaper
Why is it that EIQs do not have a verbatim requirement, yet cannot achieve a de re
reading of quantified phrases? As already noted above, EIQs cannot appear overtly in
utterance-initial position. I propose that they cannot appear utterance-initially covertly
either, and so the movement of the quantified phrase to a higher position which would
be necessary to achieve a de re reading is blocked. The unavailability of this movement,
particularly for arguments, is further supported by the data on overt extraction from EIQs
in section 3.6.
3.4 Characteristics shared with direct speech: syntax
The most salient syntactic characteristics of EIQs align with those of direct speech, in
particular subject-auxiliary inversion and the lack of overt complementisers. EIQs and
direct speech reports also permit high adjunction in their left periphery in the form of
speech act adverbs,22 topicalised arguments, discourse particles and, as also illustrated in
the previous two sections, temporal adjuncts:23
(33) Speech act adverbs
a. Janei asked him seriouslyi/*speaker would he cook her dinner.
b. Janei asked him, “Seriouslyi/*speaker, will you cook me dinner?”
c. *Jane asked him if seriously he would cook her dinner.
(34) Topicalised arguments
22The indices in (33) indicate whose perspective is being expressed by the use of the adverb.
23See also McCloskey (2006) for data like (33), (34) and particularly (35)
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a. Mary asked (if) this book, was it really worth reading.
b. Mary asked, “This book, is it really worth reading?”
c. Mary asked if this book it was really worth reading.
(35) Temporal adjuncts
a. Molly asked when she got home could she have a biscuit.24
b. Molly asked, “When I get home, can I have a biscuit?”
c. ?*Molly asked if when she got home she could have a biscuit.
d. ?Molly asked when she got home if she could have a biscuit.
(? on the embedded construal)
(36) Discourse particles
a. Jamie asked please would I help him.
b. Jamie asked, “Please, will you help me?”
c. *Jamie asked if please I would help him.
Another example of a speech-act related phenomenon permitted in EIQs and direct speech
reports but blocked in indirect speech reports is the word again, used to mark repeated
questions. Again used in this way does not express the iteration of an action, but is
interpreted as a request to the addressee to answer for a second or subsequent time a
question that, it is implied, they have already answered.25 An example is shown in (37); in
this case again cannot refer to the iteration of the predicate, as someone can only die once,
but implies that the questioner has already been told this information or should already
be in possession of the information:
(37) When did he die again?
24Note that this example, due to the lack of intonational break between the matrix and embedded clauses,
is ambiguous between Molly asking the question when she got home or asking whether she could have a
biscuit once home. It is possible to introduce comma intonation here, which disambiguates between the
two readings and forces an embedded construal of the temporal adjunct. Note that comma intonation of
this type does not improve the acceptability of (35c), indicating that the fronting of the temporal adjunct
in the embedded clause can only occur in EIQs because their structure differs from indirect speech reports.
See also McCloskey (2006).
25See Yatsushiro & Sauerland (2013) for an a similar analysis of again as a speech act marker, along with
some similar interesting data from Japanese.
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= Tell me again when he died./When did he die: tell me again.
6= #When did he die for the second or subsequent time?
Again used in this way is prosodically integrated into the utterance much like the iterative
use of again. It can also be fronted, in which case only the speech-act meaning remains:
(38) a. Again, when did he die?
b. Again, did she come to the party?
It does not seem principled to suggest that speech act again is formed by an ellipsis
operation from “Tell me again” on the basis of the prosodic facts and the lack of any
kind of overt antecedent for the elided material. Instead, it is a discourse-level particle
expressing that the speaker should already be in possession of the information requested.
Subsequently, the fact that speech-act again can be embedded in EIQs and direct
speech reports, but not in indirect speech reports, is further evidence that EIQs are more
quotation-like and more closely linked to the original discourse than indirect speech re-
ports.26
(39) a. He asked me when did my cat die again.
b. He asked me, “When did your cat die again?”
c. He asked me when my cat died again
(40) a. He asked me was I coming to the party again.
b. He asked me, “Are you coming to the party again?”
c. He asked me if I was coming to the party again.
Examples (39a) is ambiguous between the matrix (iterative) and embedded (speech-act)
readings of again while (40a) is three-ways ambiguous as the embedded iterative reading
is also possible. Conversely, (39c) only contains the matrix reading of again while (40c)
allows both the matrix reading of again and the embedded iterative reading.
26It appears that sentences such as (39) can be used to differentiate between the permissiveness of a
given speaker towards embedded root phenomena; some native English speakers report that they can only
get an iterative reading of again in sentences like those in (39a) and (39c) (P. Sells, pers. comm.).
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The data in this section raise a more subtle question: is it the case that all discourse
markers are available in EIQs that are available in root clauses and direct speech reports?
The answer to this question is easily revealed to be negative.
Take for example the particle huh, which can be used to mark that the speaker expects
an prompt answer from the addressee.27 It is typically found in contexts like those in (41):
(41) a. What are you going to say, huh?
b. What are you going to do about it, huh?
c. Did you hear what I said, huh?
d. Where were you last night? Huh? en.wiktionary.com28
e. A: You gonna take your truck in to the shop or what? I told ya I can give
you a ride - huh?
B: God damn man! Would you give me a second to answer you?
urbandictionary.com29
f. Pretty cool, huh? urbandictionary.com
g. So you like cheese, huh? urbandictionary.com
Abstracting away from the examples in which huh is used with declaratives and fragment
utterances, huh in interrogatives marks a request by the speaker for a prompt response,
whether that be a confirmation or a more informative response, from the addressee. How-
ever, it cannot be embedded in EIQs:
(42) a. *I asked him what was he going to do about it, huh.
b. *I asked him had he heard what I said, huh.
It is also impossible to embed tag questions:
(43) a. She is going to the party, isn’t she?
b. Mary told you she is going to the party, *isn’t she/didn’t she?
27Note that, as with many discourse particles, this is not the only meaning that huh can impart, but it
is the only one of interest to EIQs.
28Taken from http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/huh; retrieved on 29th Apr 2015.
29Taken from http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=huh; retrieved on 29th Apr 2015.
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c. Is she going to the party, do you know?
d. John asked you is she going to the party, *do you know/didn’t he?
If we compare these examples with the examples of embedded please and again in EIQs, we
see a difference in terms of the discourse demands that each particle puts on the interlocu-
tors. Please and again refine the responsibilities that the speaker and the addressee share
with respect to the question asked: please requires that the addressee take responsibility
for undertaking a given action (which may or may not be linguistic, see Woods (2016))
while again expresses that the speaker take some responsibility for their lack of knowledge.
Neither particle outright requires a specific linguistic response. The case with huh and
with tag questions is exactly opposite; both require the addressee to confirm or correct the
speaker’s speech act in their next turn.
The distinction in embeddability therefore seems to lie in the demand the particle
makes on the addressee: if it does not in itself call on the addressee to respond then it is
embeddable. If the particle’s meaning demands an immediate, specific response from the
addressee, then it is not embeddable. We might also adopt Haegeman’s (2014) terms to
describe higher discourse particles as dynamic and lower discourse particles as attitudinal,
though the latter category will be differently defined in the analysis to follow.30
Further details of the distinction between the kinds of discourse markers that may be
embedded in EIQs and those that may not will be addressed and explained in chapter 4.
3.5 Characteristics shared with direct speech: semantics
and pragmatics
Turning to the interpretive properties of EIQs, it is clear that they pattern with direct
speech reports, although certain entailments in direct speech contexts seem to be “down-
graded” to implications in EIQs.
Firstly, there are a number of ways in which direct speech reports are semantically
30A similar proposal was made from a semantic point of view by Truckenbrodt (2006) and has been made
from a syntactic point of view by scholars from the Syntax in Speech Acts project at the University of
British Columbia (Wiltschko et al. 2015, Wiltschko 2015). The proposal here differs in the detail that they
distinguish between speaker and addressee commitment while I, like Haegeman (2014), do not.
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opaque which also apply to EIQs. For example, reconstruction of an extracted element
fails in direct speech reports and EIQs where is it available in indirect speech reports:31
(44) a. ?Which of hisi/j aunts does Johnj want to know whether eachi boy loves t?
b. ??Which of his*i/j aunts does Johnj want to know does eachi boy love t?
c. ??Which of his*i/j aunts does Johnj want to know, “Does eachi boy love t?”
Note that all of the examples in (44) are degraded because they involve extraction out of
(various types of) islands, but such that interpretations for each of the examples in (44)
can be arrived at, it is clear that a bound variable interpretation can be achieved for his
in (44a) which is unavailable in (44b) and (44c).
In his evaluation of quantification in Japanese speech acts, Sudo (2013) notes that
semantic binding into direct speech reports is not generally available; the same result
obtains in EIQs:
(45) a. John asked nobody’si mother whether Mary likes himi.
b. *John asked nobody’si mother does Mary like himi.
c. *John told nobody’si mother “Mary likes himi.”
It could be argued that the above test fails on the basis of pragmatic plausibility; the
negative universal quantifier phrase in the matrix clause creates an implausible context for
the EIQ if the EIQ requires there to have been an original speech or thought act to be
reported, as in direct speech reports. This putative requirement is not entirely clear cut
and will be examined later in this section. In any case, the same result obtains when the
universal quantifier phrase everybody is inserted:
(46) a. John asked everybody’si mother whether Mary likes himi.
b. *John asked everybody’si mother does Mary like himi.
c. *John asked everybody’si mother “Does Mary likes himi?”
31As will be further discussed in chapter 6, lack of reconstruction is also a feature of other quasi-
quotational constructions, such as recomplementation in Spanish, Catalan and European Portuguese (Villa-
Garc´ıa 2012, 2015, Rathmann 2012). It also occurs in factive islands, and this will be important in our
discussion of how the EIQ connects with the matrix predicate.
82
The same result is found in Spanish and Catalan recomplementation contexts (Gonza´lez i
Planas 2014). As alluded to in the discussion of the restriction of the EIQs to de dicto
interpretations only, the EIQ is referentially opaque and does not permit shifting reference.
Therefore, while EIQs are compatible with a scenario in which many people are asked the
same question, as in (47), they are not compatible with a scenario in which many people
ask a question in which reference shifts depending on the addressee.
(47) Johni asked everybody’s mother does Mary like himi.
In fact, if we look at the binding facts in more detail we find more evidence that EIQs are
neither like direct speech nor like indirect speech reports but form some kind of intermediate
class. The fact that quantifiers in subject position can bind into EIQs—as in indirect speech
reports—suggests that EIQs are truly embedded. The fact that a quantified indirect object
cannot bind into an EIQ suggests that it is lower in the structure than the EIQ, and in
this way EIQs pattern with direct speech reports. However, restrictions on the availability
of inverse scope readings in EIQs patterns with the restrictions on overt movement out of
EIQs, which means that inverse scope readings are available if the quantified element is a
temporal adjunct rather than an argument.
(48) a. [Everyone]i wondered would Jack ask heri out.
b. [Everyone]i wondered if Jack would ask heri out.
c. *[Everyone]i wondered, “Will Jack ask heri out?”
Patterns with indirect speech
(49) a. *Mary asked [everyone]i could she take himi to the dance.
b. Mary asked [everyone]i if she could take himi to the dance.
c. *Mary asked [everyone]i, “Can I take himi to the dance?”
Patterns with direct speech
(50) a. Every boy wondered would Jack ask out a girl in the class.
every 〉 a; *a 〉 every
b. Every boy wondered if Jack would ask out a girl in the class.
83
every 〉 a; a 〉 every
c. Every boy wondered, “Will Jack ask out a girl in the class?”
every 〉 a; *a 〉 every
Patterns with direct speech
(51) a. Every girl wondered would Jack ask her out in a bowling alley.
every 〉 a; a 〉 every
b. Every girl wondered if Jack would ask her out in a bowling alley.
every 〉 a; a 〉 every
c. Every girl wondered, “Will Jack ask me out in a bowling alley?”
every 〉 a; *a 〉 every
Patterns with indirect speech
I propose that this is ultimately because the EIQ represents a specific question under dis-
cussion (QUD) and so is referentially fixed. More precisely, EIQs refer to a conversational
move; an act in a previous discourse that was made with respect to a relevant QUD in
the original discourse. In order to assess and support the claim that EIQs constitute a
conversational move with respect to a QUD, it is first necessary to outline the framework
that I am using and my terms.
3.5.1 The Question Under Discussion framework
The QUD is, according to Craige Roberts and colleagues, “a semantic question (i.e. a set of
alternative propositions) which corresponds to the current discourse topic” (Simons et al.
2010, p.316). The QUD is therefore an abstract semantic object and is usually implicit in
a conversation, though it may be the same as an overt question asked in the conversation.
QUDs drive the conversation insofar as they need to be resolved for the conversation to
move forward. In this way, they determine what constitutes a felicitous conversational
move: only moves that address the QUD by trying to resolve it are felicitous.
The first term to define, then, is move—what is a conversational move? Roberts
(2012) is clear that a conversational move is not a speech act, but that speech acts use
conversational moves; in other words, “a speech act is the act of proffering a move” (Roberts
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2012, p.6:5). Moreover, the semantic objects in the QUD framework such as the QUDs
themselves and conversational moves are not tied to particular syntactic structures or
linguistic conventions in a given language.
A key reason why conversational moves are not the same thing as speech acts is that
questions in particular can be implied by assertions made by the discourse participants.
That is, a discourse participant can introduce a question into the conversation by asserting
an answer without ever uttering the question itself. Roberts expresses this idea as follows:
[a] question is not necessarily realized by a speech act but is only a question
denotation in the technical sense that it proffers a set of relevant alternatives
which the interlocutors commit themselves to addressing: it tells you what the
discourse is “about” at that point in the discourse, and further, [. . . ] it tells us
where the discourse is going.
Roberts (2012, pp.6:8-6:9)
Of course, questions may be raised in the conversation overtly too, but typically they
are implicit. It is also important to note that questions within a conversation tend to be
interrelated: there is often one ‘big question’ to resolve, which can be a broad as “What’s
happening?” However, conversation is generally broken down into more manageable sub-
questions, whose answers ultimately entail an answer to the ‘big question’.
This notion of addressing a question through answers entailed by other answers requires
us to be clearer about what it means to address a QUD. Simons et al. (2010) note a (non-
exhaustive) range of ways of doing this: simple answers, which may be complete (52a) or
partial (52b); assertions whose content contextually entails a partial or complete answer
(53); or asking a question related to the QUD that is easier to answer in the first instance.
This latter addresses a QUD insofar as its answer is at least a partial answer to the QUD,
as in (54).
(52) Q: Which students are defending this semester? Simons et al. (2010, p.316)
a. A: Stefan, Nick and Tracy. Complete answer
b. A: Stefan, and maybe some others. Partial answer
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(53) Common ground: the legal drinking age is 21.
Q: Is Avi old enough to drink?
A: He’s twenty-two. Simons et al. (2010, p.316)
(54) QUD: What will Bill drink?
Q: Does Bill drink beer? Simons et al. (2010, p.316)
On the basis of such observations, Simons and colleagues define the notion of relevance to
the QUD for assertions and questions:
(55) Relevance to the QUD
a. An assertion is relevant to a QUD iff it contextually entails a partial or
complete answer to the QUD.
b. A question is relevant to a QUD iff it has an answer which contextually
entails a partial or complete answer to the QUD.
Simons et al. (2010, p.316)
They also go on to define at-issueness using these terms:
(56) Definition of at-issueness
a. A proposition p is at-issue iff the speaker intends to address the QUD via ?p
(whether p).
b. An intention to address the QUD via ?p is felicitous only if:
(i) ?p is relevant to the QUD, and
(ii) The speaker can reasonably expect the addressee to recognize this in-
tention.
Simons et al. (2010, p.323)
It is interesting that Simons et al. appeal to a notion of speaker intention in order to define
at-issueness, though they recognise that this is a difficult notion to pin down precisely. I
will go on in this thesis to show how context and speaker commitment, as opposed to
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intention, can affect the interpretation of content as being at-issue (chapter 6).
Returning to the construction under discussion, the EIQ, the use of this framework is
to more precisely characterise both their meaning and conditions of use. EIQs differ from
direct speech reports as they do not carry verbatim implications, and they do not entail
that a questioning speech act actually occurred. Take for example EIQs under predicates
which do not typically express communication, such as want to know :
(57) a. Everyone wanted to know whether Joe could come to the party.
b. Everyone wanted to know: “Is Joe coming to the party?”
c. Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party.
The examples in (57) are mental state reports which differ as to the commitments they make
about a prior accompanying speech act. The indirect speech act in (57a) is compatible with
a situation in which no-one asked out loud whether Joe could come to the party. It is also
compatible with a prior discourse in which the question of Joe’s coming to the party has
not been overtly discussed at all, but it is known for other reasons that everyone has had
the matter of Joe’s coming to the party on their minds. The direct speech act in (57b), in
contrast, entails that the question “Is Joe coming to the party?” was asked in the relevant
prior discourse. As such, the commitment made by the speaker’s use of EIQ in (57c) is
intermediate between (57a) and (57b); it requires a prior discourse in which the question of
whether Joe will come to the party was addressed in some form, but not necessarily asked
as a question outright. In terms of the QUD framework discussed above, this means that
some conversational move addressing the QUD “Is Joe coming to the party?” was made,
which will have entailed a speech act of a some type. There is no conventional structure for
proffering a conversational move so the speech act could be of a range of different kinds.
Note that the observation was made above that nobody is not a possible subject for the
matrix clause above an EIQ because a relevant QUD or speech act must have been made.
At first blush this seems at odds with the examples in (58a) and (58b) below:
(58) a. I didn’t ask were you coming last night.
b. I didn’t want to know was she coming.
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However, the question in (58a) (whether ‘you’ were coming last night) is interpreted as
an open question under discussion in some previous discourse context, even if the original
speaker wasn’t the one to ask the question. Similarly, in example (58b), the question “was
she coming” is still interpreted to have been at issue in the original discourse.
Note moreover that the use of the EIQ is incompatible with situations in which there is
no available referent—that is, conversational move—for the EIQ. This explains the unac-
ceptability of (59b) compared with the acceptability of (59a), where the standard embedded
interrogative is not referential.
(59) a. Everyone wanted to know whether Joe could come to the party, but no-one
discussed the matter at all.
b. Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party, #but no-one discussed
the matter at all.
This is in contrast with with (58a)-(58b) because at some point in the original discourse,
the question “Are you coming?” (in the case of (58a)) and the question “Was she coming?”
(in the case of (58b)) formed the QUD in the discourse. We can reframe the examples in
(59) in similar fashion as follows:
(60) a. Everyone wanted to know whether Joe could come to the party.
“Can Joe come to the party?” need not have been the QUD
b. Everyone wanted to know, “Is Joe coming to the party?”
“Can Joe come to the party?” was at some point the QUD and was
overtly asked in the discourse
c. Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party.
“Can Joe come to the party?” was at some point the QUD
Note, however, that the EIQ always refers to a conversational move proffered in the relevant
discussion and not simply the QUD as a kind of abstract conversational move itself. The
fact that a speech act can convey the same value as the QUD directly should not obscure
this fact, which is illustrated by the way in which the different types of embedded clause
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in (60) can be refuted by the addressee on the grounds of how the original speech act
was presented. Consider the following cases, corresponding to (60a), (60b) and (60c)
respectively:
(61) A. Everyone wanted to know whether Joe could come to the party.
B. #But they didn’t say it like that!
(62) A. Everyone wanted to know, “Is Joe coming to the party?”
B. But they didn’t say it like that!
A. True, though they actually said “Is that bore coming to the party?”
A’.??True, Mary said, “Is Joe coming to the party?” but Bill said “Is that bore
coming to the party?”
A”. #True, no-one asked at all but Mary said she wanted to see him there.
(63) A. Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party.
B. But they didn’t say it like that!
A. True, they actually asked could that bore come to the party.
A’. True, Mary asked was Joe coming to the party but Bill asked was that bore
coming to the party and Harry didn’t ask at all but talked about wanting Joe
there.
While (61) cannot be evaluated for how the question was asked, (62) and (63) can. However,
these last two also differ in that (62) still entails that a question was directly asked about
Joe’s coming to the party, regardless of how it was asked, while (63) is compatible with the
idea that one (or more) of the people wanting to know simply talked about Joe’s coming
to the party rather than directly asking the question.
The reader may notice that all the EIQ examples discussed in this section include
matrix predicates and refer to an original discourse context which temporally precedes
the utterance time. However, it is possible for the EIQ to denote a conversational move
with the same value as the QUD in the discourse in which it is produced, just like a root
question. An example of this (7a), repeated below as (64):
89
(64) Go over there and see did they bring my car in. AAE, Green (2002)
This is expected if it is correct that an EIQ denotes a conversational move proffered in a
given discourse: it should be able to proffer a conversational move in the current discourse
if the current and original discourses happen to be the same. As will be shown in chapters 5
and 6, the effect of an EIQ that is evaluated with respect to the current discourse is similar
to, though not quite the same as, asking an indirect question using a typical embedded
interrogative.
3.5.2 Perspectives
The use of an EIQ also makes implications about the original discourse participants in the
absence of overt information. While it is clear in direct speech contexts who the addressee
is, as this person is referred to using second person pronouns, this is not straightforwardly
the case in EIQs. However, there is an implication that referring expressions in the em-
bedded clause will refer to the addressee. This does not necessarily hold in indirect speech
contexts, as illustrated in (65).
(65) a. I asked whether she was having an affair.
Addressee may or may not be the alleged adulteress
b. I asked was she having an affair.
Implies that the addressee is the alleged adulteress
c. I asked, “Are you having an affair?” Addressee is the alleged adulteress
In the case of EIQs, this is only an implication as it can easily be overwritten:
(66) a. I asked John was she having an affair Addressee 6= adulterer
I assume that this is due to a a close relationship between the participants in the main and
embedded illocutionary acts in the EIQ which does not hold in the case of indirect speech
reports. I will return to this point in section 3.7.
EIQs also pattern with direct reports of questions in terms of expressive elements in
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that expressive elements in the embedded clause must be evaluated with respect to the
original speaker. This can be illustrated in an utterance such as (67) below:
(67) I mean, she just shouted at him would he just wake up already and help her find
her damn keys. She was completely out of order.
To further illustrate that this shift is obligatory, take the context in (68).
(68) Context: I think that Jane is lazy and wastes everyone’s time, but Mary is always
sympathetic to her. Mary is going out for coffee and says:
Mary: Will poor Jane be able to join me today?
Me: Mary asked if the lazy waster would be able to join her today.
Me: #Mary asked would the lazy waster be able to join her today.
Although the indirect speech report in (68) is acceptable as a report of Mary’s question,
because the attitude towards Jane can be easily attributed to the speaker, the EIQ in (68)
is not, as it must attribute to Mary attitudes towards Jane that she does not have.
Another attested example illustrates this claim with respect to discourse particles.
Assuming informally that the discourse particle oo in English expresses something like
excitement at a new idea, the example in (69) illustrates how it can be included in an
EIQ as an expression of the original speaker’s excitement. The context is that the original
speaker suddenly finds out that an old friend (the reporting speaker) and her family are
visiting the area:
(69) Theyj said oo, could wei come over for coffee so wei did [go over for coffee]
Yorkshire Eng., attested 29th Dec 2015
The fact that the reporting speaker was in the area was not new to the reporting speaker,
so oo must orient to the original speaker. In addition to this, the emphasis in (69) marks a
stretch in the utterance during which the reporting speaker mimics the original speaker’s
voice, starting with oo.
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This perspective shift32 is strictly limited to the embedded clause, however: any ex-
pressives in the matrix clause are evaluated with respect to the reporting speaker, just like
in direct speech reports.
(70) a. The bitchreport shouted, “Wake up already and help me find my damnoriginal
keys!”
b. The bitchreport shouted would he wake up already and help her find her
damnoriginal keys.
c. The bitchreport shouted that he should wake up and help her find her
damnreport keys.
The syntactic shape and expressive aspects of the EIQ are also accessible for further com-
ment by others in the discourse, another similarity between EIQs and direct speech reports
which distinguishes them from indirect speech reports. As a result, these elements of an
EIQ can be directly questioned as well as its content. This can be seen in example (71),
which is contrasted with the minimally-differing standard embedded question in (72).33
(71) A: You asked me did I cook dinner for you.
B: No I didn’t, I asked did you make me a cup of tea.
B’: No I didn’t, I was much more polite about it than that!
(72) A: You asked me if I had cooked dinner for you.
B: No I didn’t, I asked if you had made me a cup of tea.
B’: #No I didn’t, I was much more polite about it than that!
32I will also refer to this as perspective disambiguation, as some elements may be evaluated with re-
spect to the matrix subject in standard embedded clauses if the pragmatic context is right. However,
only matrix subject orientation is available in EIQs, and a similar disambiguation effect will be shown to
hold in other quasi-quotational constructions such as German/Mainland Scandinavian EV2 and Romance
recomplementation.
33It appears that some speakers who do not accept EIQs are still sensitive to the distinction between
(71) and (72) (thanks to Caitlin Light for pointing this out). This raises the following question: what
does it mean for such judgements to be available to non-native speakers of these dialects? I take this as
further support for the idea that “non-EIQ” dialects may not actually exist, and instead there is a cline of
acceptability that speakers place themselves on.
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3.6 Characteristics of EIQs only: syntax
In terms of extraction, EIQs appear at first blush to pattern with direct speech reports
in that they are opaque to extraction (cf. Quine (1960), Oshima (2006), and many oth-
ers). EIQs pattern with direct speech reports against indirect speech reports in blocking
extraction of arguments, including those traditionally referred to as “D-linked”:
(73) a. *[Which book]i did Dave ask, “Should I read ti?”
b. ?[Which book]i did Dave ask whether he should read ti?
c. *[Which book]]i did Dave ask should he read ti?
In general, extraction of adjuncts is disallowed too, though this is also blocked from the
wh-islands created by interrogative indirect speech reports:
(74) a. *Howi did Dave ask, “Did Jane see Mary ti?”
b. *Howi did Dave ask if Jane saw Mary ti?
c. *Howi did Dave ask did Jane see Mary ti?
However, “where”/“when” adjuncts can be extracted from both EIQs and indirect speech
reports according to my own experimental studies (on which more below), in contrast with
direct speech reports:
(75) Island effects: weak islands?
a. *Wherei did Dave ask, “Did Jane see Mary ti?”
b. ?*Wherei did Dave ask if Jane saw Mary ti?
c. ?*Wherei did Dave ask did Jane see Mary ti?
In order to understand exactly what types of element can be extracted from EIQs, as well
as indirect and direct speech, I conducted three short empirical studies.
The matter of extraction from speech reports, particularly from interrogative speech re-
ports, poses a number of puzzles. Focusing on indirect speech reports, it has recently been
argued that sentence-initial wh-phrases are strongly preferred to be associated with a ma-
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trix rather than an embedded clause, if the reading is possible (Omaki et al. 2014) though
past and contemporary research argues against this in the case of acquisition (de Villiers
et al. 1990, Woods 2014a) and in adult speakers (Weverink 1991, Weissenborn et al. 1991).
However, embedded interrogatives are believed to be subject to the condition banning
movement out of wh-islands. Moreover, inversion in the embedded clause is considered to
be a complicating factor which prevents extraction from embedded clauses in adults, but
not in children (Weverink (1991), using data collected by Jill de Villiers), though the stim-
uli used by de Villiers all concern the matrix verb say. To clarify the state of affairs with
respect to the paradigm example of EIQs (involving the matrix verb ask) and with respect
to the different dialects which contain EIQs, I ran three studies: two question-answer tasks
and one grammaticality judgement task. The full methodologies, results and discussion
can be found in the appendix, but it is most important to note the following points:
(76) a. The data showed that neither polar EIQs nor standard embedded polar ques-
tions are indisputably strong islands as both permitted extraction out of these
contexts in more than 15% of cases (extraction from wh-EIQs and standard
embedded wh-questions was minimal);
b. The data confirms the there is a clear argument-adjunct divide described
above: speakers are much more likely to interpret where and when with an
embedded clause interpretation than who and what ;
c. In a three-way comparison, extraction of arguments from EIQs is judged better
than extraction of arguments from direct quotes, but worse than extraction
of arguments from standard embedded questions;
d. Speakers who accept EIQs in grammaticality judgement tasks permit less
extraction from embedded clauses than speakers who do not accept EIQs in
grammaticality judgement tasks in general, suggesting that they are more
sensitive to the possibility of independent illocutionary force in embedded
clauses. This is in line with the discussion in de Villiers et al. (2011).
Something that is clear based on these results is that even direct speech reports may not
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be the strong islands34 they have always been taken to be. Whilst extraction out of them
was clearly not judged wholly grammatical, it was not wholly rejected either. Furthermore,
it is in fact possible to find dialogues in which extraction from direct speech reports occurs;
the dialogue below is taken from a transcript of a recording of a maths tutorial. John is
the teacher and Ruben the pupil; note, furthermore, that this is an example of extraction
out of a directly quoted imperative:
(77) John: 〈unclear〉 squared it gets smaller and smaller. So that’s going to be nought
point four.
Ruben: Mm.
John: So the gradient at that point is about two. Erm what wh– where were we
〈unclear〉 where did I say find the gradient? Where X equal to three?
Ruben: Yeah.
John: Sorry 〈unclear〉 something wrong that.
Ruben: 〈laugh〉
John: So we’d be, oh, okay, that’s good cos you can do it.
Ruben: 〈laugh〉 When X is three? BNC, J91 378 (speech)
Sudo (2013) also notes that the opacity of direct speech reports is not as absolute as we
may assume, and not just for extraction. He shows that wh-doublets, which he analyses
as indefinites ranging over referring expressions, can appear in direct speech reports in
Japanese and as such represent a kind of metalinguistic quantification into direct speech
reports:35
(78) a. John-wa
John-top
“Bill-ga
Bill-nom
kita”
came
to
comp
itta.
said
“John said, “Bill came”.”
b. John-wa
John-top
“dare-dare-ga
who-who-nom
kita”
came
to
comp
itta.
said
34For adults; many studies have shown that children are insensitive to quotes-as-islands (Weverink 1991,
Hollebrandse 2003, 2007) and freely extract out of them until around the age of 7 or 8.
35Recall that (78a) is ambiguous as to whether it is a direct or indirect speech report, whereas (78b)
must be a direct speech report due to the presence of the wh-doublet (Sudo 2013, p.4).
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“John said “Whatsisname came”.36 Sudo (2013, p.8)
Similarly in English, elements of direct speech reports can be replaced with indefinites
when the speaker wishes to report an utterance which she cannot remember verbatim.
The example in (79) shows that not only nouns, but other lexical items can be replaced
by terms like something in order to plug gaps in a half-remembered quote:
(79) What did I say, Scott then had the cheek to something me? Wish me, that was
it, wasn’t it. BNC, KCE 3472 (speech)
It is also clear from natural speech that expressions which are presented as direct
speech (or mental state) reports can also be “hijacked” by the reporting speaker who may
unfaithfully report the original discourse or thought for some kind of discourse effect, as
in the example below:
(80) Auntie Mary obviously went37, “I can’t just give a cheque as a wedding present,
I’ll give them a shit piece of art as well.”
Yorkshire Eng., attested, 28th Feb 2015
Assuming that Auntie Mary is fond of her relatives and would only give them presents she
thinks to be good ones, it is unlikely that the quotation above accurately represents her
thoughts and speech. Rather, the speaker has inserted her own thoughts and judgements
into the quotation while still presenting it, to all intents and purposes, as a quotation
and therefore as representative of Auntie Mary’s thought process. This suggests that
direct quotation is not as opaque as we sometimes assume. Furthermore, the structure
of the utterance above is clearly one of an attributed quotation in terms of indexicality,
independent tense and the syntactic constraints it is subject to:
36I have adapted slightly Sudo’s gloss to make the point immediately transparent to readers who are
unfamiliar with Sudo’s paper; in fact, he refrains from equating terms like whatsisname to the wh-doublets
due to their wider distribution.
37“Go” quotatives are most often used to report the speech of third persons (Romaine & Lange 1991,
p.243); in this case, context makes clear that it is her mental state that is being “reported”.
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(81) a. *Whati did Auntie Mary say
38, “I can’t just give them a cheque as a wedding
present, I’ll give them ti as well.”
Both the empirical and experimental data therefore suggest that EIQs fall somewhere
between direct speech reports and indirect speech reports on some continuum of islandhood.
As will be shown, this intermediate nature of EIQs extends to their interpretation and
ultimately, the conditions in which they are used instead of indirect or direct speech reports.
3.7 Characteristics of EIQs only: semantics and pragmatics
EIQs also have properties independent of direct and indirect speech reports, in particular
the implications which hold between the matrix arguments and the identity of the original
discourse participants, i.e. the speaker and addressee(s) of the embedded question. An
example of this, (65b), is repeated below as (82):
(82) I asked was she having an affair.
In the absence of an overt “addressee” (that is, matrix indirect object) in the EIQ, a
referent in the embedded question is assumed to be the addressee. In the case that there
are two referents in the embedded question, it is usually the subject, in these cases he:
(83) a. I asked did he go to see her.
b. I asked what did he show her.
Furthermore, if there is no overlap between matrix arguments and the original discourse
participants, EIQs can be harder to interpret. In particular, EIQs with third-person matrix
arguments and first- or second-person embedded arguments are hard to resolve if they are
string-identical to direct speech and pragmatically unlikely to occur:
38The predicate is changed here as extraction over quotative predicates such as go and be like are inde-
pendently ruled out (cf. Flagg (2007), Haddican & Zweig (2012)):
(i) What did he say?
(ii) *What did he go?
(iii) *What was he like?
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(84) a. John asked Mary if Ispeaker could meet youaddressee at the weekend
b. John asked Mary, “Could IJohn meet you Mary at the weekend?”
c. John asked Mary could Ispeaker meet youaddressee at the weekend
Without context it is easy to construe (84c) as a direct speech quotation because of its
string similarity to direct speech reports and because it is slightly pragmatically odd that
John would ask such a question of Mary and expect an answer. Context improves the ease
of achieving this reading:
(85) Context: John is my secretary, Mary is yours and we are overdue a meeting.
John asked Mary could Ispeaker meet youaddressee at the weekend
When the EIQ cannot be string-identical to direct speech (without assuming a fairly con-
trived context) the EIQ reading is easier to achieve:
(86) John asked Mary did Ispeaker meet youaddressee at the weekend.
It is not immediately clear why these facts should hold. It is evident that there is a very
close connection between the embedded and the matrix event, in that the reporting speaker
must have close knowledge of both the original speech act and the original discourse context
in order to accurately use an EIQ; arguably, a better understanding of the discourse context
in which the original speech act was made is needed to use an EIQ than is needed for a
direct speech report, as suggested by the facts on substitution in section 3.3. It is also clear
that the difficulties in resolving first- and second-person embedded arguments when the
matrix arguments are third-person is no kind of syntactic constraint, but indeed relates
to context and plausibility. This is not a unique phenomenon: there are other types of
structure in other languages which link propositions to speech acts so closely that they
prefer first-person agents or a strong contextual link between third-person agents and the
speaker.
An example is the case of independent or indexical clause types in Plains Cree, an
Algonquian language spoken in Saskatchewan and Alberta, Canada. Plains Cree, like the
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other dialects of Cree, makes a distinction between independent and conjunct clauses.
Clauses which are marked as independent are indexical as they are strongly bound to the
current speech act situation in terms of temporal and spatial deixis and speaker commit-
ment. Independent clauses are usually used in out-of-the-blue contexts; if they are used
in narrative contexts, the topic of the clause will continually be reaffirmed as an overt
nominal as anaphoric elements are blocked in independent clauses (Cook 2014, pp.71-72).
Conjunct clauses, in contrast, are not so closely linked to the speaker but can be used to
express distance from the speaker’s point of view; Cook (2014) analyses them as being
anaphoric on previous discourse. Conjunct clauses are the only type of clause which can
be embedded39 and generally appear in conversational, narrative and established contexts
(Cook 2014, pp.139-140). Example (87a) illustrates a bare independent clause (an inde-
pendent clause that does not have a left-peripheral marker for reasons outside the scope)
and example (87b) a conjunct clause:
(87) a. Clare
Clare
kˆıweˆ-pimohteˆ-w.
home-walk-3sg.indep
“Clare walked home.”
b. Clare
Clare
eˆ-kˆıweˆ-pimohteˆ-e.
conj-home-walk-3sg.conj
“. . . Clare walked home.” Plains Cree, Wiltschko (to appear)
Cook (2014) claims that both types of clause are equally complex in terms of structure—
there is not one which has more structure than the other—but that independent clause
marking ties the proposition to the speaker’s coordinates and commitments in a way that
conjunct clause marking does not. Example (87a), for example, does not only convey the
proposition that Clare walked home, but that the speaker knows it to be a fact and is
stressing that it is the case. Example (87b) only conveys the proposition that Clare walked
home and distances the speaker from any commitment to the proposition or taking any
responsibility for its truth. Cook offers another example with a more subjective predicate,
39Cook (2014) and Wiltschko (to appear) note that the distinction between independent and conjunct
modes does not map onto the distinction between embedded and matrix clauses; independent clauses must
be matrix clauses, but conjunct clauses can appear in matrix or embedded contexts. This means that
Plains Cree could be a valuable resource for determining the nature of the IAP in matrix clauses, though
this will have to be pursued in future research.
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which further highlights the role of the speaker in independent clauses:
(88) Context: consultants are asked to translate the English sentence “I like this chair.”
a. mıˆywaˆsin
good.vii
oˆma
dem.inanimate
teˆhapiwin.
sit.animate-intrans.nom
“This is a nice chair (to me).”
b. #eˆ-miywaˆsik
conj.good.vii
oˆma
dem.inanimate
teˆhapiwin.
sit.animate-intrans.nom
“. . . This is a nice chair.” Plains Cree, Cook (2014, pp.108-109)
Cook’s consultants suggest (88a) as an appropriate translation of I like this chair as
the predicate mıˆywaˆsi- is interpreted with respect to the speaker. Moreover, one of the
consultants notes the following:
(89) “If you use mıˆywaˆsin about something that someone else has, then the other person
has to give it to you. It’s very powerful.”
The intuition in (89) suggests the strength of the connection to the speaker conveyed by
the use of an independent clause. It is particularly relevant to the EIQ data shown in (85)
that a strong connection is forged between the speaker and the proposition in independent
clauses, just as there must be a strong contextual link between the matrix speaker and the
question in the EIQ in (85) for the EIQ to be licit. Cook further notes that:
When the subject of [a] predicate is distinct from the speaker (e.g. a third
person), the use of an indexical clause means that the speaker has some other
relation to the proposition: the speaker may have experienced the event coded
by the proposition, be epistemically committed to the proposition, or be pro-
viding an evaluation of the proposition.
Cook (2014, p.109)
In contrast, the conjunct clause in (88b) shows no such connection between speaker
and proposition; Cook’s consultants say that a conjunct clause would never be used to
express the speaker’s own opinion towards the chair.
The EIQ data in (85) and the data from Plains Cree illustrate that natural language can
use syntactic and morphosyntactic means to encode a close relationship between a relevant
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discourse participant and a proposition or question. In the case of Plains Cree, clauses
are typed according to whether the speaker and her situation are intimately related to the
proposition (in the case of independent clauses) or whether the speaker is distant from
the proposition (in conjunct clauses). In English, an EIQ is used to convey an intimate
link between the reported question and the original questioner and can also imply that the
reporting speaker has privileged knowledge of the original discourse. In contrast, indirect
questions do not make any claims about the relationship of the reporting speaker to the
original discourse, nor do they encode any details about the original discourse context.
3.8 Summary: EIQs as quasi-quotational structures
It is clear from the facts on EIQs that they are syntactically embedded due to the presence
of Sequence of Tense effects, the lack of indexical shift and the binding facts. There is
also no phonological evidence to suggest that EIQs constitute an independent clause or
utterance. However, it is also clear that they are not selected by the matrix predicate under
which they are embedded. Negation, modal and [+wh] operators in the matrix context are
not expected to interfere in selection relations, yet they affect the compatibility of EIQs
with certain matrix predicates.
On the other hand, EIQs are semantically and pragmatically much more similar to
direct speech. They presuppose that the embedded question was at some point the QUD
of the original discourse, regardless of the matrix predicate and whether or not it usually
communicates an explicit questioning act. They can also contain expressive and perspec-
tival elements contained in the original act, for example speech act adverbs and discourse
particles. Finally, the exact content of the EIQ is restricted by the original speaker’s
knowledge and common ground; if a given label for a particular referent is not connected
with that referent by the original speaker, then the reporting speaker may not use that
label in the EIQ. Yet EIQs differ from direct speech reports in that there is no verbatim
requirement of the kind imposed on direct speech reports.
It is therefore proposed that EIQs are a kind of quasi-quotational structure. They
are neither indirect nor direct speech reports. Instead, they combine aspects of both to
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produce a structure which does not require the reporting speaker to repeat or reperform
the original speech act verbatim but allows the reporting of expressive and not-at-issue
content, content which cannot be expressed through the use of indirect speech reports.
Neither are they strictly embedded speech acts, because there are phenomena such as huh
as outlined in section 3.4 that can never be embedded. Instead, I refer to EIQs as embedded
illocutionary acts due to these restrictions on exactly the type of so-called root phenomena
that can be embedded in EIQs. EIQs are not the only exponents of quasi-quotation in
natural language and other cases will be treated in the chapters to follow.
The reader may at this point ask whether EIQs are cases of “mixed” quotation,40
analogous to the cases of Japanese imperatives examined by Maier (2009, 2010). According
to Maier, mixed quotation “consists of an indirect speech report in which a part is quoted
verbatim” (Maier 2010, p.3). In his system, indirect speech complements to verbs such
as ‘say’ are of type t and direct speech complements to verbs like ‘say’ are of type u, an
utterance type. Embedded clauses in mixed quotations are also of type t, but they contain
some part that, whilst not an utterance of type u in itself, carries the presupposition of
having been said verbatim. To use Maier’s key example, (90) is made up of an assertion
and a presupposition:
(90) John said that this is “news to me”.
a. Presupposition: John used the expression ‘news to me’ to express some prop-
erty P.
b. Assertion: John said that this has property P. Maier (2010, p.7)
Maier notes that in (90), ‘news to me’ is still a VP of type et rather than an utterance of
type u, just as it would be in the following sentence:
(91) John said that this is news to me.
The differences between (91) and (90) are that the referent of the first-person pronoun is
John in (90) but the speaker in (91) (Maier 2010, p.7). Moreover, the presupposition in
40As did Hotze Rullmann at WCCFL 33, with thanks.
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(90) is like an anaphor in that the property of something being “news to X” exists that
can be referred to in (90) but not in (91) (Maier 2010, p.9).
There are a number of reasons why I do not consider EIQs to be mixed quotation qua
insertion of directly quoted elements into an indirect speech act, and also some reasons
why Maier’s ‘mixed quotation’ class might not be a particularly helpful one.
Beginning with the second point, it is not entirely clear in Maier’s work how mixed
quotation is distinct from indirect speech reporting in some cases, nor is it clear that
that distinction is empirically justified. In his 2010 paper, Maier suggests that embedded
imperatives in Japanese (and English and German) should be analysed as mixed quotation
because the dedicated imperative form of the embedded verb used in such cases is the
same as that used in matrix imperatives, but indexical elements of the embedded clause
are determined by the current, and not the reported, utterance context. He claims that
non-mixed quotation analyses can only account for this combination of matrix verb form
and shifted indexicals by the insertion of a ‘monstrous operator’ in the sense of Kaplan
(1989), despite these operators not being otherwise available in these languages.
However, Maier does not provide any strong evidence that the Japanese examples are
not examples of embedded speech reports other than the presence of the imperative verb
form and the inability to extract over the imperative verb form; he does not use other
diagnostics such as the availability of wh-doublets (cf. Sudo (2013)) or the unavailability
of NPI licensing.
What is more, he assumes that monsters in the Kaplanian sense are the only method
of accounting for the lack of indexical shift; an intuition which runs counter to the usual
analysis of monsters as operators in indirect speech reports which effect indexical shift,
rather than mask it. As I intend to show, there are other structural ways of analysing
the insertion of elements from the original context without resorting to a mixture of direct
speech reporting plus monster operators. In fact, his account of mixed quotation leaves a lot
of questions unanswered: he seems to propose a verbatim requirement on everything except
indexicals, though sometimes these are reported verbatim too. He also suggests that free
insertion of other elements deemed necessary by the reporting speaker is available. Neither
of these points is incompatible with an analysis of imperative indirect speech reports such
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as that proposed by Kaufmann (2015).
Finally, the elements which undergo shifting in EIQs (and in similar constructions) are
much more constrained than would be expected under a mixed quotation account. If EIQs
were a matter of mixed quotation, we would assume that speech act adverbs, for example,
would optionally orient to the current speaker in cases in which they are not quoted, but
this is not possible: in EIQs they obligatorily orient to the original speaker. The same goes
for discourse particles and imperative verb forms in English; these all obligatorily orient to
the original discourse participants and not the current ones. Moreover, temporal adverbials
do not shift. This argument further extends to non-Indo-European languages which show
a range of quasi-quotational constructions in which personal pronouns (of all syntactic
roles, not just subject or object) or verbal agreement may shift perspective. This shift
affects the availability of other elements in the clause, such as vocatives, which is directly
conditioned by the presence of shifting. Crucially, all these phenomena are dependent on
each other, which a mixed quotation analysis cannot predict due to its lack of constraints.
In all these cases, mixed quotation is also freer than quasi-quotation, because as (85) shows,
there must be some kind of connection between the matrix arguments and the embedded
EIQ. Similarly, in languages like Manambu41, quasi-quotational constructions are only licit
when the matrix subject is intimately involved in and affected by the original speech act
(Aikhenvald 2008, p.397). This restriction does not apply in mixed quotation, however,
as the original speaker Herman need not have any particular connection with or have ever
conversed with Wanda in order to license mixed quotation in (92):
(92) Herman said that Wanda “hated her looks with all her heart and soul.”
In these ways the effects of quasi-quotation are much more constrained than mixed quota-
tion, in which any element of the clause can potentially be quoted.
Given these issues, I do not see that Maier’s account actually shows that Japanese
embedded imperatives are a real mixture of direct and indirect speech reporting, nor that
the presence of the imperative verb form in embedded contexts is indicative of direct quo-
41An Ndu language spoken in New Guinea.
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tation. Furthermore, given the lack of restriction on the mechanisms that Maier proposes,
it does not seem that mixed quotation as Maier characterises it is a particularly helpful
class which could be usefully extended to other languages.
However, there are elements of Maier’s analysis that will prove to be very useful in the
following account of EIQs. In a sentence like (93), Maier considers mixed quotation to
“induce a meaning shift, from the actual meaning of the words to the meaning that the
reported speaker associates with those words” (Maier 2010, p.7).
(93) John said that this is “news to me”.
Maier states that use of the string “news to me” carries a presupposition that these quoted
words are meant to express some particular property which belongs to something else in
the speech report; in (93), the use of this string expresses that whatever “this” refers is
new information to John, and that the reporting speaker felt this to be notable in her
report. We have already seen above that the use of the EIQ over a standard indirect
speech report also carries a presupposition, namely that the question contained in the EIQ
at some point constituted a question which was at issue (discussed or overtly asked) in the
original discourse.
Maier’s analysis aside, there are many other reasons to reject the idea that EIQs are
examples of mixed direct and indirect quotation. Firstly, there is no requirement whatso-
ever that any part of the EIQ is a verbatim quote. To take examples from the previous
discussion like (60) and (58a), repeated below as (94), there is no requirement that the
questions represented in these EIQs were even asked as questions, though the question
they represent must have been discussed in the original discourse. Nor is it clear which
part of (94a) or (94b) could be said to be directly quoted:
(94) a. Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party.
b. I didn’t ask were you coming last night.
Given that it hardly seems sensible to start considering individual lexical items in these
examples such as party, Joe and coming as quoted items, it is unclear how EIQs could
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definitively be considered mixed quotation, or even quotational at all, if quotation is con-
tingent on some kind of verbatim reproduction. Other aspects of the behaviour of EIQs
are intermediate between the behaviour of indirect and direct speech reports, such as ex-
tractibility of elements (as illustrated in section 3.4) the types of discourse markers which
can be adjoined in EIQs (as will be illustrated in section 6.2). As such, it does not seem
warranted to analyse EIQs as a mixture of direct and indirect speech reports, but instead
to analyse them as a separate method of reporting questions altogether.
I will do this by retaining the spirit of McCloskey’s (2006) analysis of Irish English
EIQs and proposing that the extra layer of structure that he introduces is a projection
dedicated to encoding the illocutionary force of a clause. This projection is inspired by,
but is an amended version of the Speech Act structures proposed by Speas & Tenny (2003)
and Haegeman & Hill (2013). In this way not only the syntactic characteristics of the EIQ
but also its interpretive characteristics may be accounted for.
3.9 Conclusion
EIQs provide speakers of English with a third method of reporting speech that is inter-
mediate between direct and indirect speech reports. EIQs do not introduce the verbatim
inference that comes with use of a direct speech report, most noticeably because indexical
shift does not occur. However, like direct speech reports, EIQs allow the representation
of (certain) not-at-issue and expressive components of the original speech act. In partic-
ular the EIQ expresses the relationship between the discourse participants to be one of
true information seeking or true requesting, such that the original speaker’s stance and
attitude with respect to the question is clear. Consequently, the EIQ represents an orig-
inal speech act but does not reperform it. While it represents the discourse move made
by the original question, it does not itself constitute the same discourse move in the new
discourse. Furthermore, the EIQ refers to a conversational move made in order to resolve
a question under discussion in the relevant original discourse. In the case of EIQs used
under present tense predicates, it is proposed that the use of the EIQ effectively ends up
denoting itself, though this proposal will be refined in chapter 5. Taking the syntactic and
106
pragmatic dependence of the EIQ together with its referential nature, we see that the EIQ
can be analysed as an embedded illocutionary act in a less powerful way than in Krifka
(2014), but with more pragmatic effects than the analyses of Henry (1995) and McCloskey
(2006)42 can account for.
In the chapters to follow I shall discuss the syntactic structure of the EIQ, building on
McCloskey’s (2006) analysis to incorporate new ideas about the differences between the
two highest functional heads in the structure and how the structure can account for the
syntactic and semantic characteristics of the EIQ. In doing this I will also bring in data on
quasi-quotational structures in other languages, in particular Spanish, Catalan, European
Portuguese, German and the mainland Scandinavian languages. I shall then discuss the
syntactic relationship of the EIQ to the matrix clause, how this affects its distribution and
how it fits into our understanding of clausal complementation more generally.
42It is only fair to note that McCloskey’s analysis, in noting the availability of adjunct phrases in EIQs,
nods towards the discourse role of the EIQ—something that he explicitly makes mention to at the end of
his paper (McCloskey 2006, pp.114-118). He does not develop this approach in the paper, however.
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Chapter 4
Analysis Part I: the Illocutionary
Act Phrase
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter my focus will be on justifying an extra layer of structure that I claim is
present in EIQs and on detailing the role(s) and representation of this extra layer. I will
refer to this layer as the Illocutionary Act phrase (IAP) because, I claim, it instantiates
independent illocutionary force in the embedded clause but is not the full Speech Act layer
of Speas & Tenny (2003) and others.
I will also claim that the IAP is available in other quasi-quotational constructions, so
in this chapter and the one to follow, I will bring in and discuss examples of such construc-
tions. I will specifically consider recomplementation in Spanish, Catalan and European
Portuguese, which occurs in embedded assertions and embedded questions, and discourse-
related embedded verb second (EV2)1 in German and Mainland Scandinavian2, which
occurs in embedded assertions.
1This is in contrast with “generalised” EV2 as found in Yiddish (Diesing 1990), Afrikaans (Biberauer
2002a,b, 2015b), and dialects of Icelandic (Ro¨gnvaldsson & Thra´insson (1990), amongst many others). The
typology of EV2 across Germanic is still only partially understood, and there are other languages with
apparently discourse-related EV2 which I will not discuss in this thesis, including Dutch, Swiss German,
Frisian and possibly Faroese.
2These languages do not behave wholly the same with respect to EV2 (cf. Julien (2015)) and I will
highlight the differences between German on the one hand and the Mainland Scandinavian languages on
the other as they become relevant.
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4.2 Motivations for extra structure
4.2.1 Refining and extending past analyses
I propose that an extra layer of structure, specifically an extra projection above ForceP,
is present in the embedded clause of a quasi-quotational construction for the following
reasons: the possibility of adjoining high material that is generally barred in clausal com-
plements; the availability of V-to-Forceo movement that is not necessarily in complemen-
tary distribution with the presence of a complementiser (cf. obligatory complementisers
in Swedish EV2, some EIQ examples in English); the islandhood of EIQs, EV2 and re-
complementation clauses; and the special meaning of quasi-quotational constructions, in
particular the obligatory disambiguation of perspectives. As I will argue in this chapter
and the one to follow, this projection consists of a perspectival monster that disambiguates
between potential perspective holders and is the argument to a functional head.
In many ways this proposal is a refinement and an extension of past ideas. It is heavily
influenced by the CP recursion analysis of EIQs by McCloskey (2006). McCloskey claimed
that the availability of root-like adjunction is due to the presence of a functional head—
in his analysis a second CP—between the matrix verb and the embedded CP, thereby
circumventing the Adjunction Prohibition to CP that he attributes to Chomsky (1986,
p.6):
(1) Adjunction to a phrase which is s-selected by a lexical (open class) head
is ungrammatical. McCloskey (2006, p.93)
The availability of high adjunction correlates with the availability of verb movement to
Forceo, so McCloskey argues that the extra functional head accounts for both phenomena
following established principles on lexical and functional selection and also shows parallels
with the distinction between embedded interrogatives that represent true questions and
those that represent resolved propositions.3 Although McCloskey informally ties the avail-
3McCloskey also claims that the availability of multiply realised complementisers, as in examples like
(i), also provide evidence for a CP recursion structure (McCloskey 2006, p.104):
(i) My fervent prayer is that for the sake of the president and the sake of this nation that this matter
This intuition, though attractive, is not correct for a number of reasons. These will be discussed in chapter
6. I do not believe that this diminishes the strength of McCloskey’s analysis for EIQs however.
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ability of the CP recursion structure to differences in illocutionary force, I will take this
informal connection one step further to show that the co-occurrence of CP recursion and
independently represented embedded illocutionary force is not solely pragmatic but has
other syntactic reflexes. In so doing, I will also do away with the Complementiser Hap-
lology Filter that McCloskey requires to avoid multiply recursing CPs, instead concluding
that the restriction of the CP recursion structure to just two positions results from the
two functional heads being distinct and interacting with embedding predicates in specific
ways.
This proposal is also a refinement and an extension of Speas & Tenny’s (2003) pro-
posals that speech acts are headed by a three-place predicate containing a syntactically-
represented speaker and hearer with a silent [ask] head (or relevant equivalent). Speas &
Tenny primarily focused on matrix cases and some problems for their account have already
been discussed in section 2.3.4. Postulating a whole three-place predicate with speaker and
hearer in the case of embedded clauses with independent illocutionary force would imme-
diately and rightly be subject to the criticism of redundancy, given the presence of the
matrix clause.
However, a secondary element to their analysis may prove to be of use in cases such as
that of quasi-quotational constructions. In addition to the three-place predicate described
above, Speas & Tenny look to account for the highly restricted properties of phenomena
like logophoric pronouns and evidentiality by proposing a further projection between their
Speech Act phrase and the rest of the clause called SentienceP. SentienceP relates a Seat
of Knowledge in its specifier with an Evidential element in its complement (Speas & Tenny
2003, p.333). This SentienceP has a dual use; accounting for cases in which the perspective
holder is not one of the discourse participants and accounting for so-called “interrogative
flip” using framework-internal principles. Zu (2015) also uses this structure to account
for verbal agreement in Newari (Sino-Tibetan), which varies depending on whether the
perspective-holder is a discourse participant or an argument of the matrix clause. She
argues that the verbal agreement is mediated via a logophorically-sensitive PRO in the
specifier of SentienceP, which sits between the matrix clause and the complement CP.
I will propose a similar analysis to Zu’s in order to account for perspective disambigua-
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tion in quasi-quotational constructions, which retains the insights of Speas & Tenny with
respect to syntactically-represented perspective holders. My account will differ in terms
of the representation of the perspective holder, which crucially is NOT a referential DP (a`
la Speas & Tenny) or PRO (a` la Zu) but a perspectival monster that will be discussed in
the next chapter. Moreover, I will extend Zu’s conclusion that SentienceP (in this work
IAP)4 is embeddable by showing that only IAP is embeddable and that other discourse
projections are not. This will account for the restrictions on the type of discourse particles
that can be embedded in quasi-quotational contructions such as EIQs and EV2.
There are further reasons for postulating an extra layer of structure based on the specific
data considered in chapter 3 and data from EV2. Firstly, it was shown in section 3.4 that
discourse particles like please can occur as the highest element of the EIQ. In Woods (2016),
I show that there are (at least) two types of please in English. One of these is embeddable
in contexts such as EIQs and is a verb-based, clause-initial, integrated functional head that
interacts with but cross-cuts clause types. Its effect is to specify the illocutionary force
carried by the clause it heads. This kind of please is only compatible with interrogative
and imperative clause types (as shown in (2)) and specifies their interpretation such that
they can only be interpreted as requests rather than information-seeking questions (3) or
orders (4), respectively:
(2) a. Please can I have a beer?
b. Please get me a beer.
c. *Please I’ll have a beer. (without prosodic break)
(3) a. Can you open the window? Request or information-seeking question
b. Please can you open the window? Request only
(4) a. Open the window. Request or order
b. Please open the window. Request only
4Note that Speas & Tenny cleave quite closely to Cinque’s (1999) hierarchy of projections to guide their
proposed structure and Zu keeps to their original terminology. I do not follow this line of thinking, not least
because speech act adverbs can be embedded in EIQs without any evidence that a speech act projection
with speaker and hearer is present. It is for this reason that I will not follow their labelling structure
despite the similarities between our proposals.
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As previously noted in section 2.4.2, Coniglio & Zegrean (2012) examine similar kinds of
discourse particles in matrix clauses in German, Italian and Romanian. They claim that
the way in which they cross-cut clause types is evidence that illocutionary force, which they
define as the expression of speaker attitudes and intentions, is syntactically represented in
a projection separate from any clause typing mechanism. They represent the relationship
between Illocutionary Force, Force and discourse particles5 as one of agreement, in which
a discourse particle, overt or covert, values an interpretable clause type feature on a lower
Force head, and an interpretable “intention” feature on a higher Force head. They represent
this relationship as in (5), using their original notation:
(5) ill. force [utype] [val]/[i intent] [val] ←− intentionality valued
clause type [itype] [val] ←− clause type valued
prt [utype] [val]/[uintent] [val] Coniglio & Zegrean (2012, p.249)
The diagram in (5) illustrates that neither the clause-typing head nor the illocutionary force
head that Coniglio & Zegrean assume enter the derivation with values for their respective
features. These features are valued via Agree with a particle, a functional head that may
or may not be spelled out in a given sentence.
Problems with this analysis include: the postulation of a null discourse particle in
all sentences that do not contain an overt particle, which they claim is not spelled out
due to the lack of “markedness” of its value, though it is not clear what they mean by
“markedness” here; the fact that one discourse particle may be compatible with a number
of different clause types; a lack of clarity as to how their system copes with realisation of
multiple particles; and a lack of explanation as to how other processes that are dependent
on or mark clause type, such as wh-movement, are triggered in their system.
Whilst I will follow Coniglio & Zegrean’s idea that illocutionary force and clause type
are not represented on the same head, I will propose a very different analysis of how
5Some particles, in particular the German particles, are assumed to be base-generated in the Mittelfeld,
others, such as Romanian oare, are assumed to be generated in the C domain. Woods (2016) outlines
reasons for believing that clause-initial integrated please is generated as the overt instantiation of the IA
head. The position of the discourse particle is not crucial to their analysis (Coniglio & Zegrean 2012,
p.240) or to mine, though the possibility of overtly spelling out the IA head provides stronger evidence for
its presence than apparently obligatory silence would.
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different types of illocutionary force are represented and how they interact with clause
types.6
4.2.2 Directly representing independent illocutionary force
In addition to the presence of high discourse particles that specify illocutionary force,
there is another syntactic reflex that I will argue is directly dependent on independent
illocutionary force, namely the overt instantiation of Forceo either by verb movement (EIQs,
EV2) or repeated complementisers (recomplementation).
In order to argue this, it is necessary first to make clear my definition of independent
illocutionary force. As alluded to in the previous chapter, independent illocutionary force is
not a question of requiring or provoking a response from an addressee. This is a criterion
for independent illocutionary force that seems to be used exclusively in discussions of
embedded illocutionary force in non-direct speech reports, yet few would argue that direct
speech reports containing questions lack independent illocutionary force, even though they
do not require a response from the addressee to whom the report, not the original question,
is addressed for the discourse to continue successfully. Moreover it is not the case that a
clause must be the main point of utterance (MPU, in the sense of Simons (2007)) to have
independent illocutionary force. There are myriad examples of clauses without independent
illocutionary force that can be the MPU—standard embedded declaratives, for instance—
and cases of main clauses which carry illocutionary force yet are not the MPU.
In fact, the main point of utterance is not even strictly tied to the most “speech-act”-
like part of the utterance. There is a variety of reasons why an embedded clause may be
the MPU rather than a matrix clause but that does not mean that the embedded clause
constitutes a separate speech act. One reason that some EIQs may seem like main points of
utterance (or main information requests, MIRs)7 is that they match the main clause type
6To foreground the discussion to come, my analysis of please in Woods (2016) shows that clause-initial
please does not simply cross-cut clause types, but cross-cuts within clause types; it is only available with
polar interrogatives and not with wh-questions. These facts suggest that Portner & Zanuttini’s (2003)
assertion that clause type is a collection of features rather than a single feature on Forceo is the right
approach to take, though the role of Forceo will also be shown to be of particular significance in marking
clause type.
7Simons does not address questions in her paper, though Haddican et al. (2014) define the Main In-
formation Request (MIR), in similar terms to the MPU, as the question denoted by the utterance of an
interrogative sentence in a given context (Haddican et al. 2014, p.100).
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(cf. Haddican et al. (2014)), that is to say that they are both interrogative clauses. Another
trigger for MRI-hood appears to be tense. We see in (6) that neither (a) nor (b) invite a
natural answer to the embedded question, even though one is a standard embedded question
and one is an EIQ. Conversely, both examples in (7) invite a more natural—certainly a
more co-operative—answer to the embedded than to the matrix question:
(6) a. Did you know whether Mary was coming? Standard embedded question
b. ?Did you know was Mary coming? EIQ
(7) a. Do you know whether Mary is coming? Standard embedded question
b. Do you know is Mary coming? EIQ
In fact it also seems that tense actually adds another layer of complexity to the acceptability
of EIQs under certain predicates. If we substitute know in (6) with ask, suddenly the EIQ
seems better-formed, even though (7b) is fine and we know that the acceptability of EIQs
under factive verbs improves under interrogation.
(8) a. Did you ask whether Mary was coming? Standard embedded interrogative
b. Did you ask was Mary coming? EIQ
I do not know why tense interacts with MPU/MIR in this way and will not try to account
for it here. However, the relative acceptability of (6b) and (8b) indicates that although
the EIQ need not be the MIR, it may be preferred that it is, at least in the presence of
a second-person subject. The examples in (9) with a third-person subject do not seem to
differ in acceptability.
(9) a. Did she know was Mary coming?
b. Did she ask was Mary coming?
It is clear that the factors that influence the MPU-ness of a clause are many and interact
in complex ways. It is also clear that independent illocutionary force is not contingent
on the clause being the MPU. Instead, following Krifka (2014), I claim that independent
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illocutionary force is the expression of responsibility being taken for the proposition/set
of propositions in the given clause by a given discourse participant. Note that indepen-
dent illocutionary force simply is not about the availability of attitudinal, expressive or
not-at-issue material, though it is related to this. Like Krifka, I use the term responsibility
rather than commitment, a term commonly used with respect to illocutionary force, be-
cause commitment can be described in terms of strength, which is a separate matter from
illocutionary force. Though a speaker may not be strongly committed to the truth of a
proposition, for example if they use a particularly weak evidential marker of some kind in
a declarative clause, they are still responsible for the truth of that proposition; they take
responsibility for the truth of the proposition in the conversation with the proviso that they
only have weak evidence for it. Moreover, as detailed in section 2.4.3, Krifka (2014) shows
how a speaker can take responsibility for a proposition despite not believing in it at all or
being able to make any real commitment to its truth, for example in the case of lies and
bullshit. In the rest of this dissertation therefore I will use the definitions of illocutionary
force in table 4.1, which are based around the concept of responsibility.8 Note that the
table below is by no means exhaustive and will be developed and elaborated on in the work
to follow, but it is intended to provide a working definition of illocutionary forces upon
which we can build our understanding of the syntax and semantics of quasi-quotational
constructions:
8Thank you to Manfred Krifka for discussing this concept with me and pointing me towards the relevant
literature.
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Force Definition
Examples of clause
type
Asserting
Speaker takes responsibility for the truth
of the proposition (cf. Krifka (2014)
Declaratives
Promising
Speaker takes responsibility for enacting a
desired or required action (M. Krifka, p.c.)
Declaratives (in En-
glish), Promissives
(e.g. Korean)
Questioning
(Information-
seeking)
Speaker expresses the desire for the ad-
dressee to provide a true answer to the
question based on the addressee’s knowl-
edge; the addressee takes responsibility for
the truth of the answer
Interrogatives, some
declaratives
Requesting
Speaker expresses the desire for the ad-
dressee to take responsibility for enact-
ing a desired action, linguistic or non-
linguistic
Interrogatives, Im-
peratives
Ordering
Speaker expresses the requirement for the
addressee to take responsibility for enact-
ing a desired action, linguistic or non-
linguistic
Imperatives
Exclaiming
Speaker takes responsibility for an atti-
tude and making it public (S. Repp, via
M. Krifka, p.c.)
Exclamatives, Inter-
rogatives
Table 4.1: Working definitions of types of illocutionary force
But to return to the original statement made in this section, I claim that the overt
instantiation of Forceo either by verb movement (EIQs, EV2) or repeated complementisers
(recomplementation) is directly dependent on independent illocutionary force. In fact the
relationship is biconditional, because for independent illocutionary force to be present
it must be unambiguous as to where the responsibility for the speech act lies, and this
disambiguation effect only occurs when Forceo is marked either by verb movement or
recomplementation.
4.2.3 Roadmap for this chapter
Having laid out the motivations for postulating extra structure and my approach to illo-
cutionary force, the rest of the chapter focuses on the head of the proposed Illocutionary
Act phrase (the IA head) and will be structured as follows. First I will discuss overt and
covert representations of the IA head and how it encodes illocutionary force like a modal
116
verb but also displays some noun-like properties. To do this I will also bring in data from
languages other than English, in particular data from EV2 in German and Mainland Scan-
dinavian. I will also continue to clarify the meaning of independent illocutionary force and
how this relates to filling Forceo, with particular focus on embedded verb movement and
how independent illocutionary force affects the mechanism of V-to-Force. The details of
the external argument of the IA head will follow in chapter 5.
4.3 Structure and representation
The extra layer of structure proposed here is represented in (10):
(10) a. I asked him [please would he make dinner for me]
b. IAP
perspectival
monster
situation
pronoun
IA’
IA
(please)
ForceP
Force
would
TP
he make
dinner for me
Focusing on the IA head, as shown in (10) it can be optionally spelled out as please if the
embedded clause is compatible with a request reading. In the case that it is spelled out
as please, this overtly marks requesting force and the embedded clause can no longer be
interpreted as an information-seeking question.
Further arguments for postulating clause-initial integrated please as an instantiation of
the IA head are detailed in Woods (2016) and are recapped below:
(11) a. Only in its clause-initial position is please obligatorily interpreted as a request
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marker
b. Clause-initial please is only compatible with clause types that permit a request
reading: polar interrogatives and imperatives
c. Clause-initial please is not a politeness marker (it is possible in non-polite
contexts) but is inseparable from the meaning of requesting
d. With sentence fragments such as “Please Mum!”, please can constitute a
speech act of requesting on its own; it is also interpreted as a request rather
than a politeness marker, with the actual content of the request elided as it
is recoverable from context
e. Clause-initial please is not used by children until they have reliably acquired
CP, despite reinforcement by parents of the polite usage. This suggests that
it is not fully acquired until all the relevant structure is in place
f. Clause-initial please falls into line with other discourse particles also analysed
as illocutionary act heads (cf. Coniglio & Zegrean (2012)):
(i) It cannot be modified
(ii) It cannot be co-ordinated
(iii) It is derived from a verb, namely to please
It is not simply enough to rely on one possible overt instantiation of the IA head, however;
it is also necessary to understand its finer structure, especially when it is covert, and how
it interacts with the Forceo head to bring about the syntactic reflex of verb movement.
The proposal made in this section is that the IA head is a modal operator that may be
overt or covert and that takes two arguments: a clause (whether that be a proposition, a
set of propositions or a property) and the relevant perspective holder(s). To do this, I will
take Hacquard’s (2010) analysis of intensional modal operators in the syntax as a starting
point and extend her analysis to suggest that similar operators are embeddable in precisely
such cases as EIQs and EV2.
4.3.1 V-like structure
Hacquard (2010) argues that the meanings of modal verbs are related to events and de-
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termined by basic principles of binding and locality; they are interpreted according to the
closest event binder, be that a VP event, an event predicate in a higher clause or the
speech event. In proposing this, she claims that speech events are syntactically repre-
sented as modal operators and are therefore syntactic binders for variables just like any
other. Specifically, she proposes that there is one speech event operator per utterance in
the highest position of the clause and that this determines the illocutionary force of the
clause. Taking assertive events as her example, she proposes an ASSERT modal operator in
the style of Alonso-Ovalle & Mene´ndez-Benito (2010) “which quantifies over the speaker’s
epistemic/doxastic alternatives and combines with a proposition” (Hacquard 2010, p.102):
(12) [[assert]]c = λp. λw. ∀w’ ∈ doxspeaker of c(w): p(w’) = 1
(Hacquard 2010, p.102)
Hacquard then reworks the operator in (12) with respect to events. To do this she also
defines what the content (con) of the event is—in the case of assertion, a member of the
set of the speaker’s doxastic alternatives:
(13) [[assert e0]] = λp. λw. Assert(e0,w) & ∀w’∈ ∩con(e0):p(w’) = 1
where ∩con(e0) = dox(ιx Holder(x,e0),w); ιx Holder(x,e0) = speaker
(Hacquard 2010, p.102)
This modal operator differs from matrix verbs qua event binders in three ways: firstly, in
terms of the event doing the binding; secondly, in terms of whose alternative worlds are
being quantified over; and thirdly, in terms of being relativised to a given context. Below is
the definition of believe given by Hacquard, which is treated as “quantif[ying] over worlds
compatible with the subject’s doxastic alternatives” (Hacquard 2010, p.101).
(14) [[believe]] = λp. λx. λw. ∀w’ ∈ dox(x,w): p(w’) = 1 Hacquard (2010, p.101)
In event terms, believe is an “event predicate in terms of the experience, object and context
of the event [. . . ] where con(e) denotes the content of e.
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(15) [[believe]] = λe. λp. λx. λw. Exp(e,x) & belief’(e,w) & ∀w’ ∈ ∩con(e): p(w’) =
1 where ∩con(e) = dox(ιx Exp(e,x), w) Hacquard (2010, p.101)
The details of the differences mentioned above are as follows: firstly, the event in [[assert]]
is bound by the default event binder (cf. Percus (2000)) whereas the event in [[believe]]
is bound by the only other element in the sentence which introduces a new event binder,
which is aspect (Hacquard 2010, p.99). It is important to note that while [[believe]] has an
event argument, it does not introduce its own event binder. Secondly, the alternative worlds
being quantified over in [[believe]] are those of the matrix subject—this is well understood
and accepted. Thirdly, however, the speech context is introduced in [[assert]] but not in
[[believe]] because of the clause in (13) in which the alternative worlds are evaluated with
respect to a perspective holder, and that perspective holder is identified as the speaker.
Returning to the question of EIQs, we are concerned with the interpretation of context-
dependent elements related to attitudes and knowledge that exclusively orient to the matrix
subject in EIQs, despite not behaving uniformly in standard embedded questions. In
standard embedded questions, such elements often receive a speaker-oriented interpretation
despite being embedded under speech or attitudinal verb, and it can be hard to assign a
subject-oriented interpretation to such elements. The behaviour of attitudinal elements
in standard embedded clauses suggests that an analysis that relies on the matrix verb
as the operator determining the interpretation of these elements in EIQs is not sufficient
for several reasons. Firstly, it is not clear in that case why both speaker and subject
orientation is available in standard embedded clauses—this is an ongoing problem that I
will not address here. Secondly, we have already seen that the exact meaning of the matrix
verb is unimportant with respect to the interpretation of quasi-quotational constructions:
all EIQs have the same interpretation as referring to a conversational move in the original
discourse, regardless of meaning differences in the matrix verb such as introspection or
whether the matrix verb explicitly introduces a question or not. As Roberts (2012, p.5)
puts it, “[conversational] moves [the items in the QUD stack, R.W.] are not speech acts
but the semantic objects that are used in speech acts: a speech act is the act of proffering
a move.” This is illustrated again below:
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(16) a. They were all asking would John come to the party #but no-one mentioned
it.
b. They were all saying would John come to the party #but no-one mentioned
it.
c. They were all wanting to know would John come to the party #but no-one
mentioned it.
Regardless of whether the matrix predicate entails that a specific question was actually
asked in the original discourse context, there must be a conversational move made that
addresses a relevant QUD in the original context for the EIQ to refer to.
For these reasons I propose extending Hacquard’s analysis of speech event operators in
matrix clauses to embedded clauses of the quasi-quotational type. In this way we can ac-
count for both the event-relatedness of EIQs and the fact of obligatory subject orientation,
if we consider the role of the context, which is present in the modal speech event operator
and not in the matrix verb qua operator. We can also begin to understand a difference not
yet investigated in this thesis so far, namely that while perspective disambiguation also
occurs in EV2, it is not the same as perspective disambiguation in EIQs. In fact, there are
also differences across the EV2 languages I am treating here: in German, all attitudinal,
epistemic and expressive elements in EV2 are evaluated with respect to the speaker, not
the matrix subject, and the proposition expressed in the embedded clause is also inter-
preted as being asserted by the speaker. In Mainland Scandinavian, however, both fully
speaker-oriented and fully subject-oriented EV2 clauses are possible (cf. Julien (2015)).9
The primary focus of this section, however, is to detail the properties of the modal operator
itself and how it interacts with its internal argument; I leave the discussion of the external
argument for the next chapter.
4.3.1.1 EIQs: covert QUESTION or REQUEST operators
Turning first to the IA head in EIQs and interrogative recomplementation clauses, we can-
not simply adopt Hacquard’s speech event modal operator because it deals with assertive
9Thanks to Caroline Heycock, for ensuring more nuance in my arguments with respect to EV2.
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and not questioning or requesting force. We must therefore consider the underlying repre-
sentation of these kinds of forces. A full semantic explanation will not be attempted here
but an informal description of its content will be given.
The first of the modal operators that can constitute the IA head in these constructions
is the QUESTION operator. The QUESTION operator will be present in quasi-quotational
constructions with questioning force, such as EIQs and interrogative recomplementation
clauses. Remember that this is not the case with all EIQs; some will carry requesting force,
specifically those that are compatible with overt clause-initial please. The QUESTION op-
erator must do the following: it must quantify over the addressee’s epistemic alternatives—
what the addressee knows to be true—and combine these with a set of propositions.
The fact of picking out the addressee is core to the QUESTION operator, as questioning
force means that it is the addressee who is responsible for providing the true answer to the
question. The QUESTION operator simply states that it is the addressee in the relevant
context whose epistemic alternatives are quantified over; how the ‘correct’ addressee is
picked out (the current addressee or the original addressee) will be explained in the next
chapter.
It is also important that the QUESTION operator combines with a set of propositions
rather than a singleton proposition. This part of its meaning ensures that the EIQ is
restricted to “true” questions and excludes resolutive clauses, i.e. clauses containing wh-
items that in fact represent propositions, such as the kind of ‘interrogative’ clauses selected
by matrix verbs like know.
The composition of the QUESTION operator with the set of propositions is as follows;
it takes a set of propositions of type 〈t,t〉10 and returns an element of type 〈s,e〉; that is,
an intensional type. What this means will be more fully explained in section 4.3.2.
The EIQ structure so far can therefore be schematised as below:
10I am using non-intensional types here partially for simplicity, and partially because I will suggest that
the situation pronoun (i.e. world parameters) does not enter the derivation until a later stage.
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(17) IAP
<s,e>
IA
<<t,t>,<s,e>>
QUESTION
ForceP
<t,t>
Force
<t<t,t>>
will
TP
<t>
you come to dinner tonight
The REQUEST operator is somewhat different, even though it also combines with elements
of type 〈t,t〉. Firstly, it does not quantify over the addressee’s epistemic alternatives, but
over the doxastic alternatives of the speaker. This is in line with our definition of requesting
force in table 4.1 in section 4.2.2 as a matter of making the world how the speaker wants
it to be—the responsibility for making the world so may lie with the addressee, but it is
the desires of the speaker that provide the ordering source for the alternatives. This kind
of characterisation of requesting force implies that speaker-orientation is encoded into the
semantics of requesting force. This gives us desirable results, because “interrogative flip”
does not appear to hold in interrogatives or imperatives with requesting force, as illustrated
by the examples including speech-act adverb seriously below:
(18) a. Seriously, please can you take a seat? Speaker is being serious
b. Seriously, please take a seat. Speaker is being serious
In (18a) and (18b) it can only be the speaker who is being serious, in contrast with (19), in
which seriously is interpreted as the addressee being required to be serious in their answer:
(19) Seriously, where did you take the seat?
Addressee expected to answer seriously
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The fact that it is the speaker’s alternatives that are considered in requests and orders
also fits well with the data on the availability of embedded imperatives that follows in
chapter 6. However, it is necessary that the importance of the addressee is also recognised
because it is the addressee that carries responsibility for carrying out the desired action. I
will argue in section 4.4.3 that the addressee’s contribution is syntactically represented in
addition to the semantic contribution of the speaker shown here.
As has already been mentioned, the REQUEST operator takes as its input a wider
range of clause types than the QUESTION operator. As noted in table 4.1, it can combine
with both interrogative clauses of type <t,t> and imperative clauses of type <e,t>11. I
therefore propose that it does not take a specific type as its input, but that its input
must be some complex type of the kind < σ, t>. This prevents it from combining with
declarative clauses, which are of a simplex type t, which is what we want, but allows it to
combine with both interrogative and imperative clause types.12
The structure of an EIQ with requesting force is therefore as follows:
(20) IAP
<s,e>
IA
<< σ,t>,<s,e>>
REQUEST
ForceP
<t,t>
Force
<t<t,t>>
will
TP
<t>
you come to dinner tonight
We also know that the REQUEST operator can be overtly spelled out as please, resulting
in the structure below:
11Here I follow Portner’s (2004) characterisation of imperatives as properties.
12The restriction of requesting force to polar interrogatives has another source which I predict to be
pragmatic, but I leave the details of this for further research.
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(21) IAP
<s,e>
IA
<< σ,t>,<s,e>>
please
ForceP
<t,t>
Force
<t<t,t>>
will
TP
<t>
you come to dinner tonight
4.3.1.2 EV2: a covert ASSERT operator
Moving onto the ASSERT operator that I claim is present in German and Mainland Scandi-
navian EV2, I will largely adopt the same approach as taken by Hacquard (2010). Asserting
force as defined in section 4.2.2 is when the speaker takes responsibility for the truth of the
proposition that they utter, regardless of the strength of their own commitment towards
it. Therefore I adopt Hacquard’s formalisation of ASSERT, which is more precise than her
informal characterisation, which states that it is worlds ordered according to the doxastic
alternatives of the speaker (or matrix subject qua original speaker) that matter rather than
worlds ordered according to the speaker’s/matrix subject’s epistemic alternatives.
ASSERT is similar to REQUEST but differs from QUESTION in that it quantifies over
the speaker’s/matrix subject’s doxastic alternatives. However it differs from both in that
the responsibility aspect of its meaning is evaluated with respect to the speaker, current or
original. Exactly how this plays out forms the basis of section 4.4. It also differs from both
REQUEST and QUESTION in terms of the type of its input; it will be no surprise that
ASSERT requires a type t complement, which is the truth value that the speaker expresses
responsibility for.
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(22) IAP
<s,e>
IA
<t,<s,e>>
ForceP
<t>
I will come to dinner tonight
The full details of all these structures, including external arguments, will be completed in
the next chapter.
4.3.2 N-like behaviour
In the sections above I have shown that the IA head is verb-like in terms of having an
argument structure and in terms of applying modal force to the clause it selects. I also
showed that one of the possible overt instantiations of the IA head in English is a particle
derived from a verb. However, it emerges that the IA head is also noun-like in some
respects, which is a desirable outcome in order to fully capture the characteristics of quasi-
quotational constructions. Relatedly, we need to develop the idea of what it means for an
EIQ to be or to refer to a conversational move from the relevant previous discourse, as
this must be captured by the make-up of the IA head. I shall briefly outline here previous
analyses of embedded clauses as referential. I will then present my ideas on what it means
for an embedded illocutionary act to be referential and on the nature of its referent.
4.3.2.1 Embedded clauses as referring expressions
Sheehan & Hinzen (2011) discuss the possibility that clauses can be referential, proposing
that clauses with independent assertive force refer in that they hold extensionally, i.e. they
refer to extensional truth.13 They also claim that embedded root clauses are referential
as they also refer to an extensional truth rather than exhibiting intensionality; Sheehan &
13Like many other scholars discussing embedded illocutionary force, Sheehan & Hinzen restrict their
analysis to assertive force.
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Hinzen analyse embedded root clauses as being more projected and extensional than typical
embedded clauses, thereby behaving similarly to referential DPs, specifically proper names,
both syntactically (with respect to islandhood) and semantically (with respect to having
an extensional denotation). But these are not the only types of referential clause; they
also claim that factive clauses are referential, comparing them to definite DPs. Sheehan
& Hinzen draw a parallel between the presupposition of truth associated with a factive
clause and the presupposition of existence associated with definite DPs (Sheehan & Hinzen
2011, p.22) and note the syntactic opacity of both factive clauses and definite DPs. The
grammatical exponent of referentiality of factive clauses, they claim, is the complementiser
that, which they analyse as a pro-form that picks out the “salient compatible contextual
referent”—a fact (Sheehan & Hinzen 2011, p.23).
Rathmann (2012) in her examination of recomplementation in Spanish takes a similar
tack to Sheehan & Hinzen (2011). She claims that, given the similar behaviour of factive
and recomplementation clauses with respect to argument extraction and what she calls
the “event-content” effect in factive emotives, both factive clauses and recomplementation
clauses should be analysed as referential.
Let us first examine what she means by the “event-content” effect. She claims that
there is a greater “emphasis” on the matrix event of saying or telling in recomplementation
clauses than in non-recomplementation (standard embedded) clauses that she links to the
obligatory shift in perspective that recomplementation brings about. However, she does
not explain what it means to have more “emphasis” on the matrix event. Furthermore,
she claims that the embedded clause of a emotive-factive modifies the matrix clause by
describing the motivation for the matrix subject having that emotion, thereby “anchoring”
it, and that recomplementation contexts are similar in that they provide the expressive
content of the utterance described by the matrix verb as well as its propositional content.
(23) a. I am happy that they gave the money to John
I am happy = comment; that they gave the money to John = ‘anchor’
b. Mary said that they gave the money to John
Mary said = source; that they gave the money to John = comment
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c. Mary
Mary
dijo
said
que
that
el
the
dinero
money
que
that
a
to
John
John
que
that
se
CL.3pl
lo
CL.3sg
dieron.
gave
“Mary said that they gave the money to John.”
Mary dijo = comment; que el dinero. . . = anchor Rathmann (2012, p.14)
Note that Rathmann says of (23c) that “although the entire complement clause is preg-
matically interpreted as the referential anchor (the cause/source of the comment), [. . . ]
the topic fulfils the semantic requirements for referential anchoring” (Rathmann 2012,
p.14). However, given that it is never clear in Rathmann’s proposal what the recom-
plementation clause is referring to, it is hard to understand exactly what she means by
referential anchoring here. Rathmann also downplays the differences between emotive-
factives and recomplemenation clauses and does not explain where her judgements about
recomplementation come from. The comparison that she draws between emotive-factives
and recomplementation is also very much at odds with judgements such as those reported
in Gonza´lez i Planas (2014) for both Spanish and Catalan, the latter of which suggest that
something more than just “lack of truth-conditional evaluation by the speaker” (Rathmann
2012, p.28) is happening in a recomplementation clause.
Rathmann explicitly rejects the idea that recomplementation clauses are asserted in the
sense used in the embedded root phenomena literature. She suggests that by using a re-
complementation clause, the speaker makes a choice to distance herself from the embedded
clause and to express the perspective and attitudes of the original speaker. As evidence that
a perspective shift holds in recomplementation, Rathmann notes that clitic left dislocation
(CLLD) in recomplementation contexts differs from CLLD in non-recomplementation con-
texts. Where CLLD topics in non-recomplementation contexts must be both specific and
definite, they are only required to be specific in recomplementation contexts, as shown in
(24).
(24) a. *Mar´ıa
Maria
me
cl.1sg
dijo
said..3sg
que
that
unas
some
manzanas
apples
las
cl.3pl
comieron
ate.3pl
en
in
el
the
coche.
car.
“Maria told me that they ate some apples in the car.”
b. Mar´ıa
Maria
me
cl.1sg
dijo
said..3sg
que
that
unas
some
manzanas
apples
que
that
las
cl.3pl
comieron
ate.3pl
en
in
el
the
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coche.
car.
“Maria told me that they ate some apples in the car.”
c. *Pablo
Pablo
me
cl.1sg
dijo
said..3sg
que
that
un
a
coche
car
lo
cl.3sg
compro´
bought.3sg
ayer.
yesterday
“Pablo told me that he bought a car yesterday.”
d. Pablo
Pablo
me
cl.1sg
dijo
said..3sg
que
that
un
a
coche
car
que
that
lo
cl.3sg
compro´
bought.3sg
ayer.
yesterday
“Pablo told me that he bought a car yesterday.”
Rathmann (2012, p.21)
Rathmann further notes that indefinite CLLDs are also blocked in factive clauses because
for the speaker to presuppose the truth of the presupposition, she is required to subscribe
to all the referential details of the presupposition—a clear difference between recomple-
mentation and factives.
The effect of the data in (24) is to show that while the CLLD topics in recomplementa-
tion contexts are required to be specific, i.e. they refer to some extant apples in a context
somewhere, the reporting speaker need not report them as definite because they are not
necessarily definite in the reporting speaker’s context, but in the original speaker’s context.
Rathmann’s arguments seem to be underpinned by the idea that a clause may only
ever be asserted by the current speaker. It is clearly a weakness of assertion-focused EV2
accounts that assertion appears to have the potential to be attributed to both speakers and
matrix subjects but it is rarely made clear quite who is asserting the embedded clause, or
indeed what it means to assert something (something Rathmann also fails to do explicitly).
However, I wish to argue that independent illocutionary force is not solely speaker-linked
but that it may be matrix-speaker linked too, and that this interpretation is more fruitful
in understanding the properties of quasi-quotational structures such as recomplementation.
As a result of the arguments above, Rathmann claims that recomplementation clauses
contain a referential anchor that permits a referential reading of the clause and that this
anchor is missing in non-recomplementation clauses. Moreover, she claims that the pres-
ence of this anchor must be somehow overtly marked precisely because not all complements
of non-factive verbs can be interpreted as referential; hence the multiple complementisers
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that are characteristic of recomplementation. She also notes that it is typical in other lan-
guages such as Gungbe for referential clauses to be nominalised (cf. Aboh (2004)), further
drawing parallels between clauses with a referential interpretation and referential nominals.
However, Rathmann does not explicitly explain what the referent of the recomplementation
clause actually is.
The most interesting aspects of Rathmann’s work centre on her observations about
overt marking and perspective shifting in recomplementation. I reject the idea that she
perpetuates that assertions may only be attributed to the current speaker, but I adopt (in
order to adapt) the idea that they are referential due to the kind of properties outlined in
chapter 3. As introduced in chapter 3, I propose that the referent of a quasi-quotational
construction is some overt conversational move in the sense of Roberts’s (1996, 2012) QUD
framework. To recap, the QUD framework structures discourse according to a number of
types of information. The entities within the QUD framework are assertions that make up
the set of “payoff moves”, which contain propositions that all discourse participants have
accepted into the conversational common ground, and questions that make up the set of
“setup moves”, which all discourse participants jointly take responsibility for answering
during the course of the discourse. Taking EIQs as an example, the denotation of an EIQ
may be either a payoff move, when that payoff move relates to the question literally repre-
sented in the EIQ, or a setup move. This captures the expression of responsibility which
quasi-quotational constructions have in addition to the proposition or sets of propositions
they express in a way that Sheehan and Hinzen’s “extensional truth” approach cannot
because it cannot cope with questioning force. Another reason for using a QUD approach
is such an approach can unify assertive and non-assertive quasi-quotational constructions
where a truth-centric approach cannot. Finally, the QUD approach is preferable to the
idea that EIQs refer directly to a specific speech act in the way that a direct speech report
does, because they may refer to a discussion centring on a question that may not have been
overtly asked—that is, an EIQ whose embedded clause is interrogative-typed can be used
to report a discussion made up solely of utterances involving declarative-typed clauses.
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4.3.2.2 Determiner-like properties of the IA head
In sections 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2 I have claimed that the IA head has as its output an entity
that is evaluated with respect to a relevant discourse. By taking an element of a type
containing (properly or otherwise) t and returning an entity, the IA head resembles a
determiner in terms of its semantic composition.
There is a strong recent tradition in claiming that clauses are in fact headed by nominal
elements. Manzini & Savoia (2011) and Roussou (2010) are two notable examples of making
this argument for Romance and Greek, Laka (1990) and Adger & Quer (2001) argue this
for Basque and English, and Shim & Ihsane (2015) have developed a similar idea for
Korean and English, even showing that certain complementisers that appear above the
clause-typing morpheme in Korean are in complementary distribution with case-markers.
There is also evidence from quasi-quotational constructions, in particular Swedish EV2,
for noun-like properties on the IA head. In Swedish EV2 the complementiser att is oblig-
atory, where it is optional in typical complements. Att, like its English counterpart that,
is etymologically descended from a demonstrative pronoun. Interestingly, it can, in EV2
constructions, co-occur with the standard definite pronoun det in matrix object position,
suggesting that att is no longer pronominal in itself but that it has nominal properties that
will permit a clause it heads to directly identify a pronominal object of a matrix verb.14
(25) Han
he
sa
said
det
it
att
that
Gusten
Gusten
har
has
faktiskt
actually
inte
not
ho¨ns
chickens
la¨ngre.
any.more
“He said that Gusten actually doesn’t have chickens any more.”
Petersson (2010, p.141)
In chapter 6, I will explain why appealing to an identification function to explain how
quasi-quotational constructions relate to the matrix clause is not the most desirable route
to take but that the true complement to the matrix verb is, in fact, a nominal.
As further evidence that quasi-quotational constructions are nominal-like, they are
14Note that the example in (25) is not extraposition because there is no prosodic break between det
and att (Petersson 2010, p.141) and because det and att must be linearly adjacent for the sentence to be
grammatical; no adverbial material may intervene between the two elements or between att and the rest of
the embedded clause (Petersson 2010, p.140,142).
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strong islands like DPs and, as we will see in chapter 6, they can appear in copular con-
structions. Moreover, quasi-quotational constructions can be described in similar terms
to nominals: they have their own properties such as niceness and nastiness and can be
described in these terms. They can also be time-bounded in that they can be resolved in
a way that standard embedded clauses cannot—the propositions that standard embedded
clauses contain do not come into existence or cease to exist, they just exist regardless of
whether or not they are accepted into the discourse. Finally, there is evidence that quasi-
quotational constructions are not predicational: they cannot appear in small clauses, they
enter into equative constructions rather than predicational constructions and, crucially,
they cannot be fronted (which is otherwise unexpected if quasi-quotational constructions
are nominal-like).
It is tempting to claim, like Adger & Quer (2001) for their unselected embedded ques-
tions, that non-selected interrogative clauses can be headed by polarity sensitive determin-
ers, as this appears to be a simple and elegant way of accounting for the distribution of
EIQs under rogative (true question) predicates and negated responsive predicates. How-
ever, this idea quickly runs into problems when one considers that EIQs freely appear
under say, which does not license polarity sensitive items such as negative polarity items
(NPIs). Moreover, it also fails to account for the paradigm cases of EIQs under verbs of
interrogation such as ask and wonder. Though some scholars assume that the interrogative
verb inherently licenses elements such as NPIs in its scope, it is hard to separate the effect
of the verb of interrogation from the interrogative features in the clause it selects. Some
evidence from the selection of DP and PP elements by verbs of interrogation as in (26)
suggests that it is not the verb but some inherent property of the embedded clause that
licenses NPIs:
(26) a. I was wondering something.
b. *I was wondering anything.
c. I asked something.
d. ?*I asked anything.
e. I enquired about some tools.
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f. *I enquired about any tools.
A similar analysis of EV2 clauses as positive polarity items also fails, as they are available
under negation and negative verbs given the correct pragmatic context, as the Swedish
examples below show:
(27) a. Det
it
a¨r
is
va¨l
prt
ingen
nobody
som
that
tvekar
doubts
p˚a
on
att
that
dom
they
go¨r
do
det
it
alltid
always
fo¨r
for
att
to
f˚a
get
upp
up
fo¨rsa¨ljningen?
sale.def
“I bet nobody doubts that they always do it to raise sales.” Julien (2009)
b. ?Jag
I
tvivlar
doubt
inte
not
p˚a
on
att
that
den
that
boken
book
ko¨per
buy
du.
you
“I don’t doubt that you bought that book.” Wiklund (2010, p.83)
c. Vi
We
uppta¨ckte
discovered
faktiskt
actually
inte
not
att
that
den
that
bloggen
blog.det
la¨ste
read
han
he
varje
every
dag
day
“We actually didn’t discover that he read this blog every day.”
Wiklund et al. (2009)
EV2 is also permitted under an interrogative main clause in both Mainland Scandinavian
and German:
(28) a. Vet
know
dere
you.pl
at
that
jeg
I
har
have
aldri
never
sett
seen
vinter
winter
før!
before
“Do you know that I’ve never seen winter before!”
Bokm˚al Norwegian, Julien (2009, p.6)
b. Wer
who
glaubt,
thinks
Peter
Peter
geht
goes
nach
to
Hause?
house
“Who thinks Peter is going home?” German, Truckenbrodt (2006, p.296)
I do not have any new insights to add to the kinds of analyses given above, other than
to provide more support through quasi-quotational data that (at least some) clauses have
nominal properties and that polarity sensitivity is not key in determining the distribution of
quasi-quotational constructions. Quasi-quotational clauses reflect their nominal properties
in terms of their interpretation as referring expressions and, as it will be shown in chapter
6, how they compose with the matrix clause.
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4.3.3 Interim summary
This conceptualisation of the IA head as a modal operator with an internal and an exter-
nal argument (though the latter is not spelled out here) not only avoids the redundancy
associated with a Speas & Tenny-style three-place predicate but can capture many of the
properties associated with EIQs, including their referentiality. It improves on Coniglio
& Zegrean’s (2012) work by avoiding postulating a clause-type feature for which a cor-
responding feature on the illocutionary force head can be multiply valued. The analysis
here also goes some way to showing that illocutionary force is made up of a combination
of semantic type matching and syntactic feature checking.
4.4 Licensing embedded V-to-Force
In section 4.2 I argued that overt instantiation of Force via verb movement (EIQs, EV2)
or a particular complementiser (recomplementation) is a necessary reflex of independent
illocutionary force in the embedded clause. In this section I will show the mechanism for
this, focusing on the syntactic relationship between IA and Force, and in so doing hope to
shed light on the mechanisms behind subject-auxiliary inversion more generally.
4.4.1 The IA head as Phase head
The first assumption that I make is that the IA head is a Phase head. This assumption
is motivated by the islandhood of quasi-quotational constructions, the fact that the IAP
is obligatorily the highest projection in the EIQ, and the fact that ForceP cannot be
topicalised because it has already been spelled out low. This brings with it the assumption
that IAP is not simply one of the many Rizzian left-peripheral heads, but is an independent
projection. The argument structure proposed for the IAP is consistent with this, as is the
fact that the IA head also has determiner-like properties.
Taking islandhood first, we have already seen that the only wh-items that can be
extracted from EIQs are the adjuncts when and where. Arguments cannot be extracted,
nor the adjuncts how or why. I claim that the extraction of arguments is blocked because
although they can move to SpecForceP, they cannot move up to the next phase edge
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because it is already filled by the Perspectival Monster:
(29) IAP
perspectival
monster
situation
pronoun
IA’
IA
QUESTION
ForceP
DP
what
Force’
Force
did
TP
DP
Jamie
T’
T
did
VP
V’
V
want
DP
what
When/where adjuncts, in contrast, can adjoin very high, as evidenced by data such as
(30), in which the adjunct [when she got home] must have an embedded construal:
(30) At school, Molly asked when she got home please could she have a biscuit.
Examples like (30) and section 3.4’s (35) suggest that adjuncts are able to first merge
above the IA head and as such may be moved higher into the matrix clause.
The presence of the IAP as a Phase head also accounts for the fact that EIQ cannot be
extraposed as the complement of a phase cannot be extracted. Chomsky (2008) notes that
T and V are not available for extraction in contrast to C and v, attributing this fact to the
relationship of featural inheritance that holds between the Phase head and its complement.
To preface the analysis of the EIQ’s relationship with the matrix clause in chapter 6, the
entire Phase, in contrast, can appear to be extracted if the nominal complement it modifies
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is extracted, hence utterances such as (31) are acceptable:
(31) The question would he come to the dinner party was asked of him several times.
More will be said about this in chapter 6.
The question of featural inheritance leads to the key motivation for characterising IA
as a Phase head. While IA inherently carries illocutionary force features, these features
are not primarily realised on IA per se but on Force (C), by way of verb movement to
Force or realisation of Force as a particular complementiser (cf. the Japanese to/koto
distinction). This does not prevent extra or exceptional realisation of illocutionary force
features on IA as discourse particle please, for example, but this is not the primary method
of representing these features, just as complementiser that, which is restricted to tensed
declarative clauses, is optional in many complement clauses in English. To recap, just as
T derives its phi-features from Force, so Force derives its illocutionary force features from
the IA head. If T is not selected by Force then it will not carry phi-features and will not
be able to attract a DP to Spec,TP. Similarly, if Force is not selected by IA then it will not
carry illocutionary force features and will not be able to attract the verb to the Force head.
Note that this mechanism holds for main clauses too; all main clauses are hypothesised to
have an IAP above ForceP.
4.4.2 What does it mean to represent illocutionary force syntactically?
Let us then focus in on what precisely triggers the verb’s meaning to Forceo and how this
movement affects meaning. The discussion of IA qua Phase head above implies that verb
movement to Force is syntactically triggered, which I think is correct. However, we need
to be clear about what the trigger is, where it comes from and also about the distinc-
tion between clause type and illocutionary force, a distinction I have been emphasising
throughout this chapter.
In order to understand verb movement to Force we have to first look deeper into the
embedded clause, because the left periphery of the clause is not the only position in which
elements indicating illocutionary force can appear.
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4.4.2.1 Tense and Assertion: not one but two clause-medial positions
As many scholars such as Coniglio (2009), Cardinaletti (2011), Coniglio & Zegrean (2012)
and Struckmeier (2014) have noted, clause-medial particles that appear between T and v
express a wide range of illocutionary forces with extra information about attitude, commit-
ment and evidence, suggesting that illocutionary force is in some way represented clause-
medially.
Other strands of research have also suggested that there is a projection related to
illocutionary force (with a focus on assertive force) just above vP. Klein (1998, 2006) and
Duffield (2007) discuss English data that suggest that the Tense node does not only carry
tense but that it also carries Assertion. In the case of English these two elements are
often conflated, but languages like Vietnamese appear to optionally spell out Assertion in
precisely this position just above vP. Evidence for the proposed separation of Assertion
and Tense and the structural representation of Assertion includes:
(32) a. Verum focus: contrastive intonation on finite auxiliaries asserts the validity of
some claim irrespective of time or contrasts some component of time. Con-
trastive intonation on lexical verbs has the second function but not the first
Klein (1998)
b. Sentences can both carry tense without being asserted (typical embedded
clauses in English, German, etc.) and be asserted without carrying tense
(Mandarin Chinese and many others)
c. In languages that do not or cannot make use of intonation to express emphasis,
word order is crucial to assert the correct part of the sentence, meaning that
the element of emphasis must be in the correct configuration with respect to
clause-medial Assertion
Klein (2006)
d. Vietnamese co´, spelled out above vP, is interpreted differently according to
the presence of (e.g.) wh-elements in the clause Duffield (2007)
e. Other elements in Vietnamese, such as wh-indefinites, change interpretation
depending on whether they scope below or above co´. Below co´ they receive
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an indefinite interpretation; above co´ they are interpreted as wh-phrases
Duffield (2007)
f. Certain elements such as temporal adverbs appear to be sensitive to their
position in the clause relative to tense and aspect:
(i) John has been dead for two weeks.
(ii) ?For two weeks, John has been dead. Klein (1998)
Duffield (2007) proposes the following structure for both Vietnamese and English with
AsrP as a separate Assertion node—(33) is adapted from (Duffield 2007, p.787):
(33) TP
T
Vietnamese: da˜
English: didj
AsrP
Asr
〈-NEG〉
〈+EMPH〉
〈-WH〉
Vietnamese: co´
English: tj
vP
. . .
I will not evaluate the finer details of Duffield’s structure here, in particular his feature
specification for the Asr head, but I will go on to provide further evidence for Tense and As-
sertion splitting in English and how conceptualising Tense and Assertion as separate nodes
can help us better understand V-to-Force movement in English, German and Mainland
Scandinavian.
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4.4.2.2 Splitting Tense and Assertion in child language
There is evidence from child language that Tense and Assertion can be separated in ways
that the adult language does not permit.15 It is well known that English-acquiring children
pass through a stage in which they produce non-adult word order in questions, namely,
they either omit the auxiliary or fail to invert the subject and the auxiliary (Klima &
Bellugi 1966, de Villiers 1991, Plunkett 1991, Radford 1994). The path taken by children
varies; some gradually move towards the adult-like inverted structure while others exhibit
a U-shaped curve in their use of subject-auxiliary inversion (Stromswold 1990, de Villiers
1991). Some also exhibit doubling of the auxiliary; though rarely picked up in longitudinal
studies, auxiliary-doubling is well attested in diary data (Menyuk (1969) and others) and
is frequently induced in high numbers in experimental studies (Thornton 1995, Rowland
& Theakston 2009).
(34) a. Father: Do you want to go outside?
Child: No! (to friend:) Do you don’t want to go outside?
4;0, Roeper (2014)
b. Where are we are? 3;8, Roeper (2014)
c. What food did the spaceman didn’t like? 4;8, Thornton (1995)
d. Which Smurf did he didn’t drop any ones? 4;8, Thornton (1995)
e. Which witch does that witch don’t have a very good broomstick?
4;8, Thornton (1995)
f. Can Piglet can’t ride the bike? 2;11-3;5, Rowland & Theakston (2009)
g. Is Piglet can push the pram? 2;11-3;5, Rowland & Theakston (2009)
h. Won’t Piglet won’t push the pram? 2;11-3;5, Rowland & Theakston (2009)
i. Is the boy who’s watching Mickey Mouse is happy?
4;7, Crain & Nakayama (1987)
There are many ways of analysing these examples, of which the most widely proposed is
that the copy of the moved auxiliary is spelled out in addition to the moved element itself
15Thanks to Tom Roeper for all his help in discussing and developing the ideas in this section, and for
all the Skype chats.
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due to the processing complexity of subject-auxiliary inversion, especially in the presence
of negation or relative clauses (Crain & Nakayama 1987, p.532,539). However, I propose
that the contexts in which auxiliary doubling occurs suggest that auxiliary doubling is not
simply an error, but may be used by the child as a strategy to ask a non-simple question,
namely a cleft question, which in the adult language requires a much more complicated
syntax.
What is the evidence for this? I have already noted that auxiliary doubling has been
induced in large proportions in certain experimental studies. On examining the method-
ologies used in these studies, it is apparent that these methodologies, useful as they are,
do not elicit non-biased na¨ıve information-seeking questions. Instead, they involve to some
degree the child asking an interlocutor about a situation that one of the two participants
is already aware of. In Rowland & Theakston (2009), for example, where 41% of questions
produced by children aged 2;11 involved auxiliary doubling, the child mediates between an
experimenter and a puppet. The puppet can see a scene enacted, the experimenter tells
the child what she thinks the scene shows, and the child asks the puppet the appropriate
question to confirm or deny the experimenter’s guesses. Abstracting away from the fact
that think is not interpreted in an adult-like way by children of the age that Theakston
& Rowland were testing (see de Villiers (2007), Harrigan (2015) amongst many others),
this is precisely the kind of context that might induce a cleft sentence in the adult lan-
guage. In this case, there is an assertion by the adult that carries a presupposition of
truth (modulated or not by the matrix verb think) that has entered the common ground
of the discourse, the truth of which is subsequently questioned. Tellingly, in a separate
experiment testing the production of polar questions with auxiliary be in Theakston &
Rowland (2009), they used a different methodology in which both experimenter and child
were equally na¨ıve as to the true answer to the questions they were prompted to ask, and
the rate of auxiliary doubling in this experiment was extremely low (less than 5%).
Similar methodologies to Rowland & Theakston (2009) are used in Thornton (1995)
and Crain & Nakayama (1987): in the former, the child is again a mediator between an
experimenter and a puppet but all three participants can see the scenario that the child is
asking a question about; in the latter, the child asks a puppet a question about a picture
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that the child can see before showing the puppet the picture. In fact, Crain & Nakayama
entertain the idea that children may be using auxiliary doubling in a similar way to the
French est-ce que (“is it that. . . ”) question marking prefix, as an unanalysed marker of a
cleft construction (Crain & Nakayama 1987, p.531).
The contexts in which auxiliary doubling occurs in naturalistic speech also lend them-
selves to a cleft question analysis. Taking example (34a), repeated as (35) below, it is
reasonable to suppose that the child wants to preserve his assertion of not wanting to go
outside, whilst simultaneously questioning whether this assertion holds for his friend too:
(35) Father: Do you want to go outside?
Child: No! (to friend:) Do you don’t want to go outside? 4;0, Roeper (2014)
(Adult version: Is it the case that you too don’t want to go outside?)
Example (35) illustrates why auxiliary doubling does not appear in longitudinal data with
any frequency: it carries a very specific meaning requiring a specific kind of context, and it
is related to a structure that is uncommon in adult language. In the Switchboard corpus,
cleft sentences make up less than 0.1% of all sentences (Roland et al. 2007) and in the
ICE-GB corpus, there are only 40 cleft sentences in direct conversation, or around 2.2
tokens per 10,000 words (Nelson 1997, Lange 2012). If we are right that auxiliary doubling
is used as a clefting strategy in child language, then we would not expect to find a large
amount of data, but when we do find it or elicit it, such contexts will be pragmatically
appropriate for clefts.
It is therefore proposed that children are not simply “accidentally” spelling out both
the moved auxiliary and its copy, but that the spell-out of the lower copy has semantic
and pragmatic import. The mechanism is as follows. I assume that in adult English, the
Tense and Assertion nodes are collapsed so that one single node carries both Tense and
Assertion features. Hence in the case of declaratives with auxiliaries or dummy do, it is
the auxiliary or do that carries tense. Moreover, if tense is not present in a clause, do is
not possible, as its only other role is to carry assertion features and non-finite clauses in
English cannot be asserted.16 Auxiliaries are permitted in non-finite clauses because they
16They may carry other kinds of illocutionary force, such as ordering or exclamative force, but may not
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also carry information about aspect, for example. This kind of proposal is in line with the
Split-INFL hypothesis of Pollock (1989) and others.
In adult-like non-biased questions requiring subject-auxiliary inversion, the tensed el-
ement moves (for reasons to be detailed in the next section) and the assertion element is
pied-piped with it.17 However, in the case that the child wants to maintain the assertion
as well as forming a question, she can use a non-adult-like structure to spell out the tensed
element in both positions, marking both the separation of tense and assertion through
maintenance of the asserted proposition.
Details of auxiliary doubling in child language support the claim above that assertion
cannot be independently expressed in English18 and that do cannot be co-opted for the job:
amongst all the examples of auxiliary doubling I could find, there were no examples of do
doubling specifically, unless the bottom copy was hosting clitic negation (i.e. was spelled
out for reasons independent from assertion). It can appear both as the tense-carrying
element in Force or as an element bearing negation in the Tense position but examples like
(36c) do not occur:
(36) a. Do it be coloured? (Roeper 1993, p.72)
b. Is Piglet doesn’t lift the basket? (Rowland & Theakston 2009, p.1487)
c. *Do(es) she do(es) play tennis?
This result would be unexpected if children ever analysed do as a potential marker of pure
assertion in English.
Moreover, it is not the case that children have “copying” difficulties with other kinds of
syntactic movement as they appear to have with subject-auxiliary inversion: children do
not experience difficulties with topicalisation in English, nor do German-speaking children
struggle with V2, or Spanish-speaking children struggle with V-to-I movement in Spanish.
I therefore claim that there is more to subject-auxiliary inversion than has typically been
be asserted.
17The assumption is that the assertion element can carry a range of values, including minus values for
assertion. See Roeper & Woods (in preparation) and the next section for more details.
18Note that this does not preclude intonation from marking emphasis in English; I am only interested in
the lexical spell-out of the Tense/Assertion position in this thesis.
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suggested, namely that it is tied to the expression of the illocutionary force of the sentence—
its expression as a true question, assertion or command—rather than a simple marker of
clause type.
Given the evidence above for the specification of Assertion on the Tense node and the
possibility of separating Tense and Assertion, I will in the next section discuss the impli-
cations of this for V-to-Force movement. However, I will recast discussions of Assertion in
the terms used in table 4.1—that is, in terms of who is responsible for the truth, action or
attitude expressed in the clause.
4.4.3 V-to-Force: illocutionary, my dear Watson
In this section I will discuss the feature that the Force head inherits from the IA head,
which I will call [Responsibility]. This feature minimally has two values, [Speaker] and
[Addressee], following my definitions of illocutionary force as given in table 4.1. I will also
discuss the crosslinguistic variation in the realisation of [Responsibility] that leads to word
order differences.
Taking quasi-quotational phenomena first, we have already seen that verb movement
occurs in EIQs and EV2 only when independent illocutionary force is present; that is ques-
tioning or requesting force in EIQs and asserting force in EV2. Moreover, verb movement
is essential for independent illocutionary force to be marked, so it is more accurate to
describe the relationship between verb movement and independent illocutionary force as
bi-conditional.19 The claim is that the IA head passes [Responsibility] down onto Force and
subsequently attracts the lexical item on the Tense/Assertion head to satisfy this feature.
In the case of EIQs, Force inherits an uninterpretable [Responsibility:Addressee] fea-
ture, so will only attract a T head with an interpretable [Responsibility] feature that is
also valued as [Addressee]. That the “Assertion” feature on T is in fact a [Responsibility]
feature is motivated because the proposal here construes responsibility simply as a question
of modality, given that we can understand responsibility as a form of (particularly strong)
epistemic modal, and T (or more precisely, the nodes potentially collapsed under T) is
well-known as a host of modality. In the case of EV2, Force inherits an uninterpretable
19This appears to be in contradiction with Wiklund (2010), but I will address this later in this section.
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[Responsibility:Speaker] so will only attract a T head that is also valued for [Responsi-
bility:Speaker]. There is no [Responsibility] feature on T in relative clauses because they
are not selected by IAP, so they cannot inherit [Responsibility] from the IA head. Hence,
no verb movement occurs and it is directly interpreted as a presupposition for which no
particular discourse participant takes responsibility.
A question arises here: if illocutionary force is as simple as feature checking, why is there
no verb movement in English matrix clauses? Why are there no examples of embedded
interrogatives with illocutionary force in German and Mainland Scandinavian? The latter
case I will leave until the next chapter to explain, because I will claim that it is due to
the mechanism for perspective disambiguation in the German-type languages. The former
case relates to how the mechanism for V-to-Force works in matrix clauses, so I will turn
to these now.
The most important assumption I will make about matrix clauses is that there is always
an IAP present above them. In fact, that is not all that is present; I also assume that there
is a second layer of structure above IAP of the kind postulated by Haegeman (2014) and
Wiltschko et al. (2015); a layer that hosts the kind of discourse particles and discourse-
oriented elements that demand immediate response from the interlocutor and that is not
embeddable in any language. I will not develop a picture of this layer here, but direct the
reader towards the aforementioned references.
Bearing this in mind, I claim that matrix Force always inherits [Responsibility] from
the IA head in German/Mainland Scandinavian and that it will internally Merge the
T head when it has the correct feature combination. Both [Responsibility:Speaker] and
[Responsibility:Addressee] on Force attract the verb in German/Mainland Scandinavian as
a way of overtly marking the presence of [Responsibility].20 This means that there are two
types of V-to-Force movement in German that are minimally different in terms of their
feature specification but that present more or less identically. Illocutionary force then is
marked by verb movement, and clause-typing comes about through the combination of
this verb movement and other featural specifications of the clause. These include whether
or not EPP is active to attract some XP to SpecForceP, whether or not [+wh] is present,
20This is basically the same idea as Bhatt & Yoon (1992), with slightly different terminology.
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and whether or not the clause is in the subjunctive or indicative mood. Note that these
features happen to congregate on and around Forceo, but do not merit postulation of one
clause-typing feature. These features are independently motivated as separate features
and are expressed as such; it is their simultaneous realisation that results in clause-typing.
This is represented in the tree in (37)21, in which the greyscale Resp:Addressee feature on
IAo represents that this has been inherited by Forceo.
(37) VP
V
asked
DP
DP
the question
IAP
Monster s1
IA’
IA
QUESTION
〈uResp:Addressee〉
ForceP
Force
wouldi
〈uResp:addressee〉
TP
DP
he
T’
T
ti
VP
make
dinner
for me
Initially it seems possible to claim that there is a difference in English, namely that the
presence of [Responsibility:Speaker] on Force invokes a different syntactic reflex from the
presence of [Responsibility:Addressee]; the latter triggers verb movement while the former
does not. To do this, one would need to assume that in English, [Responsibility:Addressee]
21The details of how the EIQ composes with the matrix clause will be detailed in chapter 6.
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requires local checking of features via Internal Merge, whereas [Responsibility:Speaker] in
English is weaker in the sense that it can be satisfied non-locally by Agree. In this way all
declaratives are unified in English; embedded or unembedded, if [Responsibility:Speaker]
is (able to be) present, no verb movement will occur. However, there are examples of
emphatic assertions in English which do feature verb movement (such as fuck-inversion
(Sailor 2015, 2016), which I will detail in chapter 6) and would then need explaining.
To do this we need to assume that [Responsibility:Speaker] also triggers verb movement
in English. What about typical declaratives then? I claim that declaratives in English,
both in matrix and in embedded cases, are unspecified for the responsibility feature, which
entails that they are unspecified for illocutionary force. Through pragmatic processes they
are typically interpreted as assertions for which the speaker takes responsibility, but this
is not marked syntactically on Forceo.22
The reader may be wondering about certain interrogative clauses that do not exhibit
verb movement, for example echo questions that echo assertions. I argue that echo ques-
tions are an unusual example of an interrogative clause type (based on the presence of
[+wh]) selected by an unspecified IA head (which is by default interpreted as an asser-
tion). This is because the original proposition echoed in the echo question is conserved in
the use of an echo question—“John bought what?” presupposes that John did buy some-
thing in a way that “What did John buy?” does not. The idea that echo questions carry
some kind of assertive force is supported by the fact that they cannot be embedded under
know (which can only embed presupposed content) but that they cannot be embedded as
EIQs either:
(38) a. *I know that John did what.
b. *I know John did what.
c. *I asked John did what.
According to the analysis in this section this entails that echo questions are unspecified
22Discourse particles and other overt markers in positions other than Forceo may privilege the interpre-
tation of declaratives as assertions but the idea remains that assertion itself is not syntactically marked in
these contexts.
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for Responsibility on their Force head. This is not as counterintuitive as it seems given
that an echo question seems to show acceptance, if not assertion, by the speaker of the
non wh-part of an echo-question. I will not develop a full account of echo questions here
as it is outside the scope of this dissertation, but my proposal seems compatible with an
account such as that of Sobin (1990). I leave this for future work.
Returning to cases in which Responsibility is specified, our next task is to detail exactly
how the asymmetry between matrix and embedded clauses with respect to subject-auxiliary
inversion comes about.
The proposal I will make here emerges from previous accounts but it is recast in new
terms and aims to explain why both typical embedded declaratives and typical embedded
interrogatives lack independent illocutionary force. I claim that when Force is directly
selected by the lexical verb, there is no way for it to derive the [Responsibility] feature
because feature inheritance cannot take place between V, a non-Phase head, and Force.
As it stands, then, nothing on Force probes for the [Responsibility] feature in the embedded
clause so verb movement to Force does not occur. Consequently, neither illocutionary force
nor, by extension, clause type is overtly marked in [-wh] embedded clauses via movement to
Force. Another means of overtly marking clause type must then be found—assuming, along
with Weerman (1989) and Bhatt & Yoon (1992) that clause type must be overtly marked
in every clause—that does not relate to verb movement in the embedded clause and that
ensures that the lexical verb selects the correct kind of complement. Bhatt & Yoon (1992)
argue convincingly based on cross-linguistic evidence that Force carries a subordination
feature when it is embedded; following this, I claim that Force in standard embedded
clauses is specified for [Subordination] and that this feature can actually be valued either
as declarative or interrogative. Again this results in overt clause-type marking without
postulating a single unified feature specific to clause-typing; instead, clause-type is a value
on a separately motivated feature both in matrix clauses (where it is partly a result of
the value of [Responsibility]) and subordinate clauses (where it is a result of the value of
[Subordination]).
I do not claim that triggering of movement by [Responsibility] is the only mechanism
for verb movement in embedded clauses; I already mentioned that Icelandic and Yiddish
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differ in how V2 behaves in both matrix and embedded clauses. There is also evidence
that two types of V2 (illocutionary-force related V2 and non-illocutionary-force related V2)
can occur in the same language—Biberauer (2015a) shows that Afrikaans contains both
illocutionary force-driven EV2 as described for German and V2 word orders in embedded
interrogatives and relative clauses that do not appear to be at all restricted by illocutionary
force or the type of matrix predicate they are embedded under. This second type of EV2
is not the concern of this thesis and will be left for future research.
A question remains about the above analysis - is it problematic to postulate a respon-
sibility feature, albeit clause-internal, in all clausal complements to verbs, especially given
that they may be the ‘other’ kind of EV2 complement, or not quasi-quotational at all? I
think that there is evidence for the presence of clause-medial [Responsibility] regardless of
the left-peripheral characteristics of the clause.
Firstly, clausal complements have some kind of perspective attached to them, whether
the pragmatic context privileges a speaker, a matrix subject, or even a general point of
view. This distinguishes them from, for example, relative clauses, which are presupposed.
It could be argued that this interpretation of a perspective comes from the lexical verb, and
indeed it is difficult to separate out these two hypotheses in the case of verbs such as say
or tell. However, Kratzer (2009, 2014) shows that clausal complements must contain some
degree of independent modality because they can appear with verbs that do not typically
select for clausal complements, in particular verbs of manner of communication:
(39) a. Ralph sighed *(that) he had not seen Ortcutt at the beach.
b. Ralph
Ralph
seufzte,
sighed
dass
that
er
he
betrogen
betrayed
worden.
been was.subj
“Ralph sighed that he had been betrayed.” Kratzer (2014, slide 9)
c. Ralph raged that they hadn’t informed him. Kratzer (2014, slide 8)
d. Ralph
Ralph
tobte,
raged
dass
that
man
they
ihn
him
nicht
not
informiert
informed
habe.
have.subj
“Ralph raged that they hadn’t informed him.” Kratzer (2014, slide 8)
Kratzer also shows that such complements appear to be syntactically different from typical
clausal complements to verbs, as they are not amenable to extraction:
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(40) *Whoi did Ralph sigh that he saw ti at the beach? Kratzer (2014, slide 34)
Partee (1973a) also notes this phenomenon, not only highlighting the obligatoriness of the
complementiser, but also the fact that such clauses may take on a more direct speech
report-like flavour by containing grammatical features present in the original speech act
that do not form part of the reporter’s grammar (Partee 1973a, p.326):
(41) Jed hollered *(that) them brown cows was back in the corn patch again.
Partee (1973a, p.326)
These clauses are not, however, exactly the same as the quasi-quotational constructions
examined in this thesis. They only marginally permit speech-act adverbs and discourse
particles (42), left-peripheral temporal adverbs do not receive an embedded interpretation
(43) and there is not a complete disambiguation of perspectives like that which we see in
EIQs (44):
(42) ??Ralph sighed that seriously he had seen Ortcutt at the beach.
(43) Ralph raged [around Christmas time] that he had seen Ortcutt at the beach
No embedded construal of temporal adjunct
(44) ??Ralphi raged that honestlyi, speaker they hadn’t informed him.
I believe that there is a spectrum of quotationhood bookended by indirect speech reports
and direct speech reports, and that there is a range of constructions in the middle. The
constructions listed above from Kratzer and Partee are further along in the spectrum than
indirect speech reports but, on the evidence of (42)-(44) above, not as far along as the
quasi-quotational speech reports.23
Similarly to the Kratzer and Partee examples, there exist examples of non-V2 con-
structions that nonetheless contain discourse-related elements. Wiklund (2010) presents
the following examples in Swedish:
23It is also possible that there are a couple of parallel spectra given the existence languages that show
indexical shift, as it is not clear whether they should be considered more or less quotational than, for
example, the quasi-quotational constructions described here.
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(45) a. Hon
she
sa
said
att
that
han
he
fasen
damn
inte
not
hade
had
gjort
done
ett
a
skit.
shit
“She that he hadn’t damn well given a shit.
b. Hon
she
sa
said
att
that
han
he
hade
had
fasen
damn
inte
not
gjort
done
ett
a
skit.
shit
“She that he hadn’t damn well given a shit.
(46) a. Hon
she
sa
said
att
that
han
he
a¨rligt
honestly
talat
speaking
inte
not
hade
had
fo¨rst˚at
understood
det.
that
“She said that, honestly speaking, he had not understood that.”
b. Hon
she
sa
said
att
that
han
he
hade
had
a¨rligt
honestly
talat
speaking
inte
not
fo¨rst˚at
understood
det.
that
“She said that, honestly speaking, he had not understood that.”
(47) a. Vi
we
uppta¨ckte
discovered
att
that
de
they
minsann
indeed
inte
not
hade
had
kommit.
come
“We discovered that they indeed had not come.”
b. Vi
we
uppta¨ckte
discovered
att
that
de
they
hade
had
na¨mlinge/minsann
indeed
inte
not
kommit.
come
“We discovered that they indeed had not come.” Wiklund (2010)
In addition to containing speech-act adverbs and swear words, the (a) examples in (45)-
(47) have similar syntactic restrictions to EV2 clauses as they cannot be topicalised, they
resist wh-extraction and they can only appear under the kind of predicates that permit
EV2. However, it is clear to see that they do not require EV2 to license these items and,
furthermore, there is no disambiguation of perspectives.
Similar examples of discourse particles embedded in non-V2 clauses can be found in
German (48) and Bavarian (49):
(48) Maria
Maria
hat
has
gesagt,
said
dass
that
Hein
Hein
wohl
prt:probably
heute
today
hier
here
ein
a
Ma¨dchen
girl
getroffen
met
hat
has
“Maria said that Hein has probably met a girl here today.”
Adapted from Zimmermann (2004, p.3)
(49) A: Mia
we
miassn
must
ned
neg
in’d
in.det
Schui. . .
school
“We don’t have to go to school. . . ”
B: Wei
because
do
there
scho
already
Ferien
holidays
san
are
ga¨?
prt
because we’re already on holidays then, right?” S. Thoma, p.c.
150
As in the Swedish examples, the discourse particles in (48) and (49) are only available
in contexts that optionally permit V2, even if that V2 is not realised. However, all of
these structures lack the disambiguation of perspectives crucial to the quasi-quotational
constructions and their expression of fully independent illocutionary force.
Wiklund uses the Swedish examples above to counter the idea that EV2 and illocution-
ary force are biconditionally related. However, Wiklund’s definition of illocutionary force
(like many other scholars she focuses on assertive force) is, as she admits, somewhat im-
precise: she defines assertive illocutionary force as “roughly the act of uttering a sentence
with the intention of making the addressee accept the content of it and take it as part of
the common ground” (Wiklund 2010, p.82). This is subtly different from my definition,
which does not concern itself with the behaviour of the addressee. Moreover, she identifies
any clause permitting speaker-oriented elements as being a clause with illocutionary force,
even though it is not straightforward to see how this follows from her definition of illocu-
tionary force. In fact, as I have claimed here, there is a distinction between the availability
of discourse-related elements and the presence of fully independent illocutionary force, a
distinction that Wiklund herself hints towards at the end of her paper. The account I pro-
pose here captures and develops Wiklund’s intuitions that EV2 is linked to evidentiality by
claiming a stronger link between EV2 and illocutionary force, on the understanding that
illocutionary force is (in part) the disambiguation of perspectives. Just as with the Kratzer
and Partee examples, I propose that these examples are more quotation-like than indirect
speech reports but less so than quasi-quotational constructions, from which it follows that
these clauses also have a [Responsibility] feature realised somewhere in the clause, if not in
the left periphery—note that all the discourse particles in the above Swedish and German
examples are clause-medial, while the Bavarian example is clause-final. I propose that
clause-medial illocutionary objects express a weaker version of illocutionary force than can
be expressed by clause-initial operations. There is some precedent for the idea that re-
alisation of the [Responsibility] feature clause-medially rather than clause-initially results
in a weaker, but present, sense of quotationhood. Cardinaletti (2011) notes that clause-
medial discourse particles in Italian are derived from adverbs, have a modificational role
and interact with the CP level. In contrast clause-initial particles are derived from verbs
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and interact with the material higher than CP, that is with discourse participants. I also
show in Woods (2016) that clause-initial and clause-medial please in matrix clauses differ
in terms of how strongly they convey requesting force—clause-initial please is strictly ex-
cluded from being syntactically integrated in declarative clauses but clause-medial please
is available under deontic necessity modal verbs in declarative clauses; essentially, clause-
medial please is to some degree dependent on the presence of a given modal force rather
than providing its own:
(50) a. *Please ladies must remain fully dressed while bathing.
b. Ladies must please remain fully dressed while bathing.
Attested, Woods (2016)
Struckmeier (2014) suggests that only a subset of features available on Force are available
on clause-medial particles, explaining its weaker interpretation. In particular, the [Respon-
sibility] feature in clause-medial position is interpreted differently because it is separated
from other syntactic elements introduced by IA, such as the perspectival monster and
its effects, and other elements potentially available on Force, such as [+wh] and other
clause-typing features.
The realisation of the [Responsibility] feature and how it forges connections between
Force and T helps us to understand the spectrum of quotationhood across a range of con-
structions. It has also enabled us to explain the matrix-embedded asymmetry of subject-
auxiliary inversion as well as examining cross-linguistic differences in verb movement.
Much work remains to be done. We are yet to fully understand the structure of the
Swedish examples in (45)-(47), or indeed the examples given by Partee (1973a) and Kratzer
(2014). However, the proposal here takes the previous insights into embedded verb second
and refines them, giving a detailed analysis of the role and representation of the functional
head that others have proposed above ForceP. It also demonstrates how this head interacts
with Forceo and ultimately with illocution-related features in a position just above vP,
bringing evidence from both clause-initial and clause-medial discourse particles to bear on
how illocution is represented in two positions but to different degrees.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter I have proposed that there is an Illocutionary Act Phrase (IAP) above
ForceP whose head is a modal operator encoding illocutionary force. To do this, I have
refined the concept at the heart of illocutionary force, namely responsibility, and proposed
working definitions of a range of illocutionary forces on this basis. These definitions capture
the modal quality of the IA head, which takes into account desire/necessity modality in
addition to responsibility depending on the type of operator. I concluded that the IA head
is a verb-like modal operator with an argument structure relating a perspectival element to
a clause. It is also a Phase head, a property that I use to explain both the islandhood of the
quasi-quotational constructions it heads and its relationship with Forceo, which I likened
to the relationship between Forceo and T. However, the IA head also has some noun-like
properties in that it does not return a truth value or a proposition, but a discourse entity.
Finally, I discussed the implications of the IA head and its featural make-up for an analysis
of subject-auxiliary inversion.
In the chapters to follow I will develop two strands of the analysis that have been hinted
at in this chapter but not developed. Firstly I will detail the role and representation of the
IA head’s external argument, the perspectival monster. Secondly, I will discuss in greater
detail how the IAP links the clause it contains to a relevant discourse, including a more
detailed characterisation of the QUD framework.
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Chapter 5
Analysis Part II: the Perspectival
Monster
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter it was proposed that a functional Illocutionary Act head selects for
a clause, passes a [Responsibility] feature onto Force in that clause and further specifies the
illocutionary force of the clause by expressing an ordering source for possible worlds. That
ordering source is the speaker’s preference or desire in the case of asserting and requesting
force and addressee’s knowledge in the case of questioning force. The Illocutionary Act
head also nominalises the clause. The IAP has the type of an entity, type 〈e〉 and denotes
an abstract discourse object—a conversational move.
It was also proposed that the Illocutionary Act head has an external argument that
specifies the perspective according to which the clause is evaluated. This chapter is de-
voted to detailing the representation of the external argument and how it interacts with
material in the embedded clause, in particular the interpretation of expressive, not-at-issue,
perspectival elements.
The chapter is structured as follows: I will present more extensive evidence that per-
spective shifting occurs in quasi-quotational constructions, bringing in data from embedded
imperatives and reason clauses. I will claim that a Perspectival Monster fixes the context
according to which perspectival elements in its scope are evaluated; essentially, the per-
spectival monster provides a connection between the embedded clause and the relevant
context.
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5.2 Evidence for a Perspectival Monster
In chapter 3 I outlined some evidence for perspective shifting to the original discourse
participants in EIQs, in particular the shifting of typically speaker-oriented elements like
speech act adverbs (section 3.3) and expressive elements such as swear words (as in section
3.5). In this section I will both explore questions of perspective shifting in general and
present more evidence for perspective shifting in quasi-quotational constructions. I claim
that EIQs and recomplementation clauses shift towards the original discourse participants
and that German EV2 clauses shift to the reporting speaker. The state of affairs in
Mainland Scandinavian is more complex, and will also be discussed.
5.2.1 Shifty predicates: a case of “coming” and “going”
Starting with the concept of perspective shifting in general, Bylinina et al. (2014, 2015)
and Sudo (2016) build on observations by Fillmore (1975), McCready (2007) and others in
noting that a range of items in natural language are sensitive to perspectives, and hence
to perspective shifting. These items are determined by context—though not necessarily in
the narrow sense of the utterance context—and their perspectical interpretation does not
directly impact the truth of a sentence, as long as they hold from someone’s perspective.
These items include relative locative directions such as left and right, relative socio-cultural
expressions such as foreigner, logophoric items and predicates like come and go that make
certain indexical presuppositions. Moreover, there are contexts in which these items are
known to be especially prone to shifting, such as questions, embedded clauses under atti-
tude predicates and conditionals Bylinina et al. (2014, p.1), though they do not obligatorily
shift in any of these contexts.1
The analysis put forward of EIQs so far suggests that these shifty elements whose shift
is only optional in the contexts above (Bylinina et al. 2014, pp.5-10) should obligatorily
shift in EIQs—at least, they should only be evaluable according to the original and not
the reporting context. This is borne out by the data below:
1Bylinina et al. (2014) also identify a group of items that do shift obligatorily in the same contexts,
including evidentials, epistemic modals and predicates of personal taste. As this latter group of items do
not test my hypothesis of EIQs as obligatory shifting contexts, I will not concern myself with them here.
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(1) Relative locative directions
a. Mary said that Bill is standing on the left. Left of speaker or Mary
b. Mary asked John if Bill is standing on the left. Left of speaker, Mary or John
c. Mary asked John was Bill standing on the left. Left of Mary or John
(2) Relative socio-cultural expressions
a. Mary said that John was a foreigner.
John’s nationality differs from speaker’s or Mary’s
b. Mary asked Bill if John was a foreigner.
John’s nationality differs from speaker’s, Mary’s, or Bill’s
c. Mary asked Bill was John a foreigner
John’s nationality differs from Mary’s or Bill’s
(3) ‘Come’ and ‘go’
Context: Guillaume is in France, Mary is in London and the speaker is in Leeds.
a. Guillaume said that Mary should come to his house in France.
‘Come’ from Guillaume’s perspective
b. Guillaume said that Mary should go to his house in France.
‘Go’ from speaker’s or Mary’s perspective
c. Guillaume asked Mary if she would come to his house in France.
‘Come’ from Guillaume’s perspective
d. Guillaume asked Mary if she would go to his house in France.
‘Go’ from speaker’s perspective
e. Guillaume asked Mary would she come to his house in France
‘Come’ from Guillaume’s perspective
f. #Guillaume asked Mary would she go to his house in France
No perspective available to evaluate ‘go’
We can also look to attested examples whereby ‘come’ is used in the case that the original
speaker is already at the desired location and ‘go’ is used when the original speaker is not
already at the desired location, regardless of where the reporting speaker is:
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(4) Theyj said oo, could wei come over for coffee so wei did [go over for coffee]
Yorkshire Eng., attested 29th Dec 2015
(5) He mentioned [that there was another club opening across town], and [would I like
to go with him], and I said “Sure, I’d love to go with you.”
Canadian Eng., The Graham Norton Show, 15th Jan 2016
The perspective shifting we see in EIQs is not therefore the same as that examined by
Bylinina and colleagues but is more akin to indexical shifting: it is triggered by embedding
under specific attitude contexts; it is obligatory in those contexts in terms of how it is
triggered; and it is not only inherently “shifty” items that are affected but also expressive
elements, which are typically considered to be speaker-oriented by default.
5.2.2 Embedded imperatives
There is another type of embedded speech act that I have not yet dealt with in this thesis.
Embedded imperatives have only recently been accepted in the literature as possible in
natural language but are in fact widespread in languages like English, German, Japanese
and others. An attested example from a Caribbean dialect of English is shown in (6), in
which a cricketer discusses the mindgames he plays with an opponent.
(6) Stokes doesn’t learn, because they keep telling him do not speak to me because I’m
going to perform.
They = Stokes’s teammates, the media; subject of the imperative = Stokes;
me = the speaker
Caribbean (Jamaican) Eng., Metro, Mon 4th Apr 2016, p.43
Embedded imperatives provide further evidence for the crosslinguistic differences in per-
spective shifting between English and German/Mainland Scandinavian. In English, the
covert subject of the embedded imperative is interpreted as the original addressee as in
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(7)2 whereas in German and Swedish3 it is interpreted as the addressee in the reporting
context, as in (8). This is in addition to the shifting of other elements as mentioned above.
That the subject of the embedded imperative is interpreted as the original addressee in
German is illustrated by data from Kaufmann (2015):
(7) I talked to a lawyer yesterday and he said speak to his sister
Interpretation: Lawyer advised speaker to talk to lawyer’s sister.
Adapted from Kaufmann (2015, p.9)
(8) Context: On Monday, Magda tells Michael “Claudia should leave at 5, not 7.”
Michael tells Claudia, who intends to book the train at 7:
Magda
Magda
hat
has
gesagt
said
fahr
leave.imp
schon
already
fru¨her
earlier
“Magda said youClaudia should leave earlier.” Kaufmann (2015, p.8)
Interestingly, Kaufmann notes that in the examples above and in the other languages
she cites, no directive commitment is imposed on the addressee in the current discourse
context, although they are interpreted as being the subject of the original command. This
fits with the proposal advanced in this thesis that embedded illocutionary force is not
a question of being the Main Point of Utterance, Main Information Request or, to coin
a similar term for commands, the Main Direction for Action. This is further illustrated
by the following attested example, in which the embedded imperative is embedded under
2Kaufmann claims that subjects of English embedded imperatives can be interpreted either as corefer-
ential with the current addressee or with the original addressee; she further claims that example (i) prefers
the former interpretation and example (ii) the latter:
Context: Peter’s visa is about to expire.
(i) Mary to Peter: “I talked to a lawyer yesterday and he said marry my sister.
Context: Mary lost her wallet.
(ii) Mary to Peter: “I talked to John and he said call his bank.
There appears to be a split in interpretations here; I and other native speakers of English who accept
EIQs do not interpret the imperative subject as the current addressee in either example, rendering the
context for (i) odd. However, other English speakers (particularly at the department colloquium at the
University of York) have noted that they do accept a current addressee reading for (i). Kaufmann marks
the judgements she presents as tentative, so clearly more fine-grained work is needed here, particularly on
a possible interaction between EIQ acceptance and the availability of a current addressee-as-imperative
subject reading. Moreover, more careful examples are needed—in the case of “marry my sister”, it is quite
easy to interpret this as a direct quote rather than an embedded imperative. Although this is strange in
the context, both careful examples and more detailed contexts are needed to gain clearer judgement data
on the issue.
3Thanks to Anders Holmberg for his judgement on the Swedish version of (8), which patterns with
Kaufmann’s judgements for German.
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an temporal adverb expressing frequent use of the imperative and the addressee of the
utterance is clearly not the addressee of the imperative.
(9) The guard usually says wait for me but they often don’t [wait for me].
Subject of the imperative = onboard train guards; me = speaker
Tyneside Eng., attested 5th Feb 2016
However, Kaufmann notes that in German, an embedded imperative is only felicitous if the
original addressee hasn’t already carried out the directed action and if s/he is in a position
to carry it out. That is to say that the action is still possible and as such unresolved in
the reporting context. These facts are important in considering how the modal IA head
and the perspectival monster to be proposed interact: in order to achieve the meaning
noted by Kaufmann, it must be the matrix subject’s doxastic alternatives that form the
ordering source in the modal IA head, but a current discourse participant, specifically the
addressee, that is identified as the holder of responsibility. As the [Responsibility] feature
is in the scope of the perspectival monster that will be proposed, it will be subject to
the perspective fixed by that monster operator, as I will show.Take the German example
in (8) to work this through: the speaker Michael must recognise the direction contained
within the imperative (that Claudia should leave) to be unresolved in the current discourse
and recognises Claudia as his addressee, but Michael is not the one who requires Claudia
to leave earlier so does not himself require Claudia to act in the actual context. He is
still conveying Magda’s message, using a quasi-quotational rather than direct or indirect
report so that he does not impose a directive requirement of his own but still communicates
that the requirement on Claudia is unresolved. In this way embedded imperatives mirror
the other quasi-quotational constructions we have examined and the reduced speech act
structure that I have proposed in that they express the taking-on of responsibility but not
the call on the addressee to respond.
We can add some more data to Kaufmann’s survey that continues to support both the
analysis put forward so far and the proposal to follow that a perspective shift that is akin
to indexical shifting occurs in quasi-quotational constructions. Firstly, when considering
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Castilian Spanish, we might predict that the subject of embedded Spanish declaratives is
the original addressee based on the shift to the original perspectives that we see in recom-
plementation. Rivero (1994) does not state so directly, but she notes that an imperative
like (10) is interpreted as a report that contains the illocutionary force of an imperative
without representing an command independent of the original discourse.
(10) Dijo
said.3sg
que
that
a
to
no
neg
molestarle.
bother.inf-cl.3sg
“He said don’t bother him.” Rivero (1994, p.552)
She also compares the embedded imperative in (10) with the Spanish indirect questions
examined by Lahiri (2002), which were also interpreted as representing the discourse com-
mitments from the original discourse rather than introducing new responsibilities into the
reporting discourse. This is confirmed by native speaker judgements; the original addressee
is obligatorily interpreted as the subject of the embedded imperative.4 We can therefore
conclude that the subject in Spanish embedded imperatives is interpreted as the original
addressee and not the addressee of the report.
A final example to support the connection between shifting orientation in quasi-
quotational structure and shifts in covert perspectival elements is the case of Japanese.
Kaufmann notes based on native speaker judgements that Japanese embedded imperatives
are interpreted according to the original context (Kaufmann 2015). This is further backed
up by the fact that the imperative form used in Japanese does not necessarily match the
form that the speaker would use to make a demand of their addressee, even though the
embedded clause is an indirect report based on the pronouns (Maier 2009, 2010, Sauerland
& Yatsushiro 2014). Taking an example from Maier (2009, p.7), my boss says the following
to me:
(11) Asatte
day-after-tomorrow
made
until
ni kono
this
shigoto-o
work.acc
yare
do.imp.impolite
4Thanks to Ana Godoy, Jorge Gonzalez, A´ngel Luiz Jime´nez Ferna´ndez and other amig@s hispanohab-
lantes. My informants suggested that, in the absence of any other contextual factors, the fact of reporting
the imperative carries the implication that the addressee in the reporting situation was also supposed to
comply with the command but this does not take away from the fact that there is an obligatory link to the
original addressee.
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“Finish this work by the day after tomorrow!”
I then report this to my respected friend the next day as follows:
(12) [Ashita
tomorrow
made
until
ni sono
that
shigoto-o
work.acc
yare
do.imp.impolite
to]
comp
jooshi-ni
boss-by
iwaremashita
told.hon.pst
“I was told by the boss finish that work by tomorrow.”
Note that the temporal indexical, the demonstrative pronoun and the politeness marking
on the matrix verb all orient to the reporting situation. However, the impolite marking
on the embedded imperative orients to the original situation. If it were to orient to the
current situation, the embedded imperative would not carry impolite marking because the
current addressee, my respected friend, would merit polite marking on the verb. Maier
(2009) claims that this is evidence of “mixed quotation” in Japanese and that there are
effectively “silent quotation marks” around yare in (12). Apart from the fact that silent
quotation marks are very difficult to test, this is an oversimplistic analysis that does not
account for other kinds of perspective shifting both in EIQs/recomplementation (where
there is no overt difference between shifted discourse markers and speech act adverbs, for
example) or even other kinds of shifting in Japanese. Coulmas (1985, p.55) presents an
alternative way of reporting (11):
(13) [Ashita
tomorrow
made
until
ni sono
that
shigoto-o
work-acc
yaru
do.imp.antihon
yooni
prt
to]
comp
jooshi-wa
boss-top
iimashita.
say.hon.pst
“The boss told me finish the work by tomorrow.”
The presence of yooni, a particle used to mark imperatives in indirect speech, and its
compatibility with yaru in the embedded clause suggests that yaru is not invisibly quoted
but is genuinely shifted within the embedded clause. Sauerland & Yatsushiro (2014) also
note that genuine mixed quotation in other languages tends to be prosodically or gesturally
marked, which is not the case in examples like (12) or (13), that yare is the only part
161
of the sentence that may be “quoted”—the shifting of asatte (‘day after tomorrow’) to
ashita (‘tomorrow’) is obligatory and cannot be interpreted as quoted—plus there are
other aspects of the embedded imperative verb that cannot have been quoted from the
original context. Sauerland & Yatsushiro (2014, p.197) use the example below, spoken by
a male, to illustrate this:
(14) Hanako-ga
Hanako-subj
[kanojo-no
her-gen
ie-ni
house-to
sugu
immediately
koi
come.imp
to]
comp
denwa-o
phone-acc
kakete-kita.
placing-came
“Hanako called me up and said come right now to her house.”
The form of the embedded imperative verb koi in (14) is the form used only by male
speakers of Japanese, so Hanako could not have actually used the form koi in her original
speech. However, the use of koi marks the embedded clause in (14) as a quasi-quotational
construction that makes completely clear that the command “come right now” was made
of the original addressee and not of the addressee of the report.
As Kaufmann notes, the fact that the embedded imperative addressee is not always
coreferent with the current addressee causes problems for theories of imperatives such as
To-Do List theories (cf. Portner (2004)), because they show imperative clause-typing to be
separate from imposing directive responsibility on the addressee. Furthermore, obligations
can be imposed in one context on an addressee in a future context (Kaufmann 2015,
p.11). It is clear that force and clause typing are once again separate but related processes
and raises questions about exactly how the constituent parts of illocutionary force are
represented such that the correct interpretation can be achieved after shifting (a process
that itself is yet to be detailed).
5.2.3 Reason clauses
A final piece of evidence that the languages under investigation differ in terms of the
interpretation of perspectival material can be found in reason clauses. Reason clauses are
independently interesting because they are another licensing environment for EIQs, but
this point will be left for the next chapter.
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In their work on the syntax and semantics of situation pronouns, Florian Schwarz and
Ezra Keshet bring to light a difference in the interpretation of reason clauses embedded
under attitude predicates. In his 2012 work, Schwarz notes that he and Keshet differ in
whether they judge the following sentences as accurate reports of the context in italics:
(15) Context: The teacher thinks the glasses A, B, and C, which contained a clear
liquid, were filled with vodka (they actually contained water).
a. The teacher thinks John should be punished because he drank glasses A, B,
and C.
b. The teacher thinks John should be punished because he drank every glass
with water in it.
Schwarz (2012, pp.35-36)
Schwarz claims that a transparent interpretation of the above scenario, as represented in
(15b), is available, while Keshet rejects this, claiming that only the opaque reading in (15a)
is available. The important point here is that Schwarz is a native speaker of German and
Keshet is a native English speaker. An informal survey of 5 English and 5 German and
Swedish speakers showed that the English speakers agree with Keshet while the German
and Swedish speakers agree with Schwarz. While further systematic investigation is clearly
needed, this is suggestive that the divide between English on the one hand and German
and Swedish on the other in terms of attribution of perspective is not limited to quasi-
quotational constructions, though it is clearly related to clauses embedded under attitude
predicates. If it is found that English speakers and German and Swedish speakers differ
fundamentally in how they attribute perspectives to different holders, this could have wider
implications both for theory, in particular theories of perspectival operators and situation
pronouns, as well as for first and second language acquisition.
5.2.4 Summary: a Monstrous path awaits
Two kinds of shifting are possible in natural language: the shifting of overt phi-features
from the current context to an original context, known as indexical shift, and a similar
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but covert shifting of perspectival features. A recent and convincing analysis of indexical
shift was presented in Sudo (2012) and developed in Shklovsky & Sudo (2014) for the
shifting patterns in Uyghur (Turkic). According to this analysis, there is a syntactic
monster operator in the high left periphery. The principal evidence for the syntactic
representation of such an operator is the distribution of overt phi-feature shifting in Uyghur;
there exists a hierarchical split within embedded clauses between arguments that show
shifting (objects and low-positioned nominative-marked subjects) and those that do not
(high-positioned accusative-marked subjects). Shklovsky & Sudo say nothing about the
availability of embedded root phenomena in Uyghur embedded clauses, nor do they make
any claims about the interpretative characteristics of shifted versus non-shifted clauses,
though they note that embedded objects are ambiguous between shifted and unshifted
interpretations in the case that the subject is accusative-marked due to the lack of overt
markers of shifting in the left-periphery.
The parallels between indexical shifting and perspective shifting are clear: there are
syntactic requirements as to the kinds of predicates that clauses must be embedded under
and the scope of the element that effects shifting; moreover shifting is obligatory under the
scope of the monster operator and hence all shiftable elements in its scope shift together
(a property remarked upon by Anand & Nevins (2004)). There are two core differences
between indexical shifting and perspective shifting. Firstly, indexical shifting only goes
in one direction—towards the embedded context. There is usually no ambiguity in the
interpretation of pronouns because shifted and non-shifted pronouns have different forms
(except the ambiguity noted above in Uyghur). In contrast, perspective shifting does not
tend to result in an overt shift but in an interpretive shift, and can go both ways; either
the utterance or embedded context may be the target of shifting, and without shifting,
both contexts are available to evaluate perspectival elements, even if one context may be
pragmatically preferred.
The second difference lies in the kinds of elements that may be shifted. While only
pronominal, temporal and locative indexicals may5 shift under indexical monster operators,
5As Sudo (2012) discusses, not all temporal and locative indexicals shift even if the language shows
pronominal indexicals. He claims that shifting depends on the lexical make-up of the temporal and locative
expressions in these cases. He also attributes non-shifting of certain pronouns to lexical differences, claiming
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the group of perspectival elements that can shift is more heterogeneous: covert imperative
pronouns, speech act adverbs, discourse particles, even topicalised phrases as in Romance
recomplementation.
Bylinina et al. (2015) claim that perspective-sensitive items are routinely evaluated with
respect to a context and that this forms part of their semantic value; perspective-sensitive
items are crucially distinguished from pronouns in that they do not carry an index. Indices
allow pronouns to refer to a potentially infinite number of possible referents—as many
possible referents as are in the context. In contrast, perspective-sensitive items can only
be evaluated by perspective holders with specific roles in the context (speaker, addressee) or
in the syntax (matrix subject, matrix indirect object). This approach retains Kaufmann’s
(2015) observation that context-dependence goes beyond the thematic roles associated with
the speech event, because speakers and hearers not represented in the utterance context
can still be represented in other contexts, for example the context generated by use of an
attitude predicate. Bylinina et al. (2015) then propose that there is a perspective operator
Π that does carry an index and is therefore pronominal-like; in the context of Bylinina et
al’s work this allows the operator to pick up any salient person’s perspective, but leads
to in the same problem that postulating an index on the perspective-sensitive item itself
would result in—there is little to stop the operator from referring to any salient individual
in the context, which both their data and mine show would overgenerate (a fact they
acknowledge at the end of their paper).
Kaufmann (2015) too suggests that a shifting operator is available in the case of embed-
ded imperatives; she looks to extend the use of indexical monster operators to embedded
imperative cases by claiming that covert pronouns such as the second-person feature in im-
peratives in languages like English are shiftable indexicals, in contrast to overt pronouns
that do not shift. There are some potential problems with this account: it would necessi-
tate that all perspective-sensitive items contain a covert pronoun, which may or may not
be true, but again raises the problems mentioned by Bylinina et al. (2015) with respect
to the restricted reference of such pronouns. Partee’s (1989) concerns about a pronomi-
for example that the non-shiftable second person pronoun in Slave´ is lexically specified to always refer to
the addressee in the utterance context.
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nal explanation for perspective shifting also remain: firstly, that there is a lack of overt
evidence for the presence of these covert pronouns; secondly, that when an overt pronoun
can appear with a perspective-sensitive element, it is sometimes blocked by other factors
in the sentence—in the case of (16), a habitual interpretation:
(16) In all my travels, whenever I have called for a doctor, one has arrived (*there)
within an hour.
Requires an antecedent for ‘there’
Bylinina et al. (2015, p.73), adapted from Partee (1989)
A final argument against Kaufmann’s analysis is that the majority of the languages that
she looks at are not languages that typically permit indexical shifting—Japanese is the only
possible exception (cf. Sudo (2012)). Given that the shifting of covert elements according
to context is far more widespread than overt indexical shifting, it is better justified to
suggest that it is a separate process rather than that the lack of indexical shifting in the
presence of perspective shifting is a lexical coincidence holding across a large number of
languages.
Focus, then, should be put on the proper examination of the structure and semantics
of perspective-shifting elements to determine how their sensitivity to perspectives is repre-
sented, but this is not the focus of this thesis. For the purposes of this work, I will assume
that they are sensitive to a perspectival parameter in the context tuple without being
sensitive to every parameter in the context. To explain how this perspectival parameter
is shifted, the next section contains a proposal similar to that in Bylinina et al. (2015),
namely that there is an operator, a Monster, that specifically determines the context ac-
cording to which perspectival elements orient. I do not claim that this monster has its own
index but that it can only draw on two contexts for its values: the utterance context or
the original discourse context (cf. Hacquard (2010), Sudo (2012) and their proposals for
matrix attitude verbs).
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5.3 The Perspectival Monster
Some assumptions must be made and laid out before the syntax of the perspectival monster
can be detailed.
I will follow Percus (2000), Hacquard (2006), Sudo (2012), Schwarz (2012) and others
in assuming that silent situation pronouns exist in the structure and that these are bound
by similarly syntactically present world binders. There is a strong and growing body of
evidence to suggest that these situation pronouns are syntactically real; Percus (2000)
shows that the quantified phrase every semanticist in (17) can be evaluated according to
the actual context or to another salient context, resulting in two available meanings:
(17) If every semanticist owned a villa in Tuscany, what a joy this world would be.
Percus (2000, p.117)
a. If every actual semanticist owned a villa in Tuscany, what a joy it would be
(because I would own one/because we would have a close community. . . ).
{w: every semanticist in our world owns Tuscan villa in w}
b. If every semanticist in this hypothetical situation owned a villa in Tuscany,
what a joy it would be (because they’d all be far away/because they’d stay
out of trouble. . . ).
{w: every semanticist in w owns a Tuscan villa in w}
As Hacquard (2010, p.99) points out, however, there are locality restrictions on such inter-
pretations: if situation pronouns are in the restriction of a quantifier such as every, they
may be bound by either the actual world binder at the top of the matrix clause or by a
binder introduced by some modal element. However, if they are in the scope of a quantifier,
they must be bound by the most local world binder. Hence we do not get a reading for
(17) in which every semanticist, real or otherwise, owns a villa in the real world.
Hacquard’s own work builds on this locality restriction to illustrate how situation pro-
nouns and how they are bound are crucial in deriving the interpretation of modal verbs,
thereby deriving the possibility of interpreting a single modal verb in multiple ways from
its position in the clause relative to different situation pronouns.
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Finally, Schwarz (2012) argues that syntactically represented situation pronouns occur
in limited environments. He argues that verbs do not combine with situation pronouns be-
cause they must always be interpreted according to the nearest situation binder. However,
the interpretation of DPs is freer, so Schwarz claims that they do combine with a situation
pronoun; specifically that the situation pronoun is an argument of the determiner head.
He introduces this idea for a number of reasons, including to derive the locality restriction
noted by Percus and described by Hacquard.
I will not take a particular stand on the issue as to whether verbs combine with a
syntactically present situation pronoun or a solely semantic argument. What is important
for the analysis to follow is that attitude verbs do introduce a new world binder.
Having assumed the availability of situation pronouns, we must then define situation
pronouns and what they contain for our purposes. Sudo (2012) proposes that they denote
a tuple consisting minimally of a speaker, a hearer and a world parameter. I add to this by
proposing that the tuple also contains a perspectival centre parameter, i.e. the discourse
participant or entity against whose perspective the sentence is evaluated. In the default
case the perspectival centre parameter will pick out the speaker of the utterance, but there
are many cases in which it will not; not only the cases that Bylinina et al. (2014) discuss
but also in cases in which a general point of view is expressed. The perspectival centre
is restricted as to the discourse participants or entities that it can pick out; it must pick
out a speaker, a hearer, a syntactic argument with a thematic role or the general point of
view. It cannot simply pick out any salient person in the discourse context, meaning that
it is different from the case of third-person pronouns in that it is syntactically (and not
just pragmatically) restricted as to its identity. The context tuple is represented below:
(18) A context c for an utterance U = 〈ac, hc, PU, w〉 where:
ac is the speaker in c
hc is the addressee in c
PU is the perspective holder for U
6
w is the world at issue in c.
6Irrespective of the content of U.
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I assume that the perspective holder is determined by some factor in the utterance in order
to capture the restriction on the perspective holder to the discourse participants, current
or original, rather than the context at large. In the case of EIQs the IA head requires that
the perspective holders are the original discourse participants.7,8 This also captures that
utterances are subparts of contexts, such that the speaker, hearer and world at issue in a
context can be kept constant across multiple utterances that may vary in the perspective
that is taken. Distinguishing between events (here utterances) and worlds in this way is
intuitively motivated and a commonly adopted tactic, for example by Hacquard (2010).
Taking these assumptions forward, then, it is possible to propose both how the quasi-
quotational construction (IAP), which we have analysed as an entity, receives its strict
interpretation, as well as the reasons why perspective-shifting is restricted to such quasi-
quotational environments.
I will first provide an analysis for how the perspectival monster works in English and
Spanish, then I will consider German and Mainland Scandinavian.
5.3.1 In English and Spanish
I propose that the English/Spanish IA head, already analysed as a determiner, takes a
complex as its external argument composed of a perspectival monster and a situation
pronoun, the latter of which is bound by the world binder introduced by the matrix attitude
verb. I assume that all matrix verbs introduce a perspective holder parameter as well as a
world parameter on the world binder because perspective shifting, as we have already seen,
is optionally available under attitude verbs in typical clausal complements. The monster
then acts in a similar, but not identical, fashion to Sudo’s (2012) indexical monsters: it
takes the situation pronoun and switches its value for the perspectival centre parameter in
instead of the value contained in the interpretation function, effectively fixing the value on
the situation pronoun as the value against which all perspectives must now be evaluated.
The important part of this is that the values for the speaker and hearer are not shifted.
7The assumption is that the general point of view is available in any utterance context.
8I will also argue that this move captures the fact that the kind of perspective shifting we are interested
in directly correlates with uttering acts. Clearly this leads to questions about how to deal with perspective
shifting in DPs and PPs of the kind examined by Bylinina et al. (2014), but I will not address this problem
here and will touch on it only briefly in the next section.
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The effect of the monster is that when it scopes over an EIQ clause uttered according
to an interpretation function composed of a context c and an assignment function g, the
EIQ clause itself is interpreted according to an altered interpretation function composed
of a context c’ and an assignment function g.
(19) Where there is:
a. an utterance U in context c with the context tuple {ac,hc,P(U),w} and
b. utterance U contains an embedded illocutionary force operator e.g. QUES-
TION and
c. the matrix verb introduces a context k with a context tuple {x,y,P(U’),w’}
and
d. the embedded illocutionary force operator QUESTION introduces a Perspec-
tival Monster PM and
e. ik is a situation pronoun also introduced by QUESTION and
f. the interpretation function is composed of a context index and an assignment
function g
Then: the denotation of PM (ik) applied to a clause κ interpreted according to
interpretation function c,g
= the denotation of κ interpreted according to an interpretation function
〈ac,hc,P(U’),w’〉, g
= [[κ]]〈ac,hc,P(U’),w’〉, g
This differs from the indexical monster proposed by Sudo (2012) in that the indexical mon-
ster shifts all parameters of the context c, such that anything in the scope of the indexical
monster is evaluated according to an interpretation function composed of a context g(ik)
and an assignment function g. Note that my addition of the perspectival centre parameter
PU to context tuple c predicts that all cases of indexical shifting will also be cases of
perspective shifting. There is some evidence for this in languages like AkOOse, (Bantu, in
Aikhenvald (2008, p.399)) but this has not been looked into for the languages that Sudo
studied such as Uyghur. This prediction will have to be left for future research.
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The structure of the clause containing the monster is as follows:9
(20)
λw0 . . .
V
said λw1 IAP
Monster s1
IA’
IA
question
ForceP
Force
would
TP
DP
I
T’
T
would
VP
V’
V
visit
DP
him
The semantics and syntax of the monster account for the characteristics of the EIQ as
follows.
Firstly, the shift of the perspectival centre parameter results in obligatory interpretation
of perspectival elements according to the embedded context because the change occurs in
the interpretation function (following Sudo (2012)). This means that anything in the scope
of the monster will be interpreted according to the altered interpretation function while
anything above the monster will be interpreted according to the unshifted interpretation
function. Given that the proposal is that the monster is above the illocutionary force
operator, which is the head of the highest projection of the embedded clause, it is not
9I have simplified the structure where the EIQ meets the matrix clause for expository purposes; this will
be discussed in chapter 6.
171
possible to test this prediction on any material in the embedded clause. However, examples
like (70) in chapter 3, repeated here as (21), show that two perspectives are available in
utterances containing an EIQ: a matrix perspective and an embedded perspective.
(21) The bitch shouted would he wake up already and help her find her damn keys.
Bitch = from speaker’s perspective
Damn = from matrix subject’s perspective
In (21), the expressive element bitch cannot refer to the original discourse because it is
not in the scope of the monster or the illocutionary force operator. However, damn can
only express the emotions of the original speaker because it is under the scope of these
elements. This is in contrast to the indirect speech report version of (21), shown in (22),
where damn can either have an original or reporting speaker orientation:
(22) The bitch shouted that he should wake up and help her find her damn keys.
Bitch = from speaker’s perspective
Damn = from speaker or matrix subject’s perspective
If anything, damn in (22) is more likely to be interpreted from the speaker’s perspective,
as it is typically an example of conventionally-implicated content (cf. (Potts 2005)) that
is obligatorily speaker-oriented.
The obligatory perspective shift in EIQs also accounts for their de dicto reading. All
items in the clause are interpreted according to the embedded perspectival centre and,
though this was not explicitly mentioned earlier, the embedded world parameter. As such
the only reading available is that which was said or asked in the original discourse; a
reading with respect to the actual world is unavailable because the actual world parameter
has been swapped out.
Moreover, de se readings of relevant anaphora are also obligatory for the same reasons—
this is illustrated in (31) and (32) from chapter 3, repeated here as (23) and (24):
(23) Indirect speech report: John asked if the photos of himself had appeared in the
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newspaper
a. OKJohn asked if the photos of he, John, had appeared in the newspaper
b. OKJohn asked if the photos of a man (who happens to be John) had appeared
in the newspaper
(24) EIQ: John asked did those photos of himself appear in the newspaper.
a. OKJohn asked if the photos of he, John, had appeared in the newspaper
b. #John asked if the photos of a man (who happens to be John) had appeared
in the newspaper
If a reflexive pronoun appears in the EIQ it must be evaluated with respected to the original
perspective holder and the world of the original discourse, such that it is not possible to
ascribe any belief other than that of self-ascription to the original discourse speaker.10
5.3.2 In German
As already alluded to, I propose that there is only one perspectival monster and that it is the
same across all the languages that show perspective shifting. What differs between English,
Spanish and Japanese on the one hand, and German and (most) Mainland Scandinavian
on the other, is not the monster but the lexical make-up of the illocutionary force operator.
This is desirable for acquisition considerations. Given that the illocutionary force operator
can potentially be overt and that its presence is always overtly marked, it is conceivable
that the child can build a stock of evidence that the presence of the IAP leads to a
certain interpretation, and the fact that this interpretation is fixed is due to the presence
of a perspective shifting operator. This is considerably less likely if it were a case of
distinguishing between types of monsters, which are always covert.
I claim that the illocutionary force operator in German reintroduces the current utter-
ance context. There are two ways in which this could happen. Firstly, we could claim that
the illocutionary force operator introduces its own world binder that, just like the topmost
10See Lewis (1979), Cresswell (1985) and Anand (2006) for more on the de se properties of contexts
introduced by attitude predicates, which also applies to the conceptualisation here of the illocutionary
force operator qua modal verb.
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binder in the sentence, picks out the utterance context. This would lead to redundancy in
the system because there would be two world binders that pick out the same world; one
high in the left periphery of the matrix cause and one in the left periphery of the embedded
clause. However, this would ensure that the situation pronoun that the IA head takes is
not simply bound by the otherwise nearest binder, the binder introduced by the attitude
predicate, as this would lead to perspective shifting and would not account for the data.
The alternative is that the illocutionary force operator in German, as in En-
glish/Spanish, does not project a world binder but only takes a situation pronoun that
is co-indexed with the highest situation pronoun in the clause. However, it is not clear
why this one type of situation pronoun should come partially fixed when this does not
seem to happen anywhere else in natural language. We must therefore proceed with the
first option despite the redundancy it introduces into the system.11
Taking this to be the case, the monster will take the perspectival centre and world
parameters from the reintroduced utterance context and switch them into the context
index in the interpretation function.
(25) Where there is:
a. an utterance U in context c with the context tuple {ac,hc,P(U),w} and
b. utterance U contains an embedded illocutionary force operator e.g. ASSERT
and
c. the embedded illocutionary force operator reintroduces the context tuple c
{ac,hc,P(U),w} and
d. the embedded illocutionary force operator also introduces a Perspectival Mon-
ster PM and
e. ic is a situation pronoun also introduced by ASSERT and
f. the interpretation function is composed of a context index and an assignment
function g
Then: the denotation of PM (ic) applied to a clause κ interpreted according to
11This option may also have the advantage of explaining why the debate over German EV2 as parataxis
has endured, because on this analysis, German quasi-quotational constructions are both interpretively and
structurally closer to root clauses. This will be further discussed later in this chapter and in chapter 6.
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interpretation function c,g
= the denotation of κ interpreted according to an interpretation function
〈ac,hc,P(U),w〉, g
= [[κ]]〈ac,hc,P(U),w〉, g
The structure of the clause containing the monster is as follows for the sentence Maria
sagte, Peter wird spielen (‘Maria said Peter will play’):12
(26)
λw0 . . .
V
sagte
λw1 IAP
λw0 IAP
Monster s0
IA’
IA
assert
ForceP
DP
Peter
Force’
Force
wird
TP
T’
VP
V
spielen
T
wird
The reader will notice that the effect of the monster as stated above is only minimally
different from the case without the monster. However, a key difference already been noted
12I have simplified the structure where the EV2 clause meets the matrix clause for expository purposes;
this will be discussed in chapter 6.
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in this thesis is that typical embedded clauses that are not embedded under the IAP are
generally ambiguous as to their interpretation. We have so far focused on the interpretation
of expressive elements such as swear words and high adverbs and how they can orient
either to the discourse participants or to the matrix arguments. This has so far been
attributed to the possibility of the perspectival centre parameter denoting an actor within
the utterance as well as the discourse participants. This is not available under the German-
type ASSERT head because the perspectival centre parameter is fixed as the speaker in
the current context.
The availability of both de re and de dicto readings has also been briefly considered.
Assuming an equivalence between de re and speaker orientation and de dicto and subject
orientation, we see that this is not the case in quasi-quotational constructions: focusing
on German EV2, expressive elements orient exclusively to the reporting speaker, not to
the matrix subject/original speaker. Also, following the discussion of de dicto readings in
the case of EIQs, we predict that only de re readings will be available in EV2 cases if the
perspective introduced and fixed by the IAP is that of the reporting speaker. This appears
to hold, as shown by data pertaining to V2 relative clauses from Ga¨rtner (2002):
(27) a. Maria
Maria
mo¨chte
wants
einen
a
Fisch
fish
fangen,
catch.inf
der
that
kariert
chequered
ist.
is
“Maria wants to catch a fish that is checkered.” Non-V2
b. Maria mo¨chte einen Fisch fangen, der ist kariert. V2, Ga¨rtner (2002, p.35)
This is a slightly different case, as the relevant item is in the matrix clause, but in (27b)
the only available reading is the de re reading, where both readings are available in (27a).
But even in the cases of EV2 under attitude predicates that we have been examining, the
de re requirement seems to hold:13 in the example below from von Heusinger (1999), ein
bestimmtes Buch (‘a certain book’) is interpreted as known within the speaker’s frame of
reference rather than any of the other candidates in the matrix or embedded clauses:
13Penner & Bader (1995) argue the opposite for Swiss German, that de re readings (loosely construed)
are only available in verb-final clauses, but native speaker informants that I have consulted confirm the
reading given here.
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(28) Du
you
hast
have
Malachias
Malachias
gesagt,
told
Berengar
Berengar
habe
has.subj
Severin
Severin
ein
a
bestimmtes
certain
Buch
book
gegeben.
given
“You said to Malachias (that) Berengar gave a certain book to Severin.”
von Heusinger (1999) in Meinunger (2006)
It is clear that perspectives in German EV2 are fixed in the same way and same contexts
and that they are syntactically marked in the same way as in EIQs. The locus of variation
between EIQs and EV2 lies in which perspective is fixed; in this type of EV2, the monster
fixes the perspective to which the clause in its scope can orient as the current utterance
context because this is the input it receives, thanks to the situation pronoun introduced
with the illocutionary force operator.
5.3.3 In Mainland Scandinavian
Mainland Scandinavian requires separate consideration from German because there are a
range of differences in distribution and interpretation that is suggestive of a fine-grained
difference between the two language groups at the level we are discussing here.
At the end of the previous chapter, I noted that Wiklund (2010) suggests that EV2
in Mainland Scandinavian has an evidential function, whereby it disambiguates whose
perspective is being expressed. She claims that EV2 clauses mark only one perspective,
that of the current speaker, whereas non-EV2 clauses are ambiguous between the speaker’s
and the matrix subject’s perspectives. She makes this claim based on personal intuition
and the behaviour of so-called speaker-oriented swear words, such as fan-i-mig (literally
‘devil in me’), in Swedish.
This claim is not uncontested, however. Stroh-Wollin (2011) examines different types
of swear word phrases and formulae and claims that the behaviour of swear words does
not support Wiklund’s (2010) evidentiality hypothesis. She conducted an informal survey
using original speech-reported speech pairs as in (29) and (30) below:
(29) Han
he
har
has
fan-i-mig
devil-in-me
inte
not
la¨st
read
brevet.
letter.def
“He has bloody well not read the letter.
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(30) a. Hon
she
sa
said
att
that
han
he
fan-i-mig
devil-in-me
inte
not
hade
had
la¨st
read
brevet
letter.def
“She said that he had bloody well not read the letter.” Non-V2
b. Hon
she
sa
said
att
that
han
he
hade
had
fan-i-mig
devil-in-me
inte
not
la¨st
read
brevet
letter.def
“She said that he had bloody well not read the letter.”
V2, Stroh-Wollin (2011, p.97)
She notes that both word orders in (30) were judged acceptable and that the swear word
fan-i-mig is interpreted as expressing the original speaker’s point of view in both cases. It
is not clear how Stroh-Wollin presented the examples to her informants, and her findings
throw up interesting questions for analyses of conventional implicatures (e.g. Potts (2005))
if they are accurate. For these reasons, I do not think that Stroh-Wollin’s objections are
particularly damaging for Wiklund’s claims.
A more serious challenge comes from Julien (2015). She acknowledges the claims of
Wiklund et al. (2009) that V2 clauses under semifactive verbs cannot be challenged by
the speaker; the example below is a Norwegian version of a Swedish example presented in
Wiklund et al. (2009):
(31) Dei
they
oppdaga
discovered
at
that
den
that
bloggen
blog.def
las
read
han
he
alltid,
always
#men
but
det
that
gjorde
did
han
he
ikkje.
not
“They discovered that that blog, he always read, #but he didn’t.
Julien (2015, p.168, modelled on Wiklund et al. (2009, pp.1925-1926))
However, she claims that under verbs like say, it is possible for the speaker to contradict
the proposition contained in the EV2 clause:
(32) Dei
they
sa
said
at
that
den
that
bloggen
blog.def
las
read
han
he
alltid,
always
men
but
det
that
gjorde
did
han
he
ikkje.
not
“They said that that blog, he always read, but he didn’t. Julien (2015, p.169)
She does not elaborate on what this means for the discourse status of the embedded clause,
other than to suggest that the EV2 clause “represents a (possibly indirect) assertion”
(Julien 2015, p.169). She claims that the embedded clause in (32) is presented as the
matrix subject’s point of view and that “it does not make much pragmatic difference
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whether or not the embedded clause is asserted in itself” (Julien 2015, p.169). I do not
understand what she means by this because it appears to undermine an assertion account
more generally if it is true, not least because it seems to suggest that V2 has no effect on
interpretation compared with a non-V2 clause, which we know not to be true based on
observations other than their distribution.
Regardless of this, we need to take the felicity of the continuation in (32) seriously14 and
examine how Mainland Scandinavian EV2 can orient unambiguously to the matrix subject
in certain cases. Note that the idea of perspective disambiguation in quasi-quotational
constructions, including EV2, still holds, because Julien (2015, p.154) also shows that
shifts in EV2 are comprehensive and involve the shifting of all relevant interpretations (as
in the Shift Together constraint of Anand & Nevins (2004)).
There is evidence that Mainland Scandinavian may have two different types of perspec-
tive disambiguation from the distribution of Mainland Scandinavian EV2 compared with
German EV2. Julien notes that there are a range of differences between the two sets of
languages, which I illustrate here in a table for ease of reference:
“Bridge”
verbs
Likelihood/
possibility
Causation Preference Relatives Under modals/
negation
Under
interrogation
Ger X × × X X X ×
MSc X X X × × X X
Table 5.1: Distribution of EV2 in German (Ger) and Mainland Scandinavian (MSc)
There is an obvious reason why German has a more restricted distribution of EV2
than Mainland Scandinavian, as already identified by Ga¨rtner (2001, 2016), Lohnstein
(2016) and Meinunger (2006)—German has subjunctive morphology that can be used to
demonstrate that the speaker is divesting themselves of responsibility for the embedded
clause. This explains examples such as (33) which apparently contradict the table above—
as Meinunger (2006) points out, the subjunctive can improve an EV2 clause in contexts
where EV2 clauses in the indicative are blocked, as shown in the parallel example in (34):
14Note that this is one of the few examples in Julien’s article that is constructed rather than taken from a
corpus. This is not to suggest that the judgement is not supported, but suggests that the kind of utterance
in (32) is vanishingly rare.
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(33) Glauben
believe
Sie
you
nicht,
not
ich
I
fu¨rchtete
fear-subj
mich
me
vor
of
der
the
su¨ßen
sweet
Last.
burden
“Don’t believe I would be afraid of this sweet burden.”
(34) ?/*Glauben
believe
Sie
you
nicht,
not
ich
I
fu¨rchte
fear-ind
mich
me
vor
of
der
the
su¨ßen
sweet
Last.
burden
“Don’t believe I would be afraid of this sweet burden.”
German, Meinunger (2006, pp.8-9)
The examples above explain the relative scarcity of indicative German EV2 clauses under
modals and negation, as they must be interpreted with respect to a perspective other than
that of the matrix speaker.15 I claim that this also explains the relative scarcity of even
subjunctive German EV2 clauses in such contexts, as they work against the specifications
of the German IAP, as detailed in this chapter and the previous one.
In contrast to German, Mainland Scandinavian has to double up on existing structures
to express matrix subject perspective, so it is unsurprising if it appears that those existing
structures have a wider distribution in Mainland Scandinavian. I however predict that
there are interpretive differences between EV2 clauses in different contexts, as I will explain
shortly.
What about the cases in which Mainland Scandinavian EV2 is barred despite EV2
being permitted in German? There are independent differences in the language that could
explain the lack of Mainland Scandinavian EV2 in relative clauses, such as the different
etymologies of the relative pronoun in German (from a demonstrative pronoun) and the
Mainland Scandinavian languages.16 As for the preference cases, I think it is necessary
to conduct more fine-grained experiments in this area. As Truckenbrodt (2006, p.292)
points out, only certain uses of preference predicates embed V2 anyway—those in which
a preference is made relative to the way things are, rather than both states of affairs
being hypothetical. It seems that Julien does not account for this carefully enough in the
Norwegian examples she gives (Julien 2015, p.171), either by not controlling for the context
or by inserting the adjunct “in the case” such that she biases slightly, but significantly,
15There are other cases of German EV2 under negation that do not contain the subjunctive, which I
examine in section 6.2.6.
16Thanks to Caroline Heycock for suggesting this reasoning.
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away from the necessary reality-grounded context.
In terms of the effect of these facts on the structure of MSc, I claim that Mainland
Scandinavian, given its lack of subjunctive morphology, makes use both of an English-type
ASSERT head,17 which like English-type QUESTION and REQUEST does not project
its own world binder, and the German-type ASSERT head, which does project its own
world binder. There is no surface difference between the two but there is an interpretive
difference: when the English-type ASSERT head is used, the perspective represented is the
matrix subject’s and the speaker may contradict it. When the German-type ASSERT head
is used, the perspective represented is the current speaker’s. This leads to the prediction
that only the English-type head will be used in those contexts in which German uses
the subjunctive and where speaker-orientation is not available. Similarly, when there is
no available perspective holder in the matrix clause, only the German-type head will be
possible, for example under predicates of causation. This prediction requires experimental
investigation to be supported.
Claiming that there are two different heads with identical surface manifestations may
seem theoretically a little unsatisfying, but there are other examples in natural language
of the same surface form achieving two different interpretations, for example Korean V-
raising (Han et al. 2007, 2016). It is also a more accurate way of representing Mainland
Scandinavian EV2 in terms of meaning and distribution.
5.4 Contexts and Conversational Moves
Having completed the description of the Illocutionary Act Phrase and the demonstration
of how it achieves the interpretations we see in quasi-quotational constructions, it is now
necessary to examine how perspective shifting in these constructions affects their impact
on the conversation. I will argue that the Main Point of Utterance (MPU) framework of
Simons (2007) is not a viable model to use and that a QUD-like approach that takes into
account aims and coherency of the discourse as well as aims of the individual interlocutors
17An English-type ASSERT head is available, as seen by the kind of matrix-subject perspective available
in Romance recomplementation and a form of embedded assertion in English that will be introduced in
6.3.1.
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is preferable. To do this, I will adopt a model of the conversation based on Farkas & Bruce
(2010), which I shall lay out first.
Farkas & Bruce (2010) in their discussion of responses to assertions and questions out-
line a conversational model whose aim is to maintain stable states within a given conver-
sation. A stable state in a conversation is defined as a state in which nothing is “at-issue”,
for example no question is unresolved or proposition unaccepted. Their model comprises
five main components:
(35) a. A list of propositions in the discourse to which interlocutor A is publicly
committed
b. A list of propositions in discourse to which interlocutor B is publicly commit-
ted
c. A Table to which discourse moves such as propositions, questions etc. are
added and stacked
d. A common ground consisting of a set of propositions to which all discourse
participants are publicly committed (such propositions may have passed over
the Table, or may follow from propositions that have passed over the Table)
e. A projected set of common grounds that provides canonical methods for deal-
ing with issues on the Table; its contents are computed according to the
contents of the Table stack
Farkas and Bruce’s (2010) proposal is like other QUD proposals in that the driving force
of the conversation is to settle all outstanding issues in a conversation, i.e. to answer all
outstanding questions. Roberts’s (1996/2012) QUD framework assumes a specific set of
questions that need answering such that they drive the conversation and cause certain
conversational moves to be put forward; Farkas and Bruce assume that filling the common
ground is the motivation for putting forward conversational moves. In either case, emptying
the Table of conversational moves is the aim.
The principal difference between their proposal and other QUD proposals is the idea
that every conversational move (an addition to the Table) comes with canonical methods
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for response (a certain configuration of the projected set). The concept of the projected
set will prove particularly useful in teasing out the difference between quasi-quotational
constructions and the QUDs they represent and/or interact with, though I will go on to
modify the concept of the “canonical” response.
An example from Farkas & Bruce (2010, p.91) as to how their system works is shown
in table 5.2. The initial context state for a conversation is K1 (where CG is the common
ground and PS the projected set of common grounds):
A Table B
∅ ∅ ∅
CG: s1 PS: ps1 = {s1}
Table 5.2: K1: Initial context state
Table 5.3 shows that A has taken public responsibility for the utterance she has placed
on the Table, namely the words “Sam is home”, and the proposition those words convey.
The common ground has not yet changed and the projected set shows that the canonical
response to A’s assertion is that it will be accepted by B and so added to the common
ground.
A Table B
p 〈‘Sam is home’[D]; p〉 ∅
CG: s2 = s1 PS: ps2 = {s1 ∪ {p}}
Table 5.3: K2: A asserts “Sam is home” relative to K1
Two ways of responding to A’s assertion are shown below, one canonical in tables
5.4-5.5 and one non-canonical in table 5.6:
A Table B
p ∅ p
CG: s3 = s2 PS: ps3 = {s2 ∪ {p}}
Table 5.4: K3: B agrees to commit to p (Canonical move)
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A Table B
∅ ∅ ∅
CG: s4 = {s3 ∪ {p}} PS: ps4 = s4
Table 5.5: K4: The CG is updated with p (Canonical move)
A Table B
p
〈‘Sam is home’[D]; p〉,〈‘Sam is not home’;
¬p〉 ¬p
CG: s3’ = s2 PS: ps3’ = ∅
Table 5.6: K3’: B denies p (Non-canonical move)
Note that ps3’ is the empty set because, Farkas & Bruce claim, there is now no possible
common ground that is compatible with both p and ¬p, so the conversation is in crisis. It
can be resolved in two ways: either one of the participants can retract their assertion, and
the other proposition is added to the CG in the way shown in table 5.5, or the participants
agree to disagree, in which case lists A and B are updated but the CG is not, as in table
5.7:
A Table B
p ∅ ¬p
CG: s4’ = s3 PS: ps4’ = s4’
Table 5.7: K4’: A and B agree to disagree relative to K3’
Finally, they model polar questions in their system as in table 5.8, following Hamblin’s
(1971) conceptualisation of polar questions as denoting a non-singleton set of propositions:
A Table B
∅ 〈‘Sam is home’[I]; p,¬p〉 ∅
CG: s5 = s1 PS: ps5 = {s1 ∪ {p}, s1 ∪ {¬p}}
Table 5.8: K5: A asks “Is Sam home?” relative to the initial input context K1
A Table B
∅ 〈‘Sam is home’[I]; p,¬p〉, 〈‘Sam is
home’[D]; p〉 p
CG: s6 = s5 PS: ps6 = {s6 ∪ {p}}
Table 5.9: K6: B confirms p in input context K5 (Canonical move)
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A Table B
∅ 〈‘Sam is home’[I]; p,¬p〉, 〈‘Sam is not
home’[D]; ¬p〉 ¬p
CG: s6 = s5 PS: ps6 = {s6 ∪ {¬p}}
Table 5.10: K6’: B denies p in input context K5 (Canonical move)
Regardless of whether B confirms or denies p, A’s list is then updated in the same way
as in table 5.4, followed by the clearing of the Table and the participants’ list with the
update of CG as in table 5.5.
In the work to follow I will largely adopt Farkas and Bruce’s system with one amend-
ment in the domain of assertions. I will not assume, as Farkas and Bruce do, that there is a
bias in the PS following an assertion towards confirmation. Farkas and Bruce’s suggestion
that assertions privilege a future common ground in which that assertion is accepted is
intuitively attractive and appears to have support in that the lack of direct response to
an assertion is interpreted as acceptance of it. However, there are reasons to reject such
a stark view of the effect of assertions on future common grounds. Firstly, it has already
been shown in this thesis as in other work that an assertion carries information that a
proposition alone does not; information about speaker responsibility for the truth of the
proposition, speaker commitment towards the proposition, newness in the discourse and so
on. An addressee may or may not have counterevidence for a proposition contained within
an assertion that the speaker is not aware of, or the speaker may have very weak evidence
for the proposition contained within the assertion but still wish to produce an assertive
rather than a questioning utterance for some other reason. Secondly, unless we assume
that the projected set for the discourse is controlled by the speaker, which is possible but
seems undesirable for other reasons, it is therefore by no means to be assumed that the
default response to an assertion is to accept the proposition it contains. Thirdly, Farkas
and Bruce define a canonical move as “removing an issue from the Table [by] reach[ing]
a discourse state in which the issue is decided” (Farkas & Bruce 2010, p.88). They also
state that addition to the common ground is a canonical move where retraction is not
(Farkas & Bruce 2010, p.85). Their motivations for this (over and above intuitive appeal)
are not clear, especially as they mention Walker’s (1996) collaborative principle just prior
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to defining a canonical change. Walker’s collaborative principle, as summarised by Farkas
and Bruce, states:
The principle requires participants to provide evidence of detected ‘discrepancy
of belief’ as soon as possible in a conversation.
Farkas & Bruce (2010, p.85)
If this principle holds, then immediate denial of an assertion cannot be considered a
non-canonical move, but a canonical one in the case of a mismatch in belief or knowledge
state between speaker and addressee.
I therefore propose the following amendment of Farkas and Bruce’s model: the projected
sets arising from both assertions and polar questions are non-singleton sets, but their
constituent parts differ. I stick with Farkas & Bruce (2010) in claiming that the projection
set arising from a polar question p or not p is {s1 ∪ {p}, s1 ∪ {¬p}}. I diverge from Farkas
& Bruce (2010) in that the projection set arising from an assertion p is {s1 ∪ {p}, s1}. The
impact of this on understanding responses to an assertion is that both confirmation and
denial of an assertion are canonical moves, but that denial of an assertion results in vacuous
updating of the common ground, which is dispreferred. Why this is so is illustrated below
in 5.11: unlike Farkas and Bruce’s illustration of a denial move in 5.6, in 5.11 the projected
set is not empty. This is because a “crisis” with respect to the contradictory propositions
on the Table does not leave us with no possible coherent common ground; it leaves us with
exactly what we started with—the current common ground as the projected set.
A Table B
p 〈‘Sam is home’;p〉, 〈‘Sam is not home’;¬p〉 ¬p
CG: s3” = s2 PS: ps3” = s2
Table 5.11: K3”: B denies p in input context K2 (Canonical move)
The crisis that exists is that the Table needs clearing of two contradictory propositions,
meaning that either (a) one interlocutor must retract their commitment or (b) they must
agree to disagree, just as Farkas & Bruce (2010) state. Until that time, the projected set
can only be the common ground.
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I will now show, using the system described above, that EIQs do not automatically
constitute a conversational move separate from the root illocutionary act despite carrying
independent illocutionary force. This will be shown to be because EIQs are related to a
different discourse context. Conversely, German-type EV2 clauses do constitute a separate
conversational move from the matrix clause because they are related to the same discourse
context. The restrictions on German-type EV2 follow from the fact that conversational
moves that reintroduce an already settled issue (that is, a proposition that has already
been accepted into or is already present in the CG) are banned as they are redundant.18
5.4.1 EIQs in conversation
Implicitly understood in our version of Farkas and Bruce’s model so far is that only asser-
tions made relative to the context K constitute conversational moves in K. Similarly, only
questions made relative to the context K constitute conversational moves in K. Moreover,
we have seen that a speaker who utters an EIQ need not be the original questioner in
the utterance context, nor does the addressee assume responsibility for the answer the
utterance context.
We therefore have to consider two important matters19 before proceeding. Firstly, how
are embedded speech reports in general dealt with in this model? Secondly, what is the
status of the utterance in this model?
The question about utterances is dealt with briefly by Farkas & Bruce (2010). They
follow Stalnaker (1978) in noting that, “as a side effect of an assertion the common ground
is automatically updated with the proposition that the author of the assertion has made
the assertion” (Farkas & Bruce 2010, p.93). They do not represent this in their model. I
will represent this in my model as the automatic addition of a proposition P to the common
ground in any case that an illocutionary act made with respect to the current utterance
context is uttered. P contains the details of the speaker, addressee, the type of speech act,
the words used by the speaker and the context in which the speech act took place. P will
18Note that this is different from the vacuous updating of the CG in 5.11 because neither of the propo-
sitions on the Table in 5.11 are already present in the CG.
19No doubt there are many more matters not dealt with here, for example how wh-questions fit into the
model, but I restrict myself to the most relevant pressing matters.
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typically look something like (36):
(36) Speaker A asserts to Addressee B “I am not feeling well” in context C.
The question about embedded speech reports does not fall under Farkas and Bruce’s (2010)
remit.20 I propose that sentences containing a declarative complement clause introduce
two propositions onto the Table.21 Evidence for this includes the fact that both the overall
and the embedded proposition can be challenged (as illustrated in (37)) and the fact that
either the overall or the embedded proposition can be interpreted as the MPU:22
(37) A: John said that phases were introduced in Chomsky 1995.
B. He’s wrong, phases were introduced in Chomsky 2001.
B’. You’re wrong, he said that phases were introduced in Chomsky 2001.
B”. You’re wrong, Mary said that phases were introduced in Chomsky 1995.
The initial assertion in (37) is modelled as follows:
A Table B
p
〈‘John said that phases were introduced
in Chomsky 1995’[D] 〈‘phases were intro-
duced in Chomsky 1995[D]; q〉; p〉
∅
CG: s7 = s1 PS: ps7 = {s1 ∪ {p}, s1 }
Table 5.12: K7: A asserts “John said that phases were introduced in Chomsky 1995”
relative to initial input state K1
The representation of an embedded polar interrogative is slightly different—where an
embedded proposition is automatically added to the Table along with the main propo-
sition, this is not automatically the case with an embedded polar interrogative. This is
because an embedded polar interrogative does not put one proposition forward but two
contradictory propositions. There are two ways of interpreting utterances containing em-
20Neither do Farkas and Bruce model how not-at-issue content such as attitudes are treated in the
discourse and I do not directly propose an answer to that here. I will assume for the purposes of this
discussion that the proposition denoting the fact that a certain speech act was made contains information
about how that speech act was made.
21An exception to this is sentences with a factive matrix verb, as the proposition in the complement must
be (interpreted as) presupposed. I leave the analysis of factive verbs aside for the purposes of this chapter.
22Thanks to Norman Yeo for timely discussion on this point and for the examples below.
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bedded interrogatives: if interpreted directly, the main point of the utterance is the overall
proposition and the interrogative is effectively ignored. If interpreted indirectly, the main
point of the utterance is the embedded interrogative, the contradictory propositions are
interpreted as being on the Table and the hearer will be expected to confirm one of the
propositions. This is modelled in table 5.13 for the direct interpretation and table 5.14 for
the indirect interpretation.
A Table B
p 〈‘Mary asked if Sam is home’[D]; p〉 ∅
CG: s8 = s1 PS: ps8 = {s1 ∪ {p}, s1}
Table 5.13: K8: A asserts “Mary asked if Sam is home” relative to the initial input context
K1
A Table B
p
〈‘Mary asked if Sam is home’[D]; p 〈‘Sam
is home’[I]; q,¬q〉〉 ∅
CG: s9 = s1 PS: ps9 = {s1 ∪ {p, q}, s1 ∪ {p,¬q}, s1}
Table 5.14: K9: A asserts “Mary asked if Sam is home” relative to the initial input context
K1
As with the discussion in section 4.2.2, it is not clear how the speaker and hearer decide
whether the set of propositions is on the Table or not, but I will leave that for future work.
An important point in terms of the difference between standard embedded clauses and
quasi-quotational clauses is that a response by B that questions not-at-issue content, such
as the way John said what he said, is not available. Neither is it possible for B to attribute
the incorrect content to the speaker. Both of these facts are illustrated in (38):
(38) B”’. #He didn’t say it like that!
B””. #You’re wrong, phases were introduced in Chomsky 2001.
This is because only the proposition contained in the embedded clause is added to the
Table. No proposition P denoting the fact that a context-specific speech act was made
by John has been added to the Table. Similarly, no proposition P denoting the fact that
the speaker asserted that “phases were introduced in Chomsky 2001” has been added
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to the Table. The speaker of the initial assertion in (37) expressed the content ‘phases
were introduced in Chomsky 1995’ in that he uttered those words but did not assert the
corresponding proposition.
In contrast, quasi-quotational constructions do introduce some proposition P that de-
notes the fact that a certain speech act was made in a certain context by certain interlocu-
tors. As such, table 5.15 illustrates the effect of an EIQ relative to context k when uttered
in context K:
A Table B
p; Pk
〈‘Jane asked me [would I visit her]k[D]’; p;
〈Pk〉〉 ∅
CG: s10 = s1 ∪ PK10
PS: ps10 = {s10 ∪ {p}, s10 ∪ {Pk}, s10 ∪
{p, Pk}, s10 }
Table 5.15: K10: A asserts “Jane asked me would I visit her” relative to initial input state
K1
In table 5.15, the CG is automatically updated by PK10 , which is the proposition “A
asserts “Jane asked me would I visit her” in K10.” The Table consists of three things, listed
in (39):
(39) a. The syntactic structure of the assertion that, crucially, contains the syntactic
structure of EIQ complete with subject-auxiliary inversion
b. The denotation of the sentence asserted (p, or ”Jane asked me would I visit
her”)
c. A proposition representing the fact that some speech act denoted by the EIQ
occurred in the relevant context (Pk, or Jane said some P in k)
Finally, the PS in 5.15 is the CG (complete with automatic update) plus two propositions
to be accepted: the proposition contained within A’s assertion and the proposition that
Jane uttered some P in k. Both of these propositions are up for debate and can legitimately
be challenged or denied by addressee B.
However, Farkas & Bruce do assume that the fact of a speech act occurring is also
registered in the CG. I assume that speech acts are automatically entered into the CG of
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the context in which they are uttered, but any illocutionary acts that are presented but
evaluated with respect to another context are put onto the table to be accepted into the
CG separately. As table 5.15 shows, this means that in uttering an EIQ A is proposing
both a proposition and that an utterance23 took place in context k to be accepted into the
common ground.
As the utterance “She asked me would I visit her” adds p and Pk to the Table in table
5.15, B may accept or deny both p and Pk. The conversational set-up is not one of a
questioning situation because there is no p on the Table that is not in one of the discourse
participants’ lists of public commitments, because p and Pk are not mutually exclusive, and
simply because p and Pk are both asserted. Note that this accounts for the bias towards
first and second person arguments in EIQs. The EIQ is asserted to have occurred so the
speaker must have some evidence for its having happened in order to assert it, and the
most natural way for the speaker to have evidence of a speech act having happened is for
the speaker to have been involved in it.
Similarly, when an EIQ is used inside a question like “Did he ask was it there yet?”,
the only proposition in question is the one contained in the matrix clause, because the EIQ
is solely represented as an utterance having happened in context k.
However, we have also seen that EIQs can appear to constitute the main information
request (MIR), for example the EIQ in (7b) in section 4.2.2, repeated below as (40):
(40) Do you know is Mary coming?
Whilst it is pragmatically more satisfactory to give an answer to whether or not Mary is
coming, the interpretation of polarity particles as responses to questions like (40) suggests
that the EIQ does not actually place an independent question into the conversation. When
used independently, polarity particles like yes and no can only be interpreted as a response
to the question “Do you know whether p?” In order for them to be interpreted as a response
to the question contained in the EIQ, yes and no must be accompanied by a repetition or
reworking of the proposition “Mary is coming.”
23By utterance, I mean an utterance of an expression of a relevant proposition or question, as appropriate.
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We must however account for the fact that EIQs like “. . . is Mary coming?” can be used
to indirectly ask a question in the current discourse. I propose that this is a pragmatic
process based on the fact that the EIQ in (40) is also evaluated with respect to the current
discourse context K—the EIQ is automatically accepted into the CG of K because it is
presented as an utterance evaluated with respect to K. It is accepted as having been
uttered without having been uttered independently because it is evaluated with respect to
the current discourse context. This means that it is recognised as a conversational move
made by a participant in the current discourse. However, it is not the only QUD,24 nor is
it the primary QUD because it cannot be independently addressed using polarity particles.
This is modelled in table 5.16:
A Table B
∅ 〈‘Do you know [is Mary coming]K12’’[I];
p,¬p,〈 ‘is Mary coming’[I]; q,¬q〉〉 ∅
CG: s12 = s1 ∪ {PK12 ,PK12’ }
PS: ps12 = {s12 ∪ {p,q}, {s12 ∪ {p,¬q},
s12 ∪ {¬p}, s12}
Table 5.16: K12: A asks “Do you know is Mary coming?” relative to the initial input
context K1
We can therefore see by putting this information into the model used here that the
EIQ-as-MIR is only a pragmatic effect. This is because the only p automatically at issue
in the utterance context is the one in the matrix clause. The question “Is Mary coming?”
is not directly asked despite there being two utterances that are marked as being evaluated
with respect to the utterance context K.
Having put forward and developed this framework, let us now return to the claim in
this thesis that EIQs denote a conversational move in the relevant discourse. What does
this now mean in the context of this chapter? What it means is that the content of the
EIQ passed across the Table of the relevant previous discourse, and that a proposition
denoting the fact of a corresponding speech act was accepted into the common ground of
that relevant previous discourse. Crucially, the EIQ does not need to represent a question
in a previous discourse but the question it expresses must have addressed in that previous
discourse, either partially or fully. For example, for an EIQ with the content {p, ¬p}, p
24This discussion once again highlights the difference between being a QUD and an MPU.
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or ¬p must have passed across the relevant Table, and a proposition denoting the fact of
that utterance will have been accepted into the common ground of that discourse.
5.4.2 German-type EV2 in conversation
German EV2 clauses (and Mainland Scandinavian EV2 clauses that are evaluated with
respect to the current context) behave like (40) as examined in the previous section and
are automatically accepted into the CG as an utterance made in that context. This is
modelled in table 5.17:
A Table B
p,q
〈‘Marga sagte, [Peter ist glu¨cklich]K13’’[D];
p, 〈 ‘Peter ist glu¨cklich’[D]; q〉〉 ∅
CG: s13 = s1 ∪ {PK13 ,PK13’ } PS: ps13 = {s13 ∪ {p, q},s13}
Table 5.17: K13: A says “Marga sagte, Peter ist glu¨cklich” relative to the initial input
context K1
Table 5.17 shows that the proposition “Peter ist glu¨cklich” is added to the Table and
the fact that A made the assertion “Peter ist glu¨cklich” is added directly into the common
ground. The effects of this will be discussed further in the next chapter.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter I argued that a perspectival monster in the specifier of IAP fixes the per-
spective and the world against that the clause in its scope is to be evaluated. The monster
is obligatorily present whenever the IAP is present. The presence of the perspectival mon-
ster is motivated by the fixed interpretation not only of expressive elements, but of shifty
predicates and covert arguments such as imperative subjects when the clause marks the
presence of the IAP. Moreover, further evidence was produced for the different shifting pat-
terns crosslinguistically, which are ultimately analysed to be a matter of lexical variation
across languages rather than a proliferation of different types of perspectival monster.
A number of open questions remain, in particular how optional perspective shifting
works in the case of typical embedded contexts and whether there is a method of accounting
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for the German-type shifting pattern without introducing as much redundancy into the
system.
With respect to the former problem, my suspicion is that it has something to do with
different combinations of perspectival centre and world parameters. I do not think that
the answer lies in monsters (contra Sudo (2016)) because there is little or no concomitant
syntactic effect of optional perspective shifting, nor is there an obvious introducer for
putative optional monsters. I leave this question for future research.
The latter problem may not be so much an empirical problem as a theoretical one. It is
possible that the fact that these structures contain this kind of redundancy could partially
account for some of the marginal judgements that some German speakers still give for EV2
constructions generally. Indeed, as Krifka (2014) notes, there is some intuitive resistance to
the idea of having two types of illocutionary force in one utterance rather than presenting
them separately as separate conversational goals. However, this kind of conjecture too
requires further research and more careful experimental examination with a range of native
speakers.
With respect to the wider question of what embedded illocutionary force is, it is clear
by this point that I do not encode a change of state in the illocutionary force operator in the
way that Krifka (2014) does. Instead, embedded illocutionary force is all about fixing the
attribution of responsibility to a specific individual in the relevant discourse context who
has the appropriate knowledge or attitudes to take responsibility for the proposition/set
of propositions. However, if the monster dictates that the relevant discourse context is the
current one, then we may see a change of state take place in the current conversation.
For EIQs, the monster fixes the interpretation of the embedded clause as the original
discourse context because that is the input it is given by the illocutionary force operator
IAo. This means that there is no direct call on the addressee in the reporting context
to respond to the embedded illocutionary act in the way she would a root illocutionary
act because the embedded illocutionary act does not belong to the current context. The
appropriateness of the next conversational move is still determined by the root act though
the fact of the embedded act being a separate illocutionary act in a given context is added
to the conversational common ground. To sum up: the use of an embedded illocutionary
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act provides propositional information to update the common ground, as well as a reference
to a (usually past) conversational move, but is not itself entered independently into the
sequence of conversational moves in the reporting discourse as a root illocutionary act
would be. It differs therefore from a typical embedded question without independent
illocutionary force in that the latter is not automatically entered into the common ground
as an uttered act, nor is its status (as an unresolved question) in the original discourse
context expressed.
The case is slightly different in EV2; because the embedded illocutionary act does per-
tain to the same context as the utterance, then it is automatically marked in the common
ground as a separate utterance from the main speech act. However, it still does not enter
into the current discourse as a conversational move additional to that of the root illocu-
tionary act; the embedded proposition is still contingent on the matrix proposition and the
fact of the embedded illocutionary act being made is added straight into the CG. These
facts also go some way to explaining the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions
with respect to factive and semifactive matrix predicates, as the next chapter will show.
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Chapter 6
Interfacing with the Matrix
(Clause)
6.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the relationship between embedded illocutionary acts and the
matrix predicates that may embed them. It is proposed that embedded illocutionary acts
are not selected by the matrix verb as an argument. Instead, they non-restrictively modify
a nominal that is the true argument of the matrix predicate. It will be shown, in the spirit
of Reis (1997), that a non-selection-based account can better explain the distribution of
embedded illocutionary acts and some of the restrictions on this distribution. I will then go
on to discuss other contexts in which quasi-quotational constructions may appear, such as
reason clauses, and whether these cases are directly parallel to the EIQs and EV2 clauses
discussed in the previous chapters. Finally, cross-linguistic differences in the availability of
quasi-quotational constructions will be discussed.
6.2 EIQ syntax is a matter of modification
6.2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters I have shown that the behaviour and characteristics of quasi-
quotational constructions can be captured by postulating an IAP structure as the highest
projection in the embedded clause. I have also shown the importance of context and
context shifting on their interpretation and use in discourse. It remains to elaborate how
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the extra structure of the IAP actually connects up with the matrix clause.
It was suggested in the previous section that the EIQ is not selected by the matrix verb
and is not an argument to it. I propose that the matrix verb selects a nominal complement,
specifically an attitudinal object that represents an act such as speaking, questioning, or
thinking, and that EIQs combine with this nominal complement to express its content and
form. This section focuses on the nature of the relation between the nominal complement
to the verb and the IAP containing the EIQ.
Moulton (2009) examined in detail the clausal complements to nouns, concluding that
they compose with the noun via Predicate Modification (PM). However, the EIQ, unlike
a clausal complement to a noun, contains not-at-issue expressive information oriented to
the original discourse in addition to a set of propositions. Moreover, I have proposed that
it is an entity, type 〈e〉, which may not compose with another noun via PM. It will be
shown in this section that EIQs are still in a modification relationship with the nominal
complement to the verb, but that this relationship is similar to Potts’s (2005) proposal for
the composition of apposition.1
The first element of the proposal to explore is the range of ways in which the EIQ
might be connected to the matrix clause.
6.2.2 Coordination
We can rule out coordination of the two clauses from the beginning. Coordination was
proposed by Antomo (2012) as the method for combining German EV2 clauses headed
by weil with the main clause. However, quasi-quotational constructions that appear as
complements are not interpreted as modifying the event of speaking nor do they modify
reasons for the speech event in the way that weil clauses do. They must merge with the
matrix clause much lower down as they only modify the product of the speech/thought
act, namely that which is said or asked or thought. Moreover, there is no morphological
evidence in any of the languages surveyed in this work that coordination or morphemes
derived from conjunctions are at play in quasi-quotational constructions.
1(Truckenbrodt 2006, fn13, p.286) mentions but rejects this route because Potts’s account explicitly
excludes the content of the appositive clause from interacting with the at-issue content of the main clause,
which is true. However, I will show that this is not insurmountable in the rest of the chapter.
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6.2.3 Restrictive relative clauses
In the vein of Kayne’s (2010) ideas about factive complements, another option is to envis-
age the quasi-quotational construction as a kind of relative clause (see also Berizzi (2010)
and Sistrunk (2012)). However, it is unlikely that analysing the quasi-quotational con-
struction as a restrictive relative clause will work for a range of reasons. Firstly, there
is no gap or resumptive pronoun present in the quasi-quotational construction. Secondly,
relative clauses are known to be strongly opaque for extraction2, yet to fully capture the
facts of the quasi-quotational construction, restricted extraction of where/when adjuncts
must be permissible. Thirdly, restrictive relative clauses are ‘truncated’ in Haegeman’s
(2006) sense—they do not have an extended left periphery—and do not contain not-at-
issue information (see also Potts (2005)), the latter point being a key characteristic of
quasi-quotational constructions. Fourthly, relative clauses differ from quasi-quotational
constructions in that temporal elements in the former need not be evaluated relative to
the matrix clause time, whereas temporal elements in quasi-quotational constructions must
be: see the example in (1) from Schwarz (2012) compared with the EIQ in (2).
(1) Hillary married a man that became president. Schwarz (2012, p.40)
Marriage = before utterance
Becoming president = before utterance but after marriage
(2) I asked him would he cook tea for me tonight
Tonight = after the original and reported utterances
Fifthly, the interpretation of restrictive relative clauses is different from that of quasi-
quotational constructions; in the case of the latter, there is no set of speech acts of which
one bears the characteristics detailed in the quasi-quotational construction, there is simply
direct definite reference. Finally, although there are few studies on the acquisition of
2Potts (2005) suggests that extraction from restricted relatives is marginally possible using data from
Postal (1998):
(i) Whati the police arrested everyone who saw ti was a video. Postal (1998, p.9)
I do not share these judgments and have struggled to find other speakers who do. It is clear that this
kind of extraction is much less acceptable than the extraction of where/when adjuncts in quasi-quotational
constructions.
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wh-relative clauses by children acquiring English, the data seem to suggest that children
do not invert the subject of a relative clause and the auxiliary, despite often doing so in
embedded interrogative clauses (Pozzan 2011). There is also evidence that children can
distinguish between embedded questions and free relative clauses, especially if the matrix
verb aids them in this (de Villiers & Roeper 1995, Clauss 2014). Acquisition studies of
German also suggest that even if V2 occurs in embedded clauses, it does not tend to occur
in relative clauses (Gawlitzek-Maiwald et al. 1992).3 Once again, more work needs to be
done, but these studies are suggestive that embedded questions and relative clauses are
not confounded in child grammar.
6.2.4 Apposition
Non-restrictive relative clauses provide a more fruitful potential path. There are structural
similarities with respect to linearisation between the appositive nominals and clauses that
Potts (2005) analyses as being in a different speech dimension to the main clause, for
example the fact that the EIQ must be adjacent to and to the right of the matrix predicate
or a content noun. Potts’s analysis is not directly transferable to these cases, however:
unlike appositive clauses, the EIQ is not ‘extra’ information, even though it contains not-
at-issue information; in fact, as shown in previous chapters and by Wiklund et al. (2009)
for EV2, it may constitute the main point of the utterance. In the same vein, they are not
logically independent from the at-issue content. In their absence, the at-issue content is
substantially altered. They also apear to interact with the at-issue content of the matrix
clause, for example negation and modality. The intonation contour of a non-restrictive
relative clause is also quite different from that of the EIQ; “comma” intonation holds in
the former case but not in the latter.
However, it is possible to take too literally the suggestion that the EIQ might be a
non-restrictive relative clause. In investigating the nature of CP ‘arguments’ to nouns as
in “the claim that Mary stole the money”, Stowell (1981) suggests that CP complements
to nouns are appositive modifiers for syntactic reasons (nouns do not case-mark, therefore
3The German evidence is not entirely clearcut; Scho¨nenberger’s (2001) survey of two Swiss German-
acquiring children found a number of non-target-like V2 relative clauses.
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they do not take arguments per se) and for semantic reasons (the CP complement to a
noun describes the content denoted by that noun). Moulton (2009) rejects the analogy
that Stowell draws between CP complements and appositive modifiers on the grounds of
differences in intonation, but agrees with Stowell that the CP is a modifier of, rather than
an argument to, the noun. Moulton also notes that clausal complements to nouns are like
relatives as they bleed Condition C effects (Moulton 2009, pp.19,49).
A similar approach that avoids the problem of intonation while maintaining the spirit
of EIQ-as-appositive-modifier might be to draw an analogy with determiner spreading.
The most well-known examples of determiner spreading are found in Greek: examples are
shown below:
(3) a. i
the.fem
asimenia
silver
i
the.fem
pena
pen
“the silver pen”
b. i
the.fem
pena
pen
i
the.fem
asimenia
silver
“the silver pen” Lekakou & Szendro˝i (2012, p.108)
c. o
the.masc
eksipnos
clever
o
the.masc
adelfos
brother
mu
me.gen
Lit. “My clever brother”/Idiomatic “My brother the wiseass”
Lekakou & Szendro˝i (2012, p.109)
Determiner spreading also occurs in some Germanic languages, most notably indefiniteness
spreading in Swiss German (4), and some varieties of Dutch (5). Double marking of
definiteness is also a characteristic of some Mainland Scandinavian languages, such as
Norwegian (6):
(4) en
a
so
such
en
a
guete
good
Wii
wine
“a really good wine” Swiss German, Brandner (2012, p.2)
(5) a. Je
you
bent
are
een
a
raar
strange
kind
kid
e´e´n.
one
“You are a very strange kid.” South-Eastern Dutch, Barbiers (2008, p.6)
b. Hij
he
wil
want
den
the
diee¨n
that.def
hebben.
have
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“He wants to have that one.” Southern Dutch, Barbiers (2008, p.6)
(6) Den
the
dyktige
accomplished
administratorn
administrator.def
“the accomplished administrator” Norwegian, Anderssen (2006)
Close apposition in Greek is a very similar-looking phenomenon to determiner spreading,
as illustrated in (7):
(7) a. o
the.masc
aetos
eagle
to
the.neut
puli
bird
“The eagle that is a bird.”
b. to
the.neut
puli
bird
o
the.masc
aetos
eagle
“The eagle that is a bird.” Lekakou & Szendro˝i (2012, p.108)
Determiner spreading is like close apposition in that there are multiple (obligatorily) def-
inite determiners, an obligatorily restrictive interpretation of the adjective and the two
parts both jointly contribute to reference; Lekakou & Szendro˝i (2012) note that determiner
spreading is used when neither subpart of the complex nominal “suffices to unambiguously
determine the intended referent” (Lekakou & Szendro˝i 2012, pp.111-112). They propose
that the correct analysis for determiner spreading in Greek is the same as that for close
apposition; a complex DP made up of two sub-DPs via identification of their Referential
roles, in which one of the nouns is elided. As the meaning and structure proposed are tan-
tamount to set intersection, they assume that DP in Greek is not of type 〈e〉, but type 〈e,t〉,
and there is a further functional head that scopes above the (complex) DP that contributes
definiteness. Their proposed structure for the sentence in (8a) is shown in (8b):
(8) a. To
the.neut
spiti
house
to
the.neut
petrino
stone
“The stone house”
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b. DefP
Def DP1,2
DP1
D
to
NP
spiti
DP2
D
to
NP
AP
petrino
N
spiti
This symmetrical structure is particularly successful at capturing the Greek data; it sug-
gests that ordering between DP1 and DP2 should be free, which is the case; in fact, if there
is more than one adjective, then all possible orderings are available. This in undesirable for
the analysis of EIQs and EV2, however; the EIQ is obligatorily sentence-final and, in cases
in which there is an overt content noun that is modified by the EIQ, the content noun must
precede the EIQ. Moreover, as noted above in the critique of a restrictive relative account,
it is not clear that set intersection is exactly the right characterisation of the relationship
between the content noun and the EIQ. The EIQ does more than just restrictively modify
the content noun; it identifies it in terms of at-issue content, form, not-at-issue content
and discourse context.
6.2.5 Equation/identification
What other options are left to us at this point? Another context in which EIQs can be
used will perhaps be of use: they can appear in post-copular position:
(9) a. Seems like Wilko is the bookies favourite for the England job when it becomes
available. This is quite distressing news, but the question is would he take it if
offered? BNC, J1G 1639
b. I asked (him) would he take it if offered.
202
(10) a. The question is what did she truly take away from the culture?
medium.com 4
b. I asked (her) what did she truly take away from the culture.
Note that in (9a), the clausal complement to question is used to introduce the content
of that particular question into the discourse; the author may expect an answer of some
kind but given the context (a post on a football club forum), it is not likely to be a
very authoritative answer and the question is more likely to generate discussion than
receive an authoritative answer. In this way (9a) seems to serve a similar purpose to
the “paradigm” EIQs considered so far by representing a question in a discourse without
introducing the kind of responsibilities that a questioning illocutionary act is typically
assumed to introduce; that is, that the questioner expects her questionee to be able to
return a reliable and true response. The same holds of the examples in (10).
Semantically, the EIQ in these examples is not a predicate: it cannot appear in a small
clause, as shown in (11), and it cannot be fronted, as discussed in previous chapters.
(11) *I consider the question what did he think he was doing?
It is possible to interpret examples like (9a) and (10) as indicating that the EIQ serves
to illustrate a possible identity for the nominal complement to the verb and structure for
the relationship between the nominal complement and the EIQ. Question is a content
noun that lexically implies an open question and the copula is used as an identity function.
Example (12) below provides a clearer illustration of a possible structure even more clearly,
as the noun question in this case is in fact an argument of the matrix verb ask and sequence
of tense also holds:
(12) Seeking to translate this question of morality to local issues, I asked the question,
did the candidates agree that it was morally wrong and perhaps a misuse of public
funds for local councillors to claim that there was no money available to install gas
central heating in the homes of elderly disabled people when they always found
4Taken from https://medium.com/@Dwavenhobble/cultural-appropriation-gamergate-and-why-
gamers-had-to-die-e745cbebc574; retrieved on 28th Apr 2015.
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money for hospitality allowances and trips abroad for themselves.
BNC, K55 8713
To illustrate a point already made, the relationship between the content noun and the EIQ
is asymmetrical, as the EIQ must always follow the content noun:
(13) *I asked [did the candidates agree] the question.
So what is the relationship between the content noun and the EIQ? As Moulton (2009)
points out, predicate modification is the most desirable mechanism for representing the
relationship between a noun and its clausal modifier because he wants to avoid equating
content nouns with propositions for a number of reasons (see Moulton (2009, p.36) for
details): his only aim is to model how the proposition describes the content of the noun it
modifies, not to identify the former as the latter. The important result, he writes, is “that
the complement to the noun intersects with the noun’s denotation.” (Moulton 2009, p.37).
However, we have already determined that straightforward predicate modification
might have undesirable consequences, and to some degree, equating more than just the
content of the clause with the nominal is precisely what we want for EIQs, so machinery
presented by Potts (2002) proves promising. His machinery involves the nominalisation of
the clause, which I have already claimed is the function of the IA head, and identification
of the nominalised clause with the nominal complement to the verb. This is achieved by a
functional head that is sister to the nominal complement to the verb and takes the nom-
inalised clause as its complement. As this functional head expresses an identity relation
between the IAP and the nominal complement to the verb, the syntactic shape/expressive
aspects of the EIQ are equated with the nominal complement and can be directly ques-
tioned as well as the content of the EIQ. This can be seen in example (14), repeated from
section 3.5, which is contrasted with the minimally-differing standard embedded question
in (15).
(14) A: You asked me did I cook dinner for you.
B: No I didn’t, I asked did you make me a cup of tea.
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B’: No I didn’t, I was much more polite about it than that!
(15) A: You asked me if I had cooked dinner for you.
B: No I didn’t, I asked if you had made me a cup of tea.
B’: #No I didn’t, I was much more polite about it than that!
In criticising Potts’s (2002) use of this mechanism for clausal complements to nouns, Moul-
ton (2009) highlights those properties that are required for explaining some of the EIQ’s
characteristics. For example, Moulton notes that propositions cannot be modified with
regards to their qualities in the same way that content nouns can. However, by com-
municating not-at-issue content, EIQs are qualified with respect to the original discourse
context and the perspectives of the original discourse participants, as (14) shows. Moul-
ton also notes that content nouns “come into existence at particular times” in a way that
propositions do not; similarly, EIQs refer to a conversational move that was brought into a
particular discourse at a particular relevant point. As will be discussed below, that point
may or may not be contemporaneous with the use of the EIQ. Arguably EIQs also cease
to exist, a property that Moulton attributes to content nouns such as proposal, on the
basis that the conversational move they refer to can be dealt with and removed from the
conversational stack.
Another problem with Potts’s account that Moulton (2009) notes is that if CPs are of
type 〈e〉, then they require shifting to type 〈e,t〉 to compose with nouns, and it is unclear
why such a type-shifter should only be available with nouns and not in small clauses (cf.
example (11)). A crucial difference between noun phrases like “The proposal that we
destroy Alaska” that contain the CP as a predicate and the predicative relation in a small
clause is that the former forms a constituent where as the subject-predicate complex in
the small clause does not form a constituent:
(16) a. He rejected the proposal that we destroy Alaska.
b. The proposal that we destroy Alaska, he rejected.
c. It is the proposal that we destroy Alaska that he rejected.
d. What he rejected was the proposal that we destroy Alaska.
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(17) a. He considered the proposal stupid.
b. *The proposal stupid, he considered.
c. *It is the proposal stupid that he considered.
d. *What he considered was the proposal stupid.
Similarly, despite not being able to run many of the standard constituency tests on EIQs,
the noun plus EIQ complex appears to be a constituent on the basis of examples with an
overt noun, such as in example (18):
(18) a. I asked him the question, what was the length of a piece of string in his day.
b. It was the question, what was the length of a piece of string in his day, that
I asked him.
c. What I asked him was the question, what was the length of a piece of string
in his day.
Consequently it seems that there is a syntactic constraint on the application of the putative
type-shifter; it can apply in complements to nouns and in EIQs because the noun (null or
overt) and the type-shifted clause then form a syntactic constituent. This suggests that
the syntactic identity of the type shifter is akin to a relative clause head in that it creates
a strong syntactic, and not simply a semantic, connection between the nominal and its
modifier. It cannot apply in small clauses because the clausal and nominal objects do not
form a constituent.
Lahiri (2002) also argues for a nominalising operator for the case of Spanish interrog-
ative clausal complements headed by que5 recomplementation but takes a different tack
from Potts. Lahiri (2002) claims that the entity correlate of a proposition (in the case of
a declarative clause) or a set of propositions (in the case of an interrogative clause) is an
utterance, i.e. a speech act. This is due to the fact that que-interrogatives are only permis-
sible under speech act verbs, including verbs of manner of communication, but not under
5These are different from recomplementation contexts as there is only one complementiser and so they
do not contain not-at-issue content, though they differ from indirect speech reports in factors such as their
distribution, which is more like that of quasi-quotational structures though not exactly the same. I will not
concern myself with these types of complements here.
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mental state verbs. He proposes that que-interrogatives are actually question-utterances
instead of standard questions, so they must undergo a coercion process to be interpreted
as question-utterance complements to the classes of verbs that can take que-interrogatives,
rather than being interpreted as basic question complements. The coercion process Lahiri
proposes is illustrated in (19) (α here denotes some expression):
(19) Type-coercion to utterance
a. α 7→ ιu[UTT(u,α) ∧ C(u)]
b. 〈s,t〉 7→eU Lahiri (2002, p.281)
Lahiri defines UTT as a two-place predicate with the meaning “u is an utterance of the
expression α of the semantic type of a proposition” (Lahiri 2002, p.281). The existence of
such an utterance u is captured by the inclusion of the definite description C(u), according
to which the utterance is specified with respect to a context. Lahiri then shows how this
process of coercion applies in the que-interrogatives by proposing the translation below for
que:
(20) que = λQιu[UTTQ(u,Q) ∧ C(u)]
Let’s think about the IA head in these terms: the IA head takes an argument S of a
complex type 〈t,t〉. It then returns a unique utterance Q that is of type 〈s,e〉 such that the
propositional content of Q and S are identical.6 To illustrate this concisely, I define the IA
head as in (21):
(21) If S ∈ D〈t,t〉 and Q ∈ D〈s,e〉
IA = λSλQ[UTT(S,Q)]
(21) makes use of Lahiri’s two-place predicate UTT to capture the fact that the interrog-
ative clause S is an utterance of the question move represented by Q; UTT can in fact be
replaced by the more specific operators QUESTION and REQUEST proposed in chapter
4. The result is that the interrogative clause S combines with the IA head to return an
6Thanks to Norman Yeo for helping to clarify my thinking on this point.
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entity equivalent to Q. In this way the IA head is very similar semantically to a definite de-
terminer; where a definite determiner takes a property of type 〈e,t〉 and returns the entity
with that property, the IA head takes an interrogative clause and returns the conversa-
tional move with the same propositional content. This is problematic because it appears
to suggest that the EIQ always refers to a questioning act in the original discourse, but
let’s ignore this for the moment.
Having achieved nominalisation of the embedded clause, the resulting entity is then
checked against the relevant discourse context at the next stage by the perspectival
monster-situation pronoun complex in SpecIAP; if the utterance that the entity has been
identified with does not match the discourse coordinates on the situation pronoun then
the whole utterance will not be defined as true. This is achieved through functional ap-
plication, as the output of the combination of the perspectival monster and the situation
pronoun is claimed here to be of the basic semantic type 〈s〉 (following von Fintel & Heim
(2002, p.11)): it is effectively a situation anchored according to specific context. The com-
plex intensional type returned by the IA head, 〈s,e〉 is applied to this to return a basic
entity 〈e〉.
To illustrate all of the above points, the IAP and the types of its constituent parts are
shown in the tree in (22):
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(22) IAP
<e>
<s>
<s,s>
Perspectival
Monster
<s>
situation
pronoun
IA’
<s,e>
IA
<<t,t>,<s,e>>
QUESTION
ForceP
<t,t>
would he make
dinner for me
Having established how the embedded clause becomes an EIQ of type 〈e〉, I return to the
question of how this entity could relate to the matrix structure.
I assume that the true complement selected by the matrix verb is a simple content
nominal that may be left unpronounced. This nominal cannot be directly identified with
the IAP as it is of type 〈e,t〉 and the IAP is, as established above, of type 〈e〉. Why doesn’t
the IAP simply compose via predicate modification with the DP that is complement to
the verb? There are a number of reasons for this: firstly, the IAP is of the wrong type
to engage in predicate modification; it cannot join via predicate modification precisely
because it is not a predicate. Secondly, as described in the analysis of Greek determiner
spreading, there is a strict ordering between the EIQ and overt nominal complements to
the verb, so we should assume this holds when the nominal complement is covert too. This
means that whatever the mechanism is that combines the nominal object and the IAP, it
is not a symmetrical relationship. Thirdly, the EIQ need not combine with a definite DP;
the EIQ may not be the only question posed by the questioner in the given discourse but
is picked out as the specific question through the nominalisation function of the IA head
and, of course, the specific reading of the indefinite determiner7. Examples of this with
7The reader may ask how this specific reading is achieved without movement, because as shown in
section 3.3, the EIQ cannot be raised to have wide scope over the sentence. However, as Enc¸ (1991) shows,
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an overt content noun is shown below; the presence of key EIQ characteristics is clear,
especially in (23a):
(23) a. We’re er I was asked a question earlier on today erm how many assignments
will I be looking after in any one time and I just said one. BNC, JA3 46
(speech)
b. I would like to ask a question, that if this particular rule isn’t necessary,
then how does a branch go about appealing a decision made elsewhere in the
union’s hierarchy? BNC, HUD 66
Given then that the content noun is of type 〈e,t〉 and the EIQ is of type 〈e〉, composition
must proceed via a functional head that I will call ToWitP in honour of the archaic locution
that is a possible overt realisation of its function8. The function that ToWito represents is
simple and is identifiable as the function often served by the copula; this is illustrated in
(24):
(24) λxλy[x=y]
Possible support for an identificational operator is that ToWitP might be ‘pronounced’ in
a number of ways if the nominal object to the verb is also overt: as to wit, as in example
(25); as the copula as illustrated in (26); or as a pause as illustrated in (27):
(25) The question + to wit
a. I asked her the question, to wit, was she aware that she was under oath?
Constructed
b. [. . . ]the House proceeded with 20 minutes of debate on the question of consid-
eration, after which, the Chair would put the question to wit: Will the House
now consider the resolution? US House of Representatives9
specific readings can be achieved without recourse to scope positions. She notes that specific indefinites
both in Turkish and in English have a covert partitive reading; exactly the effect achieved in an example
like (23).
8Hat-tip to Eytan Zweig for the suggestion.
9Taken from the minutes of the Floor Proceedings, 1st Apr 2011, published at
http://clerk.house.gov/floorsummary/floor.aspx?day=20110401 and retrieved on 28th Apr 2015.
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c. When I saw how narrow the display was, I raised the question, to wit, is there
something unique about the Fuji XPro, did Fuji make an error, or are they
just being super conservative? dpreview.com10
(26) The question + copula
a. I think the question is how does she get out of the contract now? Constructed
b. Finally, Father McKenna said he had one last question to ask. The question
was would Colm like his mother and father to get divorced.
BNC, A07 1180
c. This is quite distressing news, but the question is would he take it if offered?
BNC, J1G 1639
(27) The question + pause/null operator
a. I couldn’t help but ask him the question: what on earth possessed him to do
it?
Constructed
b. Therefore a court will ask the question was the restraint reasonable when it
was entered by the parties? BNC, J7B 275
c. [. . . ] we find that just those same molecules are actually in the clouds in space,
and these clouds are the basic raw material from which stars and plants form
in the first place, so we might ask the question could they have got into the
earth’s atmosphere without this intermediate process[. . . ]
BNC, KRH 2929 (speech)
d. Every show she went on, they asked her this question...Why did she settle her
lawsuit? tennisforum.com11
There is also crosslinguistic evidence of the optional spell-out of this structure as either
null or lexical: in recomplementation structures, the initial complementiser que can also
be spelled out as a prosodic pause, in the case of fragment utterances:
10Taken from http://www.dpreview.com/forums/post/51603383; retrieved on 28th Apr 2015.
11Taken from http://www.tennisforum.com/showthread.php?p=16805002; retrieved on 28th Apr 2015.
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(28) a. Se
cl
le
him
pidio´
requested.3sg
una
a
candidata
candidate
y
and
dijo:
said.3sg
Mar´ıa
Mar´ıa
“He was asked for a candidate and he said: Maria.”
b. Se
cl
le
him
pidio´
requested.3sg
una
a
candidata
candidate
y
and
dijo
said.3sg
que
that
Mar´ıa
Mar´ıa
“He was asked for a candidate and he said Maria.” Brucart (1993, pp.97-98)
Crucially, as Brucart (1993) illustrates, the structure in (28b) can only be used in cases
where the question of finding a candidate was already under discussion, hence the unavail-
ability of the same structure in the out-of-the-blue context below:
(29) a. De
of
repente
sudden
aparecio´
appeared.3sg
en
in
el
the
aula
classroom
y
and
dijo´:
said.3sg
Mar´ıa.
Maria
“All of a sudden he appeared in the room and said: Maria.”
b. *De
of
repente
sudden
aparecio´
appeared.3sg
en
in
el
the
aula
classroom
y
and
dijo´
said.3sg
que
that
Mar´ıa.
Maria
“All of a sudden he appeared in the room and said: Maria.”
Brucart (1993, pp.97-98)
Following this line of argumentation, then, it could be proposed that the whole structure
from the matrix VP down is as illustrated in (30):
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(30) VP
V
asked
ToWitP
DP
D
the
NP
N
question
ToWit’
ToWit
λxλy[x=y]
IAP
Perspectival
Monster
situation
pronoun
IA’
IA
QUESTION
ForceP
Force
would
TP
he make
dinner for me
The tree in (30) cannot be our final proposal, however, for two reasons. Firstly, (30)
suggests that the matrix verb selects not for a nominal or a clausal complement, but
for a ToWit complement. It is both unclear what it would mean to select for a ToWit
complement and perpetuates the selection problem that we are trying to solve. Secondly,
we are not solving the asymmetry problem by using this co-ordination-like structure, so
we would have to account for the fixed ordering between the overt nominal and the clause
another way.
We could instead project ToWitP as a complement to the nominal head, introducing
echoes of gapless relative clauses, in order to avoid the problem of the verb selecting for
ToWitP:
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(31) VP
V
asked
DP
D
the
NP
N
question
ToWitP
ToWit
λxλy[x=y]
IAP
Perspectival
Monster
situation
pronoun
IA’
IA
QUESTION
ForceP
Force
would
TP
he make
dinner for me
Although the asymmetry and selection problems are solved in (31), a more serious
problem is introduced, namely how we would represent the NP as null in this structure.
The null NP is not something that we want to abandon, however. To this point, I have
justified the presence of a null NP by analogy with the overt presence of nouns like question
in contexts such as those in examples (25)-(27). It also reinforces the interpretation of the
EIQ that it presupposes a question under discussion that the content of the EIQ goes some
way towards resolving in the original discourse.
It is clear at this juncture that identification cannot possibly be the right analysis for
quasi-quotational constructions like EIQs. This is not only due to the structural problems
inherent in (30) and (31). There is also a semantic reason, raised with respect to adopting
Lahiri’s type coercion operation: an EIQ does not necessarily denote a questioning act in
the previous discourse, but can denote conversational moves more widely construed, either
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“payoff” (typically assertions) or “setup” moves (typically questions) used to address a
relevant QUD in that discourse. To claim that quasi-quotational constructions identify
a previous speech act is to claim that they are closer to direct speech reports than is
warranted, given the data in chapter 3.
6.2.6 A return to apposition
What options are we now left with for understanding the structure of EIQs? We want to
retain the idea that there is a nominal complement to the verb and that the EIQ contributes
the content and discourse effect of that nominal. The propositional content of the EIQ
is not additional to or conjoined with the matrix proposition because an EIQ cannot be
paraphrased as below:
(32) Jane wanted to know would he cook tea for her.
6= Jane wanted to know something and that something was the question “would
he cook tea for her.”
≈ Jane wanted to know something, namely would he cook tea for her.
The EIQ affects the at-issue content of the matrix proposition and the sentence without
the EIQ is truth-conditionally different. The main difference is that “Jane wanted to
know something” says nothing about whether Jane voiced any query or opinion on the
something ; in other words, it does not communicate the fact that Jane produces some
relevant utterance act. More obviously, the EIQ contributes information about the content
and manner of speaking that may be challenged by the addressee.
On this basis, it may seem surprising that I advocate returning to analyses of apposition
to draw out the structure of the EIQ. Appositive clauses as examined by Potts (2005,
2007, 2012) are independent of the at-issue content of the main clause. For this reason, as
already noted, Truckenbrodt (2006) rejects the idea of treating EV2 clauses as appositive
clauses. However, I claim that the interaction between quasi-quotational constructions and
operators in the matrix clause such as negation do not proceed in the same way as typical
embedded clauses, such that considering a more ‘multidimensinal’ approach is interesting.
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Ultimately, I claim that matrix clause operators affect compatibility with quasi-quotational
constructions rather than grammaticality directly, in line with Ga¨rtner’s (2002) assertion
that failure of an EV2 clause is due to semantic or pragmatic deviance.
The first piece of evidence for this is from neg-raising predicates like think. As is
well known, the negation of predicates like think implies a second sentence in which the
embedded proposition is negated. The example below is taken from Gajewski (2007):
(33) a. Bill doesn’t think that Mary is here.
b. Bill thinks that Mary is not here. Gajewski (2007, p.289)
These predicates behave differently in EV2 contexts as negation can only take wide scope:
(34) Hans
Hans
glaubt
thinks
nicht,
not
Peter
Peter
hat
has
gewonnen,
won
(er
he
glaubt
thinks
nur,
only
dass
that
Peter
Peter
gut
good
abgeschnitten
come.off
hat).
has
“Hans does not believe that Peter has won (he only believes that Peter has done
well).”
Truckenbrodt (2006, p.296)
Relatedly, in the case of EIQs, the quasi-quotational construction can be said to project
past negation, as they are still interpreted as possible open questions in the relevant dis-
course but not to the matrix subject that has been identified. (58a) from chapter 3 is
repeated below, with a continuation to illustrate the above claim:
(35) I didn’t ask were you coming last night (Mary did).
This is in contrast to sentences like (36) below, where neither (36a) nor (36b) are implied
or entailed.
(36) I didn’t ask if you were coming last night.
a. 9 I asked if you weren’t coming last night.
b. 9 Someone asked if you were coming last night, but it wasn’t me.
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Clearly, as we have been advocating, quasi-quotational clauses are not selected by the
matrix verb, even in the indirect manner suggested by Truckenbrodt (2006). In his account,
the EV2 clause (labelled CP) is the direct object selected by the verb, but it extraposes
to right-adjoin to the VP, ensuring both its surface position and, Truckenbrodt argues, in
order for the EV2 clause to interpreted according to the utterance context rather than the
embedded context. This is illustrated in simplified form below:
(37) VP
VP
tm V’
ti V
glaubt
believes
CPi
Peter geht nach Hause
Peter is going home
Truckenbrodt (2006, p.285)
Although Truckenbrodt’s account neatly accounts for the EV2 clause’s interpretation ac-
cording to the matrix clause, it does not account for the facts shown above as it doesn’t
explain why matrix negation has the effect that it has in (36b).
Before examining the claim that the failure of quasi-quotational construction under
certain matrix operators is matter of infelicity rather than ungrammaticality, let us con-
sider clauses as appositives and their interpretation, as well as the possibility that such
appositives can contain at-issue information.
Potts (2005, p.128) suggests that when an appositive clause is semantically saturated,
it behaves differently from other appositives in that it appears to contribute a separate
proposition from the main clause. This separate proposition is connected to the matrix
proposition, usually because it expresses an attitude towards or motivation for the expres-
sion of the matrix proposition (Potts 2005, pp.44,65-66). An example of this is the niched
appositive in (38):
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(38) Luke—and you’ll never believe this—ate 50 eggs! Potts (2005, p.65)
Note that despite the presence of “and” in (38) and the presence of two separate proposi-
tions, (38) cannot be paraphrased using a coordinate structure, much like EIQs:
(39) Luke—and you’ll never believe this—ate 50 eggs!
a. 6= Luke ate 50 eggs and you’ll never believe this.
b. 6= You’ll never believe this and Luke ate 50 eggs.
This kind of appositive clause may be anchored to a DP in the matrix clause and shows
similarities with embedded clauses in that a quantifier in that the appositive clause may
appear in the nuclear scope of the quantifier (Potts 2005, pp.126,128). This is illustrated
in (40), attributed to Kempson (2003):
(40) Most older people on the march, who left after Jesse Jackson, got home without
too much trouble.
= There were more older people who heard Jackson and got home without trouble
than older people who didn’t hear Jackson and didn’t get home without trouble.
In this case, an E-type strategy is used to interpret the free variable in the appositive, with
the appositive itself being treated as a proposition-denoting element (Potts 2005, p.129).
Interestingly, Potts implies that interpreting the kind of appositive in (40) as being in the
nuclear scope of the quantifier most is non-standard and that this interpretation is only
available to certain speakers. He does not provide any suggestion for why this construction
is marginal, or for what kind of speakers it is marginal (Potts 2005, p.127). Potts calls
such appositives isolated conventional implicatures and claims that the two clauses or the
clause and the DP directly compose, but that only the matrix at-issue element “counts”
for composition into the clause. He proposes the following structure, where the leftmost
CP contains at-issue content (marked by the index a, for at-issue) and the right-most CP
contains conventionally implicated content, marked by the index c. The node immediately
dominating both is therefore determined by the at-issue content (note that the tree below
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is a transposition of Potts’s ideas into (more or less) standard notation).
(41) CPa
〈t〉
CPa
〈t〉
CPc
〈t〉
Potts is clear that this method of composition is only appropriate for a element with con-
ventionally implicated content that is fully semantically saturated (Potts 2005, p.128).
However, these isolated conventional implicatures still share a number of characteristics
with the typical type of appositives, including their ordering with respect to their an-
chor when their anchor is nominal (42) and the fact that they constitute the speaker’s
perspective.
(42) *Most older people on the march got home without too much trouble, who left after
Jesse Jackson.
(43) Most older people on the march, who left after Jesse Jackson, got home without
too much trouble, # but they all left before Jesse Jackson.
So far, this seems like a viable option for understanding how EIQs compose with the matrix
nominal object. They are unambiguous in their orientation to a particular context, they
are fully semantically saturated, they denote a proposition-containing element, they must
appear directly to the right of their anchor. Moreover, as Simons et al. (2010) note, these
kinds of clauses can be interpreted as at-issue in the sense that they answer the QUD (the
example below is a reworking on Simons and colleagues’ example on page 323:
(44) Q: Who’s coming to the dinner tonight?
A: Well, I haven’t spoken to Charles—as if he’d come anyway!—but I spoke to
Sally, who is coming.
Simons and colleagues suggest that this effect obtains because the answer A gives does not
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directly answer the question asked by Q. As a result the challengeable content of A’s answer
and the appositive are concerned with different QUDs so the appositive is not-at-issue with
respect to the QUD that A’s answer targets only implicitly.
As will be clear by now, this is very similar to the situation that obtains in EIQs. Quasi-
quotational constructions are commonly used in narratives (see examples such as (2) in
chapter 3 and (6) in chapter 5), where the QUD will be something like What happened?
or What did X say? EIQs however denote a conversational move targeting a QUD in the
original discourse, which will be different. Even EIQs that are used as main information
requests can be said to be targeting a sub-QUD which is more relevant to the current
QUD, in a similar way to the appositive example in (44).
(45) Do you know is she coming to the party?
a. QUD = What is happening; who is coming to the party?
b. Sub-QUD = Is she coming to the party?
→ Can lead to a partial answer to the overall QUD.
The same holds in the case of speaker-oriented EV2 clauses like (46), for which the QUD
and sub-QUDs are displayed in (47):
(46) Hans
Hans
glaubt,
thinks
Peter
Peter
hat
has
gewonnen.
won
“Hans thinks Peter has won.”
(47) a. QUD = What is happening; what is Hans thinking?
b. Sub-QUD = Did Peter win?
How then are CI appositives and quasi-quotational constructions different? A key point is
that quasi-quotational constructions always address or represent a particular QUD different
from the main QUD, where CI appositives do not. In an example like (48), the appositive
does not address a different QUD from the main at-issue content, but reinforces the at-issue
content and provides extra, relevant but non-challengeable information.
(48) QUD = Who won the Tour de France this year?
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A = Chris Froome, a Briton, won the Tour this year.
Understanding the difference between addressing a QUD and addressing a sub-QUD, as
well as the obligatory QUD-addressing of quasi-quotational clauses, leads us towards un-
derstanding how the quasi-quotational clause qua appositive clause composes with the
nominal complement (overt or covert) of the matrix verb. In Potts’s isolated CI account,
the appositive clause is not considered in semantic composition precisely because it is
CI content. It is not clear that this can be directly carried across to the case of quasi-
quotational constructions because, despite their similarities with CI appositive clauses,
they can still be directly challenged in a way that CI appositive clauses cannot. What they
have in common, however, is that they are fixed in the way that they must be interpreted
with respect to a given context. In the case of CI content, this is obligatorily by default
the utterance context. In the case of quasi-quotational constructions, it depends on the
make-up of the IA head and what it provides to the perspectival monster as input. I there-
fore claim that a clause with a fixed perspective according to which it must be interpreted
composes with other material via the process advocated by Potts; only non-fixed material
counts for semantic composition with other non-fixed material.
This leaves us with the following structure for the nominal complement to the verb and
the quasi-quotational structure:
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(49) DP
〈e〉
DP
〈e〉
the question
IAP
〈e〉
〈s〉
〈s,s〉
Perspectival
Monster
〈s〉
situation
pronoun
IA’
〈s,e〉
IA
〈〈s,e〉, 〈t,t〉〉
QUESTION
ForceP
〈t,t〉
Force
〈t,〈t,t〉〉
would
TP
〈t〉
he make
dinner for me
In (49), the IAP does not count in terms of determining the type of the result of its
apposition to the nominal direct object the question because it is evaluated with respect
to a fixed perspective.
This brings us back to my earlier claim that the failure of quasi-quotational construction
under certain matrix operators is matter of infelicity rather than ungrammaticality. While
CI appositives are not sensitive to operators such as negation in the matrix clause, they
can still create infelicity through contradicting the at-issue content, for example.
(50) #Chris Froome, who came second overall, won the Tour de France.
Given the interactions of quasi-quotational constructions and matrix clause operators out-
lined at the start of this section and the ability to improve such interactions through extra
context, I wish to claim that quasi-quotational constructions that are unacceptable are
semantically and pragmatically infelicitous rather than syntactically flawed. This fits with
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the view that they are not selected by the matrix clause but that composition is mediated
through semantico-pragmatic means, as I am advocating here. To illustrate this claim with
specific reference to quasi-quotational constructions, I use an overt nominal direct object.
Note that while (51a) and (51b) are both perfectly acceptable, know is only compatible
if something is in apposition with a responsive clause of some kind, as in (51d) rather
than (51c), where as want to know is compatible with questioning illocutionary force, as
in (51e).
(51) a. I know something.
b. I want to know something.
c. *I know something, namely what are we doing tonight.
d. I know something, namely what we are doing tonight/that we are going to
the cinema tonight
e. I want to know something, namely what are we doing tonight.
I therefore conclude that quasi-quotational constructions are a type of appositive clause
that expands on and contains more information about a nominal direct object to the verb.
Their structure, including the matrix verb, is as follows:
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(52) VP
V
asked λw1 DP
DP
the question
IAP
Monster s1
IA’
IA
QUESTION
ForceP
Force
would
TP
he make
dinner for me
As (52) illustrates, quasi-quotational constructions are not selected by the matrix verb
and this is reflected in the way in which they interact with operators in the matrix clause.
This appositive analysis reflects their similarities with conventionally implicated content,
and their differences are accounted for by the syntax of the IAP projection as detailed in
the previous chapters.
6.2.7 More on the EIQ as a definite description
Let us now consider what implications the structure proposed in this section has for the
interpretation of the EIQ as a definite description of a conversational move in the relevant
previous discourse. In many cases the EIQ denotes an overt question, particularly when
not-at-issue and expressive content is included in the EIQ or when the EIQ appears under
a predicate like ask. But there are weaker forms too, in particularly those under wonder
and want to know, as illustrated below:
(53) a. Everyone wanted to know could Joe come to the party.
b. I was wondering could he come at six, rather than at seven.
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The use of the EIQ in (53a) (originally presented as (60c) in section 3.5) does not necessarily
denote a question that has been asked overtly, but a speech act or number of speech acts
that pertained to the QUD “Can Joe come to the party?”. As a result, (53a) is only
possible either when the question “Can Joe come to the party?” was overtly asked or
overtly discussed. This set of circumstances is more broad than the circumstances which a
direct speech report may convey and more restricted than those which an indirect speech
report may convey. Similarly, (53b) may denote a question that has already been asked
overtly or another speech act made in reference to the QUD “What time can he come?”
Another alternative in the case of (53b) is that it may introduce a new QUD into the current
discourse for discussion, due to the first-person matrix subject.12 Other examples of EIQs
that introduce a new QUD into the current discourse include EIQs under imperatives such
as (54) and EIQs under matrix predicates in non-past tenses more generally:
(54) a. Go over there and see did they bring my car in AAE, Green (2002)
b. Find out does he take sugar in his tea Irish Eng., McCloskey (2006)
(55) a. It’s gonna ask you do you want to make a transfer AAE, Green (2002, p.87)
b. I wonder if the mailman done passed AAE, Green (2002, p.87)
The appositive account laid out above not only captures the crucial features of the EIQ; it
also serves to restrict and be more precise about the kind of root or matrix-like phenomena
that we may expect to find in embedded illocutionary acts. The formal theory of QUDs
as laid out by Roberts (2012) creates entailments between questions and subquestions,
and as such encodes the commitments of the discourse participants with respect to shared
information (the common ground) and conversational strategy in the broad sense. However,
it does not encode anything about the specific kind of response that the speaker requires
of the addressee. This is exactly the division between matrix-like and non-matrix like
properties that we have already seen in the interpretation of EIQs—they are matrix-like
in that they include information about shared information and discourse commitments,
12Progressive aspect may also play a role here but, as mentioned in section 4.2.2, we do not know precisely
which factors lead to an embedded clause being interpreted as the main point of an utterance, and pursuing
this question would require more space than is available here.
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but they do not in themselves encode information about the demand on or next move
required of the addressee. In this way an EIQ denotes a conversational move in a previous
discourse but does not constitute one itself in the current discourse. As for EIQs that are
interpreted with respect to the current discourse, they still do not constitute an independent
conversational move but via pragmatic reasoning may be interpreted similarly to indirect
questions as in (56):
(56) a. Find out if he takes sugar in his tea.
b. I wonder if the mailman has already passed.
The structural analysis proposed also accounts for the ability to question the not-at-
issue content of the EIQ separately from the at-issue content, as illustrated in (14)-(15).
As the EIQ is not the object of the matrix verb, it is possible to question the content
and expression of the EIQ without denying that something was said. Moreover, the fact
that the perspective expressed in the EIQ is that of the original perspective holder makes
this possible, as it is not possible to question not-at-issue content asserted by the current
speaker.
As for illocutionary force, this is expressed by the IA head. For this reason, the content
of the EIQ can only be identified as a question or a request, not as an asserted fact, even
in cases in which EIQs occur under negated or modalised factive predicates. This is an
example of how embedded illocutionary force can affect the interpretation of the embedded
clause without meaning that it stands alone as a separate conversational move.
Let us now consider how a declarative EV2 clause refers to a conversational move. An
EV2 clause denotes an unresolved assertion in the relevant discourse, meaning that the
proposition it contains is not yet part of the common ground. In QUD terms, the assertion
must be made in order to work towards resolving some QUD. If the QUD(s) that an EV2
clause might resolve are already resolved in the relevant context, this EV2 clause will not
be licit.
This conceptualisation of quasi-quotational constructions as denoting a conversational
move that aims to resolve some QUD accounts for the wider details of the distribution
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of quasi-quotational constructions. It makes clear the unavailability of EV2 clauses (for
example) under predicates like doubt and deny : if these negative predicates are used, the
proposition they introduce is not a candidate for resolving the QUD at-issue, even as a
partial answer, because the QUD they target is the negative version of the QUD at-issue.
The availability of EV2 under semifactive predicates such as find out and realise can
also be accounted for in this way. These predicates suggest that the a QUD about the
proposition contained within the EV2 clause has existed for someone amongst the dis-
course participants because they suggest that the acceptance of the proposition in the
EV2 clause is recent or even, as in example (57b), yet to occur. This is in contrast to
factive complements that must be accepted as true—that is, the relevant QUD must be
resolved—for all participants. The idea that semifactive verbs refer to some kind of unre-
solved question is implicit in the name given to them as a group by some scholars, namely
“response” verbs. This is highlighted by the fact that the kind of semifactives that can
permit EV2 are compatible with the modifier ‘just’, which implies recent resolution, where
those that never permit EV2 are incompatible with ‘just’. The examples below show EIQs
as embedded under realise but blocked under regret :
(57) a. I just realised, would you consider the Euclid’s C-Finder a unique weapon?
funnyjunk.com13
b. I just realised would it be ok to pack water pistols in our suitcase?
netmums.com14
c. *I just regretted who did Mary see.
The fact that the QUD is unresolved for at least one discourse participant is appears to be
sufficient to license the EV2 clause: as experimental work by Heycock et al. (2012, 2016)
shows, EV2 clauses under semifactives were judged somewhat better than EV2 clauses
under factives by 104 native speakers of Swedish in Sweden. Heycock et al. (2012, 2016)
explore the idea that the availability of EV2 is determined not by the class of the predicate
13Taken from https://www.funnyjunk.com/channel/fallout/New+vegas+unique+weapons+gra+edition
+2/bhYaLou/15, 19th Jan 2016.
14Taken from http://www.netmums.com/coffeehouse/house-garden-194/holidays-travel-emigrating
-104/1335132-packing-water-pistols-all.html, 19th Jan 2016.
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but by the discourse importance of the embedded clause; specifically, whether or not the
embedded clause is the Main Point of Utterance (MPU) (Simons 2007), but they did not
find any significant effect of embedded clause MPU on the acceptability of EV2. As has
already been noted, there are some similarities between the concept of the MPU and the
QUD framework, however, for the purposes of investigating quasi-quotational utterances,
it seems that there are some advantages to using the QUD framework rather than an MPU
model in trying to understand quasi-quotational constructions. Whilst the MPU model
might be used to predict whether an EV2 clause may be accepted in a given context,
it does not predict the general syntactic distribution of quasi-quotational constructions.
For example, the fact that quasi-quotational constructions may not constitute the MPU
makes it harder to understand why they are completely out under factive verbs, even more
so when one considers that the clause embedded under a factive verb may in some cases
constitute the MPU, as in examples like (58):
(58) a. We regret that children cannot accompany their parents to commencement
exercises. Karttunen (1974, ex.26)
b. I’m afraid that your insurance policy is hereby cancelled.
Simons (2007, p.1051)
EV2 is still blocked in these cases: German, Danish and Swedish informants15 say that
EV2 is not available in translations of (58a).16
(59) German
a. Wir
we
bedauern,
regret
dass
that
Kinder
children
ihre
their
Eltern
parents
nicht
not
in
in
die
the
Cafeteria
cafeteria
begleiten
accompany
du¨rfen
can
“We regret that children cannot accompany their parents to the cafeteria.”
b. *Wir bedauern, Kinder du¨rfen ihre Eltern nicht in die Cafeteria begleiten.
15Thanks to Moritz Hellwig, Eva Schraff, Elena Espinoza and Ve´ronique Scheirs for their German judge-
ments, and to Lasse Sørensen, Johanne Nielsen and the (mysterious and powerful) Danish Linguists Network
for their Danish judgements, and Max Borg and Kajsa Dja¨rv for the Swedish judgements. Extra thanks to
Eva, Johanne and Max for the translations.
16They also note that EV2 is blocked irrespective of the interpretation given to regret, i.e. whether the
speaker is truly regretful.
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(60) Danish
a. Vi
we
beklager,
regret
at
that
børn
children
ikke
not
m˚a
can
følge
follow
med
with
deres
their
forældre
parents
ind
in
i
the
kantinen.
cafeteria.def
“We regret that children cannot accompany their parents to the cafeteria.”
b. *Vi beklager, at børn m˚a ikke følge med deres forældre ind i kantinen.
(61) Swedish
a. Vi
we
beklagar
regret
att
that
barn
children
inte
not
kan
can
fo¨lja
follow
med
with
fo¨ra¨ldrarna
adults
till
to
cafeterian.
cafeteria.def
“We regret that children cannot accompany their parents to the cafeteria.”
b. *Vi beklagar att barn kan inte fo¨lja med fo¨ra¨ldrarna till cafeterian.
Interestingly, the German informants permit EV2 in the translation of (58b), but the
Danish and Swedish informants do not:
(62) German
a. Ich
I
fu¨rchte,
fear
dass
that
Ihre
your
Versicherungspolice
insurance.policy
in
in
Frankreich
France
nicht
not
gultig
valid
ist.
is.
“I am afraid that your insurance policy is not valid in France.”
b. Ich
I
fu¨rchte,
fear,
Ihre
your
Versicherungspolice
insurance.policy
ist
is
in
in
Frankreich
France
nicht
not
gultig.
valid.
“I am afraid that your insurance policy is not valid in France.”
(63) Danish
a. Jeg
I
er
am
bange
afraid
for,
of
at
that
din
your
forsikring
insurance
ikke
not
er
is
gyldig
valid
i
in
Frankrig.
France
“I am afraid that your insurance policy is not valid in France.”
b. *Jeg er bange for, at din forsikring er ikke gyldig i Frankrig.
(64) Swedish
a. Jag
I
a¨r
am
ra¨dd
afraid
att
that
din
your
fo¨rsa¨kring
insurance
inte
not
a¨r
is
giltig
valid
i
in
Frankrike.
France
“I am afraid that your insurance policy is not valid in France.”
b. *Jag a¨r ra¨dd att din fo¨rsa¨kring a¨r inte giltig i Frankrike.
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It is unclear why this difference between German on the one hand and Danish and Swedish
on the other exists. One of the German informants notes that bedauern (‘to regret’) is sim-
ply impossible without the complementiser dass, while fu¨rchten (‘to fear’) does not have
the same restriction. It is interesting that the German case that permits EV2 involves a
single lexical verb, whereas the Danish and Swedish cases involve a copula and adjective.
This might suggests that there may be cross-linguistic variation in the predicates that per-
mit EV2 depending on how that particular language lexicalises a given predicate; however,
Swedish does allow EV2 under predicates of likelihood, which have a similar structure to
(62).
(65) Det
it
a¨r
is
troligt
probable
att
that
fo¨r
for
dessa
these
ra¨cker
suffices
det
it
med
with
en
one
behandling.
treatment
“It is likely that for these, one treatment is enough.”
Swedish, Julien (2015, p.171)
There is further evidence of fine-grained lexical differences across languages, however: Gon-
zalez i Planas (2014) shows that while Spanish does not allow recomplementation under
lamentar (‘to regret’), Catalan does if the embedded verb is in the indicative mood:
(66) a. Lamento
regret.1sg
que
that
ese
this
coche
car
(*que)
(that)
no
neg
lo
it
compres.
buy.subj.2sg
“I am sorry that you won’t buy that car.”
Spanish, Demonte & Ferna´ndez-Soriano (2009, ex. 50)
b. Lamento
regret.1sg
que
that
el
the
cotxe
car
(*que)
(that)
no
neg
te’l
cl.2sg-cl.3sg
puguis
can.subj.2sg
comprar.
buy.inf
“I am sorry that you cannot buy the car.”
c. En
the
Joan
Joan
es
it
va
aux
lamentar
regrets
que
that
el
the
cotxe
car
que
that
no
neg
se’l
cl.3sg-cl.3sg
podia
could
comprar.
buy.inf
“Joan was sorry that he couldn’t buy the car.”
Catalan, Gonza´lez i Planas (2014, p.46)
Let us now link this discussion of semifactives back into the discourse model outlined in
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the previous chapter. I claimed that EV2s evaluated with respect to the current discourse
context automatically add into the common ground the information that two propositions,
not one, were made by the current speaker. Hence, I claim that the EV2 clause containing
a proposition p is only compatible with those common grounds that do not already contain
p, either on its own or as expressed by an utterance accepted into the common ground. In
the cases of recent realisation, it is possible that p is not yet accepted into the common
ground even though it might already be part of the knowledge of individual discourse
participants. Careful experimental research on this hypothesis is needed to confirm this
claim but this must be left for future research.
6.2.8 Reason clauses (again)
In another example of a quasi-quotational construction being used to point to assertions,
Steinbach & Antomo (2009) show that V2 in weil -clauses (‘because’ clauses) in German is
used to make a comment on the context in which the main clause is uttered: for example,
in example (67) below, V2 order is strongly preferred because the weil -clause provides a
reason for the utterance of the main clause rather than a reason for the event expressed in
the main clause:
(67) Es
it
hat
has
geschneit,
snowed
weil
because
die
the
Straße
street
ist
is
ganz
whole
weiß.
white
“It has snowed, because the street is completely white.”
Steinbach & Antomo (2009, p.15)
In (67), it is very difficult to interpret weil die Straße ist ganz weiss as a reason for it
having snowed; instead, it expresses the speaker’s reasoning behind her utterance.
A similar effect is found in reason clauses in English, where we find EIQs used in all
kinds of reason clauses:
(68) a. What I’d say to the minister is, number one do we really need this order at
all because why should we have extra seats just because Germany are getting
more. BNC, JSG 227
231
b. 7 times you just need to take charge in bed, because what are you waiting
for?17
c. I suggested to him he needs to put a picture in the uniform policy of what is
acceptable because how should we know.18
It seems that, in the examples in (68), the because-clause with the EIQ actually introduces
the true topic of interest for the speaker, or at least their reason for uttering the preceding
clause: in the first case the perceived need to “keep up” with Germany; in the second, lack
of fulfilment; in the third, a perceived lack of knowledge. This kind of because-clause is
also used out-of-the-blue to introduce a new topic into the discourse; it is a particularly
popular way of captioning images on social media to justify the action captured in the
image, as if justification has been requested:
(69) a. Because what are we without five minutes ago?19
b. Because why would you wanna live any other way ????20
c. Because who hasn’t grammed tonight’s dreamy sundown in #Paris?21
Reason clauses crosslinguistically allow root phenomena (Hooper & Thompson 1973,
pp.492-493), in particular reason clauses that assert the reason for an action or a speech
act. Like quasi-quotational constructions in complement position, they cannot appear as
sentential subjects or fronted in the clause (see also Wegener (1993) and Antomo (2012)
for German):
(70) *Because what is even the point eluded her.
(71) a. *Because why not just live life, she went through with the bungee jump.
b. *Because why should you be left in the dark, the gossip is that Miss Jones likes
17Taken from http://www.bustle.com/articles/95801-7-times-you-just-need-to-take-charge-in
-bed-because-what-are-you-waiting-for, accessed 24th Jul 2015.
18Taken from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2918488/Schoolboy-9-kicked-classroom-
hair-cut-like-Arsenal-footballer-Olivier-Giroud.html, accessed 24th Jul 2015.
19Taken from http://davidkanigan.com/2015/06/18/because-what-are-we-without-five-minutes-ago/,
accessed 24th Jul 2015.
20Taken from https://instagram.com/p/00xR9rEktz/, accessed 24th Jul 2015.
21Taken from https://instagram.com/p/lAuPOVEmAK/, accessed 24th Jul 2015.
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Mr Smith.
c. *Weil
because
die
the
Straße
street
ist
is
ganz
whole
weiß,
white,
es
it
hat
has
geschneit.
snowed
“Because the street is completely white, it has snowed.”
The key difference between these reason clauses and quasi-quotational constructions in
complement position are as follows: while the quasi-quotational constructions can only
modify the matrix clause, reason clauses can modify either the matrix clause or the moti-
vations for making the speech act though, as Antomo (2012) notes, V2 order is more widely
judged acceptable in those clauses that modify the speech act. Hence, reason clauses tend
to orient to the current speech situation as there is no other speech context to orient to.
In the cases that reason clauses occur with a report of another speech situation, they will
be interpreted like other quasi-quotational constructions in that language:
(72) John told Mary that her boyfriend was cheating on her because why shouldn’t she
know what the bastard was up to?
Bastard = from John’s perspective
The reason clause in (72) not only gives the reason why John told Mary about her boyfriend,
but bastard is also interpreted from John’s perspective rather than the reporting speaker’s.
Reason clauses are also different for a very basic reason in that they are all preceded
by the functional word because. I claim that reason clauses have a different structure from
EIQs which is more like that in (30) and Antomo (2012, p.13), with because spelling out a
linking head:
(73) Do we really need this order at all because why should we have extra seats?
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ReasonP
ForceP
Do we really need this order at all
Reason’
Reason
because
ForceP
why should we have extra seats
Because does not identify the content and form of a speech act but the motivations for
an act or speech act. Like some EIQs/EV2 clauses though, in the cases where the because
clause gives the motivations for a speech act, as in (73), it appears to introduce or pertain
to a new sub-QUD. In (73), the set of QUDs is expanded from “Do we need extra seats?”
to “Why should we have extra seats?” because the latter QUD bears on the former. In this
way because is more like a coordinator than a head introducing a modification relation; two
speech acts are coordinated so as to express a causal relationship between them similar to
the causal relationship in (74).
(74) I called the Samaritans and I wanted them to help me.
= Means: Because I wanted help, I called the Samaritans
6= Doesn’t mean: I called the Samaritans and in addition to speaking to them, I
wanted them to help me
6.2.9 Comparison with factive complements
In the proposal given so far in this thesis, it is claimed that quasi-quotational structures are
referential and have some kind of extra nominal structure. The key claim is that the quasi-
quotational structures are inherently nominal in and of themselves. There is a second
group of structures that are also analysed as nominalised clauses that are in some way
referential, and that is factive structures. Rizzi (1990) and Kayne (2010) claim that the
factive complement is not directly selected by the matrix verb but is actually complement
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to a null FACT noun. This has been disputed by scholars such as de Cuba (2007) and
de Cuba & U¨ro¨gdi (2010), who note that if factive islands are complex DP islands then no
extraction should be available from them, contrary to fact. Moreover, as Kastner (2015)
notes, it is not possible for even the most basic factive verbs to take an overt nominal
complement:
(75) a. I know fact John is here.
b. *I know the fact that John is here.
Kastner (2015) also claims that the silent nominal fact analysis does not account for the
different interpretation of complements to verbs depending on whether they are nominal or
clausal. Focusing on a non-factive, non-presuppositional verb like explain, Kastner notes
that if explain takes a nominal complement, the complement is understood as containing
reasons why the relevant event represented by the nominal occurred. If it takes a clausal
complement, the complement is understood as an explanation for some relevant event that
may or may not be expressed in the same clause. This means that the speech act of
explaining has very different content in each case. This is illustrated in (76):
(76) a. He explained [DP the building’s collapse.]
= He said that the contractor was a crook, the supplies were bought cheap
and safety regulations were flouted.
b. He explained [CP that the building collapsed.]
= He said “The building collapsed” (or similar) by way of explanation for why
the street is closed. Kastner (2015, p.175)
These differences in interpretation do not entirely carry over to factive verbs:
(77) a. I regret Dan’s departure.
b. I regret Dan’s leaving.
c. I regret that Dan left.
d. I regret the fact that Dan left.
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(78) a. I forgot his name.
b. I forgot that he was called Paul.
c. I forgot the fact that he was called Paul.
In (77) there do not seem to be any differences in interpretation between the DP comple-
ments and the CP complements. In (78), though (78b) and (78c) contain more information
than (78a), the interpretation is the same. In both (77) and (78), all the options are inter-
preted like the DP complement in (76) in that they concern the event represented by or in
the complement rather presenting the complement as related to some second event.
Whilst the argument above is not a knockdown argument against Rizzi (1990) or Kayne
(2010), it is suggestive that all factive complements, unlike clausal complements to non-
factive verbs, are nominal in nature. But how does this come about? Kastner (2015) claims
that factive complements are selected by a determiner-like element that he calls δ, which
that has the effect of nominalising the clause—a strikingly similar proposal to the one
proposed here for quasi-quotational structures. Kastner shows that factive complements
are introduced by determiners in languages such as Hebrew ((79) and (80)) and have the
same distribution as DPs (in particular as sentential subjects).
(79) a. hu
he
hisbir
explained
sˇe-ha-binyan
comp-the-building
karas
collapsed
“He explained that the building collapsed.”
b. hu
he
hisbir
explained
et
acc
ze
this
sˇe-ha-binyan
comp-the-building
karas
collapsed
“He explained the fact that the building collapsed.” Kastner (2015, p.160)
(80) Bill
Bill
zoxer
remembers
et
acc
ze
this
sˇe-Dani
comp-Dani
ganav
stole
et
acc
ha-ugiot
the-cookies
“Bill remembers (the fact) that John stole the cookies.” Kastner (2015, p.162)
He also claims that the weak-islandhood of factivity relates to their status as definite
DPs that refer to a proposition in the common ground. Following Honcoop (1998), he
claims that factive complements, due to the presence of a definite determiner above CP,
do not introduce a new discourse referent (proposition) into the common ground and so
do not allow extraction across clauses, in the same way that cross-sentential anaphora
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to an indefinite is blocked if that indefinite is presupposed rather than if it introduces
a new discourse referent (see Honcoop (1998), Szabolsci (2006) and Kastner (2015) for
details). It could also be argued that the weak-islandhood of both factive complements
and quasi-quotational constructions derives from their selection by a definite determiner,
as definiteness is well-known to degrade extraction (Fiengo & Higginbotham 1981, Manzini
1992):
(81) a. *Which mani did you discover [Mary’s poem about ti]?
b. ??Which mani did you discover [the poem about ti]?
c. Which mani did you discover [a poem about ti]? Szabolsci (2006, p.483)
Note that the possessed DP in (81a) strengthens the island compared with the simpler
definite DP in (81b), which is relevant to the distinction between factive complements and
quasi-quotational constructions.
Kastner’s account is compelling for a number of reasons: it dispenses with the problems
of the null DP account such as the weak-strong islandhood problem and covers the fact
that factive complements tend to pattern with DPs. However, semifactive verbs such as
agree and deny are not compatible with DP complements:
(82) a. *I agree something.
b. I agree to something.
c. I agree that something should be done.
Kastner claims that as his proposed presuppositional determiner does not create a DP,
but a δP, that there is a more fine-grained selectional restriction on verbs like agree that
permits δP and PP complements, but not DP complements. Kastner likens this to the
selection of particular types of C by other verbs, for example verbs that only select overt
and not null C, like resent, care and mind (Kastner 2015, p.183).
In short, Kastner takes a similar angle to de Cuba and colleagues by moving away
from the idea of factivity being itself present in the syntax, instead focusing on presup-
positionality, which he claims is present in the syntax in the form of a particular type of
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determiner.
If we are to accept Kastner’s approach to factive complements, let us then recapitulate
and re-examine the analyses for factive complements and quasi-quotational constructions
and how the similarities and differences between the two fall out.
The proposal is that factive complements are clauses nominalised by a determiner δ
that selects for a CP. The resulting δP is selected by factive and semifactive matrix verbs
but cannot be selected by non-factive verbs such as say and think. The determiner δ
renders the factive complement referential and its referent is a presupposed proposition
in the common ground. Behaviourally, the factive complement has the distribution of a
nominal: it can appear in subject position and is interpreted in the same way as other
nominal complements to factive verbs; there is no nominal-clausal split in interpretation
like that found with complements to verbs like explain. Factive complements are weak
islands to extraction, unlike other clausal complements; it is claimed that this is due to
their presupposed status.
Quasi-quotational constructions are like factive complements in how they relate to the
matrix clause: factive complements, in particular factive emotives, seem to express the mo-
tivation or reason the matrix subject has for possessing the emotive or mental state encoded
in the factive verb. Similarly, quasi-quotational constructions contain information about
the relevant discourse participants’ motivations, perspective and commitment towards the
act that the matrix verb encodes in a way that standard embedded clauses do not. There
are also morphological similarities between factive complements and quasi-quotational con-
structions in some languages, for example the obligatoriness of the complementiser att in
factives and EV2 clauses in Swedish (de Cuba 2006).
Quasi-quotational constructions are also analysed in this thesis as nominalised clauses,
with a determiner-like element in the head of the IAP projection that selects for the
clause, but there the similarities end. They are not selected by the matrix verb but they
are analysed as modifying a true nominal complement to the matrix verb, which may or
may not be overt. They are not in themselves presupposed as they contain propositions or
questions that are open and unresolved in the common ground, but they pick out a referent
in the discourse, which has been argued to be a conversational move made to address or
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propose a specific QUD. Moreover, the proposition or set of propositions is “at-issue” with
respect to the relevant discourse; that which is at-issue forms the basis of a question under
discussion in the stack, it is marked as not being presupposed and a resolution for that
which is at-issue is being actively sought, either in the form of a question that requires an
answer or an assertion that is put forward for inclusion in the common ground. To repeat
(67) here as (83a), we see that the reason clause makes explicit why the speaker has made
the assertion that they have made and hence the way in which the matrix clause fits into
the discourse by expressing the speaker’s motivation for the assertion and by answering a
sub-QUD. It disambiguates the role of the matrix clause in the discourse in a way that
thinking of the V2 clause as simply “at-issue” does not.22
(83) a. Es
it
hat
has
geschneit,
snowed
weil
because
die
the
Straße
street
ist
is
ganz
whole
weiß.
white
“It has snowed, because the street is completely white.”
Steinbach & Antomo (2009, p.15)
b. QUD = What is it like outside?
Sub-QUD = How do you know what it is like outside?
As has already been shown above, the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions is
partly predictable on the basis of whether or not a matrix predicate is considered to
be factive or not, but is refined by taking into account whether the quasi-quotational
construction addresses a QUD still in the stack—that is, an open QUD—in the relevant
discourse context.
Quasi-quotational constructions differ from factive complements in that even less ex-
traction is permitted out of quasi-quotational constructions than out of factives—argument
extraction is uniformly bad, for example. Both types of complements are definite and re-
ferring;23 hence quasi-quotational constructions block extraction in the same way as was
22It is also important to note, as do scholars such as Wiklund et al. (2009), that the idea that the EV2
clause is at issue does not exclude the matrix clause from also being at issue, or in our new terms, a
proposition put forward as a possible answer for a QUD in the current stack. This was illustrated in the
previous chapter too.
23I assume that typical embedded clauses are not referential, meaning that they do not refer to a conver-
sational move in the relevant context but to a proposition more generally, in the same way that bare nouns
refer to kinds rather than individual entities.
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described for factive complements above, if even more strongly due to the complexity of the
highest projection in the quasi-quotational case. However, quasi-quotational complements
have the added syntactic difference of not being selected by the matrix verb. As a result,
when arguments are attracted up to the Spec,ForceP position in an embedded clause, they
alone satisfy the [+wh] feature on Forceo and so are no longer free for further extraction
into the matrix clause.
Quasi-quotational constructions are in (almost complete) complementary distribution
with factive clauses. Quasi-quotational constructions may not appear in sentence-initial
position or as sentential subjects24,25, they contain embedded root phenomena where fac-
tive complements cannot, and their content must be non-presupposed.
(84) [That the results were fantastic]i, Albert denied/confirmed/knew ti
Kastner (2015, p.174)
(85) a. *Att
that
hon
she
hade
had
inte
not
g˚att
gone
hen
home
uppta¨ckte
discovered
han
he
forst
first
ig˚ar
yesterday
“That she had not gone home, he discovered only yesterday.”
Wiklund (2010, p.87)
b. *Would he make me dinner tonight, I asked him.26
Note again that the fact that EV2 clauses cannot appear to the left of the matrix clause
shows that their structure is not a simple matter of coordination of two matrix clauses,
otherwise the impossibility of (85) would not be predicted.
These differences fall out from differences in the functional heads that select for factive
24It seems that in English, EIQs can appear as sentential subjects if the content noun they identify is
overt:
(i) The question would he ever finish his PhD is one that played on John’s mind at night.
(ii) ??The question when would he give me back my money is one I pestered John with frequently.
It is difficult to tell whether the element [would he ever finish his PhD] in (i) is an EIQ, an example of FID,
or even a direct quote. The very marginal status of (ii), which the indexicality of the arguments shows to
be an EIQ, suggests that it is not an EIQ but probably a direct quote.
25Henry (1995) claims that EIQs can be sentential subjects in Belfast English:
(iii) Was he vegetarian was what was puzzling them.
(iv) Can you get a good job depends on who can help you Henry (1995, p.107)
Though (iii) could be interpreted as a direct quote, or even FID, it is less clear that (iv) is ambiguous. I
do not know how to account for (iv) given that no other EIQ dialect seems to permit EIQs as sentential
subjects and there are no other examples of this available either in corpora or in the literature.
26Recall that this is infelicitous on an EIQ reading but acceptable on an FID reading, as explained in
section 3.3.
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complements compared with quasi-quotational constructions. The idea that there are dif-
ferent factive and non-factive functional heads in the C-layer is not radical; evidence for
this kind of distinction exists in overt morphosyntax in Japanese (the to-koto distinction).
Given that the two different types of functional elements proposed here are silent (in En-
glish at least), I claim that there are two loci of difference that we can perceive. Firstly, they
select for different projections in the extended left periphery of the CP: where the factive
determiner selects for FinP, the quasi-quotational determiner selects for ForceP. This kind
of selectional account has some advantages over Haegeman and U¨ro¨gdi’s (2010) operator
movement account: the similarities between factive complements and quasi-quotational
constructions can be accounted for; the nature and position of the determiners proposed
both in this thesis and by Kastner (2015) are more clearly defined and have overt counter-
parts, which is not clear in Haegeman and U¨ro¨gdi’s account; and, as Bhatt (2010, p.175)
points out, it is hard to see how operator movement results in referentiality and why it
is incompatible with illocutionary force. Neither of these problems exist in a determiner
account because the connection between the presence of a definite determiner-like element
and referentiality is clear, and the complementary distribution of the factive determiner
and illocutionary force (assuming that illocutionary force is syntactically represented in
some way about FinP) is easily explained. It is also important to note that this definition
of referentiality does not assume that referential CPs necessarily refer in the same ways as
referential DPs do.
Another difference between the two determiners is that the quasi-quotational
determiner—the IA head—has the perspectival monster-situation pronoun complex in its
specifier that anchors the clause to a specific discourse and the questions under discussion
in that discourse. In contrast, the factive determiner does not actively anchor its clause to
a specific discourse context, though the clause it selects for must contain a proposition in
the common ground of the utterance context. This results in an interpretation of presup-
positionality because the referent picked out must be presupposed to be true in all worlds,
not just at-issue in a specific set of worlds.
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6.3 Thinking crosslinguistically
6.3.1 Distributional differences
So far in this thesis, three different distributions of quasi-quotational constructions have
emerged: languages that only embed assertions and imperatives (German, Mainland Scan-
dinavian); languages that only embed questions and imperatives (English) and languages
that embed all three illocution types (Spanish).
With respect to English, we would not expect to find EV2 in English if we assume
Ross’s (1973) Penthouse Principle, given that V2 is rare in matrix clauses. At first blush,
this seems to be the case. If we consider the following embedded declaratives that do not
have an overt complementiser (following the unavailability of overt complementisers in the
embedded interrogative and imperatives) they do not show EIQ/EV2-like characteristics:
in (86) we see that speech act adverbs, discourse particles and topicalisation of arguments is
blocked; in (87) we see that null complementisers are permitted under a much wider range
of predicates than quasi-quotational constructions; and (88) illustrates the well-known fact
that extraction is licit out of embedded declaratives.
(86) a. *He said seriously he understood the problem
(*on the low construal of seriously)
b. *He said he would like a drink please
(*on the low construal of please)
c. *He said that book, he would like to read
(87) a. He knew he had to turn his life around. Daily Mail, 28th Mar 2015
b. He discovered he had won half a million Euros.
Irish Examiner, 11th Jun 2015
c. He denied he had visited Mr McCann. Irish Times, 27th Jul 1996
d. He regretted he had not achieved what he wanted to do.
BBC, 27th Sep 2013
(88) a. Whati did he say he saw ti?
b. Whoi did he say ti saw her?
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c. Wherei did he say he saw her ti?
d. Wheni did he say he saw her ti?
e. Howi did he say he saw her ti?
Radford (2013) examines apparent recomplementation structures in English declaratives
like those in (89):
(89) a. The party opposite said that if we cut 6 billion from the budget that it would
end in catastrophe.
b. It’s something that off the pitch that we’ve got to help the players deal with.
Radford (2013, p.19)
However, these kinds of constructions have a very different distribution from quasi-
quotational constructions—they do not shift perspective or permit root phenomena in
the way that English EIQs or Spanish recomplementation do. Ultimately Radford analy-
ses these structures as a kind of performance phenomenon that occurs when a particularly
lengthy adverbial is fronted in the embedded clause in order to signal that the subject will
follow (Radford 2013, p.43).
It seems that the crux of the problem relates to how embedded illocutionary acts and
perspective shifting is overtly marked in English. The clause types that can be represented
as embedded illocutionary acts are those that can be distinguished from indirect speech
reports by the movement or presence of a verbal element in the left periphery. To be precise:
EIQs feature movement of the verb into Force and embedded imperatives also feature the
verb in the C layer. In Spanish recomplementation, there is either recomplementation que
in TopicP (to follow Villa-Garc´ıa’s (2012, 2015) analysis), the exclamative marker que´ or
the preposition in the P+infinitive imperative construction. In contrast, there is no way
in the examples in (86)-(89) of overtly distinguishing an English embedded declarative
illocutionary act from a standard embedded declarative, and the same holds for embedded
exclamatives.
However, as Sailor (2016) notes, there is evidence of verb movement in matrix clauses
in some dialects of English that is innovative rather than residual and that is related to
243
strong assertive force. He has termed this type of verb movement “fuck -inversion” and it
is illustrated below (examples from Sailor (2015, p.1):
(90) A: John is a nice guy.
B: Is he fuck (a nice guy)—he stabbed my cousin!
(91) They’re all wearing kilts, but will I fuck be wearing one of them.
= I definitely won’t be wearing one.
Sailor points out that fuck -inversion is reminiscent of canonical negative inversion, as in
(92), which was also highlighted by Hooper & Thompson (1973) as a root transformation:
(92) a. They’re all wearing kilts, but under no circumstances will I be wearing one of
those. Sailor (2015, p.1)
b. Alice vowed that under no circumstances would she loan me the key.
Hooper & Thompson (1973, p.466)
Not all dialects that permit fuck -inversion can embed it, but those that permit EIQs can
also embed fuck -inversion clauses. Moreover, embedded fuck -inversion (henceforth referred
to as embedded negative assertion) contrasts with embedded canonical negative inversion
in exactly the same ways that EIQs contrast with standard embedded interrogatives (judge-
ments are mine from my North West England dialect):
(93) Compatibility with overt complementisers
a. He said (that) under no circumstances would he go to the party.
b. He said (*that) would he fuck go to the party.
(94) Extraposition
a. Under no circumstances would he go to the party, he said.
b. ?*Would he fuck go to the party, he said. FID reading available
(95) Availability in subject position
a. That under no circumstances would he go to the party was clear.
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b. *Would he fuck go to the party was clear.
(96) Third-person/first-person clash
a. Mary said that under no circumstances would I go to the party.
b. ??Mary said would I fuck go to the party. Requires context
c. I said that under no circumstances would Mary go to the party.
d. I said that would Mary fuck go to the party.
(97) Quantified matrix arguments
a. Everybodyi’s mother said that under no circumstances would hei go to the
party
b. Everybodyi’s mother said would hei fuck go to the party
c. Nobodyi said that under no circumstances would shei go to the party.
d. *Nobodyi said would shei fuck go to the party was clear.
e. Mary told each boyi’s mother that under no circumstances would hei be invited
to the party.
f. *Mary told each boyi’s mother would hei fuck be invited to the party.
(98) Wh-extraction
a. Whati did he say that under no circumstances would he do ti?
b. *Whati did he say would he fuck do ti?
(99) Orientation of expressive elements
a. Johni said that under no circumstances was Jo allowed to let the bastards?i/sp
in.
b. Johni said was Jo the fuck allowed to let the bastardsi/*sp in.
Embedded negative assertion therefore seems to provide a case of embedded assertive force
in English, which is licensed by the obligatory verb movement to C. Importantly, this
verb movement is not triggered by overt polarity in the way that inversion is triggered in
canonical negative inversion27, but via a mechanism which also licenses a strong assertive
27Of course, this is skipping completely over the question of how inversion is triggered in canonical
negative inversion constructions, which is far from settled.
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interpretation, such as the account given in chapter 4.28 It seems, then, that the idea that
overt marking is required is on the right track.
But in that case, why do languages with EV2 not have EIQs when they have matrix
questions with inversion? Moreover, why do we have the situation in Mainland Scandina-
vian whereby EV2 can be used either for speaker or matrix-subject perspective, when in
German it can only be the former? In answering these questions, it will be shown that
German EV2 and EIQs, while similar processes, are fundamentally different in a way that
is reminiscent of pronoun shifting in languages like Zazaki and Slave´ (Anand & Nevins
2004). Recomplementation, on this account, patterns with the EIQ languages. Mainland
Scandinavian EV2 will be shown to be slightly different again.
It is tempting to turn to the apparent polarity sensitivity of both EV2 and EIQs for an
answer, but it cannot be as simple as the determiner in Mainland Scandinavian also being
a positive polarity item or the determiner in English being a negative polarity item29. We
have already seen that EV2 in Mainland Scandinavian can occur under negation given
the right discourse conditions, as well as English EIQs occurring under non-interrogative
verbs such as say. Moreover, an polarity-sensitivity account does not explain the effect of
modalisation on licensing EIQs under matrix factive verbs, given that modal verbs, lexical
and periphrastic, do not typically license NPIs:
(100) a. *He saw anyone.
b. ?*He might see anyone.
c. *He wanted to see anyone.
d. He did not see anyone.
28Sailor (2015, 2016) suggests that fuck -inversion and canonical negative inversion are both triggered by
of focus-related operator movement into a high left-peripheral PolarityP, with the main difference being
that the operator is overt in canonical negative inversion and covert in fuck -inversion. However, this does
not account for the assertive force of fuck -inversion compared with the undeniably emphatic, but forceless
canonical negative inversion (this is yet another example of the disconnect between illocutionary force and
more vague, attitude-related terms like ‘emphasis’). Biberauer (2015b, 2016) also proposes a high left-
peripheral PolarityP to account for a variety of phenomena in Afrikaans which also show interesting effects
with respect to illocutionary force. Between these ideas and those that I will discuss below on polarity, it
seems that polarity and illocution may be more closely linked than we have previously realised, but this
requires much future work.
29For an analysis of similar data along these lines, see Adger & Quer (2001).
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Crucially, an NPI account does not easily cover the paradigm cases of selected questions
or EIQs under interrogative predicates, given that we do not yet fully understand how
interrogation licenses NPIs. One could take a position like that of Lahiri (2002, p.257),
who states that it is some element in predicates like ask that license NPIs, rather than
interrogation per se. However, this position logically assumes a Ross (1970) or Speas
& Tenny (2003)-like performative analysis to account for matrix clauses, which is losing
ground in the field of the syntax of speech acts for the reasons detailed in chapter 2.
Instead it is perhaps more fruitful to follow a similar line to that taken by Holmberg
& Platzack (1995), Truckenbrodt (2006), Ga¨rtner (2015) and the view outlined above that
the predicates that combine with EIQs bear a particular relation to the information state
of the original speaker. In the case of EIQs, the predicate must be compatible with a
true open question because the EIQ represents a question that, in the original discourse
context, was unresolved for the original speaker. The apparent polarity sensitivity of the
EIQ follows from the non-veridical nature of the original question. In fact, it seems that
the use of an IAP can ‘bleach’ the matrix predicate down to just its interrogative function
or alternatively overrides other aspects of meaning usually contained in that predicate.
Take for example the predicate see. When used in an imperative it can mean something
like “try to achieve x”, as in (101). In this case, there is no requirement to report back to
the speaker the success (or otherwise) of the endeavour; no ‘answer’ is required.
(101) a. See if you can finish that book before bedtime.
b. See if Mary will help you.
c. Soon you’ll see if it will work out.
This interpretation can hold in questions too:
(102) a. Can you see if you can finish that book before bedtime?
b. Why don’t you see if Mary could help you?
It can also carry the implication that the speaker of the imperative wants to know the
eventual answer: it is an information-seeking use of see that has an interpretation more
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like “find out and report back”:
(103) See if it’s your friend is at the door.
Speaker expects addressee to find out and tell her whether the addressee’s
friend has arrived
When see is used with an EIQ, only the second reading is available:
(104) a. Go over there and see did they bring my car in AAE, Green (2002, p.87)
#Speaker just wants addressee to try to find out if the car is in
Speaker wants addressee to tell her if the car is in
b. *Can you see can you finish that book tonight?
#Speaker wants addressee to try to finish the book
#Speaker wants addressee to tell her if she can finish the book
If the IA head’s role is to turn the semantic question into a question-utterance this is to
be expected; the identification of the IAP as a question rather than any other kind of
interrogative act effectively disambiguates predicates like want to know, eliminating the
possibility that they are solely a matter of internal reflection.
To address the question of cross-linguistic distribution, I propose that the difference
identified between the types of IA heads in different languages select for results in the
restrictions on the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions crosslinguistically. Lan-
guages with the German type of IA head ultimately have a kind of mixed interpretation
across the original and current discourse contexts—the modal base is provided by the
matrix subject and the responsibility lies was a current discourse participant. This is
exactly what is needed to obtain the interpretation of embedded imperatives in German
and Swedish, where the matrix subject’s doxastic alternatives determine what property
should be made true in the world and the current addressee is responsible for making it so.
However, this kind of mixed interpretation, which introduces a delay in transmission into
the process of communication, when applied to embedded questions is incompatible with
how questions work in discourse. True information-seeking questions require a response
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for the conversation to continue successfully, so this indirect method of asking them is not
compatible with normal discourse. It could be argued that EIQs should be available in
German for precisely the kind of case where a question is being asked indirectly via a third
person, though there do not seem to be any instances of this.
In contrast, the more ‘coherent’ pattern in Spanish and English, where both the modal
base and the responsibility holder are provided by the original context, should permit all
three types of embedded illocutionary act examined here. This is borne out by the data,
with the caveat that there must be a method of overtly marking the fact that it is an
embedded illocutionary act in the C layer. We also predict that we should find embedded
interrogatives in the Mainland Scandinavian languages that also permit the ‘coherent’
pattern. This is borne out by the following data from Julien (2009), though she notes
that the root-like word order in the examples in (105) is less frequent than the typical
subject-verb word order in embedded interrogatives (Julien 2009, p.47):
(105) a. Jag
I
bara
only
undrar
wonder
vart
where
ska
shall
ni
you.pl
a˚ka
go
i
in
sommar.
summer
“I’m just wondering where are you going this summer?”
b. Ja
I
kommer
come
att
to
see
see
kan
can
vi
we
go¨ra
make
undantag
exception
fo¨r
for
gravida.
pregnant
“I’ll see if we can make an exception for pregnant women.”
c. Jag
I
undrar
wonder
kommer
comes
det
it
n˚ansin
ever
att
to
ha¨nda.
happen
“I wonder will it ever happen.”
Swedish, Julien (2009, pp.47-48,53)
6.3.2 More on the nominal complement
6.3.2.1 A role for cognate nouns?
The analysis given in this chapter makes some possible predictions about the distribution of
embedded illocutionary acts crosslinguistically. For example, to take a somewhat Austinian
approach, it seems to predict that this kind of embedded illocutionary act (a representation
of a conversational move) will be restricted to languages that allow verbs to take cognate
or near-cognate nouns as their complements because these languages allow verbs like “ask”
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to select for typical30 nominal complements. The prediction would be that a language like
French will not have embedded illocutionary acts but German and Spanish will:
(106) a. *On
One
demande
asks
la
the
question.
question
“One asks the question.” French
b. Man fragt die Frage. German
c. Se pregunta la pregunta. Spanish
Based on these three languages alone, the prediction is borne out insofar as German and
Spanish have embedded illocutionary acts, but German does not allow interrogative quasi-
quotational constructions. Let’s consider non-Indo-European languages now. Some lan-
guages that appear to have embedded speech acts do not strictly have verbs of asking, but
construct asking predicates from a light verb such as do combined with a noun meaning
question:
(107) a. shitsumon
question
suru
do.pres.inform
“One asks the question.” Japanese
b. cilmun-haki
question-do.nom
“asking” Korean
From this cross-linguistic prediction may also arise an intra-linguistic prediction: the kinds
of verbs that may embed embedded illocutionary acts are those that can take the relevant
noun as an overt nominal complement when it is followed by a clause expressing its content.
This may seem intuitively correct when we consider English: we can ask a question, but
we cannot know a question. But this prediction seems to break down with predicates such
as wonder and want to know. Some examples of these predicates taking question as a
nominal complement can be found, but they are marginal:
(108) a. Mothers who are pregnant often wonder the question: is it safe to have
30As opposed to nominal complements like “something”, which show properties of both DPs and CPs.
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intercourse during pregnancy? newkidscenter.com31
b. Today I wonder the question “what if?” twitter.com32
c. So the fact that neither you nor a student would naturally wonder the ques-
tion “How many dominoes would you need to knock over a skyscraper?” isn’t
material to me. (I wouldn’t wonder it naturally either but once it was posed,
I found it engrossing.) blog.mrmeyer.com33
d. Many people often wonder the question of what pressure washing can do for
their home. pressurewashwr.com34
e. If you own a website [. . . ] you probably may have wondered the question, is
maintenance for a website really needed. webdesy.com35
f. However, it is an industry-wide problem in the UK and I know you will
all want to know the question are we done, are we done on conduct.
nab.com.au36
This second prediction, however, still relies on the selection properties of the verb, and
there are many other predicates that produce very natural EIQs but are not found with
overt question+clause complements, for example not know. As such, it is perhaps too
strong to assume that the overt content noun question is a perfect and necessary analogue
for the null content noun identified by the EIQ. It is not uncommon that null nouns do
not have exactly the same distribution as their overt counterparts; see for example certain
types of null-argument languages and analyses of pro.
However, the discussion of cognate objects leads us onto an interesting and potentially
more fruitful path. Cognate objects seem to spell out the same event described by the verb.
They may also represent the product of the act and as such can be evaluated as having
certain properties, just as EIQs can (see the discussion in sections 6.2.5 and 4.3.2.2):
31Taken from http://www.newkidscenter.com/Is-It-Safe-To-Use-A-Vibrator-While-Pregnant.html,
retrieved 6th May 2015.
32Taken from https://twitter.com/currygd/status/540563092308905984, retrieved 6th May 2015.
33Taken from blog.mrmeyer.com/2001/3acts-domino-skyscraper, retrieved 6th May 2015.
34Taken from www.pressurewashwr.com/pressure-washing-blog/, retrieved 6th May 2015.
35Taken from http://webdesy.com/the-importance-of-website-maintenance/, written by an Irish En-
glish writer and retrieved on 21st Mar 2015.
36Taken from www.nab.com.au/content/dam/nab/about.../NAB Update 091014.doc, retrieved on 21st
Mar 2015.
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(109) a. John thought an interesting thought.
b. John dreamt a nice dream. Moltmann (2013, p.163)
In this way, cognate objects seem to spell out exactly what we want them to; an object that
refers not to a speech act but to a more abstract by-product of speech acts that has both
propositional content and other evaluable properties such as tone and emotion. However,
they also have the disadvantage as identified above that their distribution are subject to
lexical specifications of verbs, which does not match the distribution of the content noun
present in EIQs.
However, there are other kinds of nominal objects that play similar roles to cognate
objects without the problem of being tied to cognate verbs. Moltmann (2013) describes
“special quantifiers” such as something, the same thing and the German Worte (‘[ordered]
words’)37 that represent not a proposition, not a speech act, but an “attitudinal object”
encompassing propositional content, intensional stance and illocutionary force (Moltmann
2013, p.133).
(111) a. John asked something.
b. John asked the same thing Mary did.
c. Seine
his
letzten
last
Worte
words
waren,
were
dass
that
alles
all
vergeben
forgiven
ist
is
“His last words were that everything was forgiven.” Moltmann (2013, p.156)
Moltmann, focusing on attitudinal objects with some kind of propositional, rather than
interrogative, content, notes that the concept of an attitudinal object as distinct from a
proposition captures a number of properties found in natural language. In sentences such
as (112)-(113) below, it seems that not only propositional content but also some kind of
attitudinal force is shared by both John and Mary—they must have a similar attitude
37See example (111c) for an illustration of the use of Worte, but note that Worte and Wo¨rter (‘[unordered]
words’) differ in that the latter cannot refer to an attitudinal object but only to the words as objects. As
such, the equivalent of (111c) is not acceptable (??? is the judgement given by Moltmann):
(110) ???Seine
his
letzten
last
Wo¨rter
words
waren,
were
dass
that
alles
all
vergeben
forgiven
ist.
is
“His last words were that everything was forgiven.”
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towards the propositional content, hence the infelicity of the continuation in (113):
(112) a. John’s thought was the same as Mary’s.
b. John’s claim was the same as Mary’s. Moltmann (2013, p.140)
(113) Jane’s thought was the same as Mary’s - the bastard had to go, #though Jane
thought he was misunderstood, really.
Furthermore, while a proposition cannot be shared, an attitudinal object (or instances of
the same kind of attitudinal object) can be:
(114) a. John and Mary share the thought that S.
b. The thought that S occurred to both John and Mary.
Moltmann (2013, p.140)
There are other ways in which attitudinal objects also differ from speech acts qua events:
as shown in (112), attitudinal objects can be treated as exactly similar but events cannot38;
38This aspect of attitudinal objects fits in well with the conceptualisation of the EV2 as asserted by the
speaker as well as representing the views of the matrix subject:
(i)Madsv˚ag’s thought—and mine too—is that in future not everyone can be engaged in everything.
A valid question to raise here is whether EV2 is completely blocked in the case of false belief on the part of
the matrix subject. It is certain that EV2 is incompatible with this kind of scenario if it is expressed with
a negated factive verb, as in example (115) below from Truckenbrodt (2006, p.299):
(115) *Hans
Hans
weiß
knows
nicht,
not
Peter
Peter
hat
has
gewonnen.
won
“Hans doesn’t know that Peter has won.”
I have not been able to find any attested examples of German EV2 being used in a situation where the
matrix subject’s beliefs and those of the speaker clash, but Julien (2015) presents just such a case for
Norwegian:
(116) Dei
they
sa
said
at
that
den
that
bloggen
blog.def
las
read
han
he
alltid,
always
men
but
det
that
gjorde
did
han
he
ikkje.
not
“They said that that blog, he always read, but he didn’t.”
A couple of notes on this: the example in (116) is one of very few in Julien’s paper that is constructed rather
than naturalistic. This may not be a particularly damning point, however, given issues with sampling and
the already rare nature of non-subject-initial EV2. She also notes that examples parallel to (116) that
have a semifactive matrix verb such as oppdage (‘discover’) suffer from infelicity, so there are some cases
of Mainland Scandinavian EV2 that must be speaker-oriented (as also noted above). Julien seems to need
to suggest that the embedded clause in (116) is still asserted, but she says that “it does not make much
pragmatic difference whether or not the embedded clause is asserted in itself” (Julien 2015, p.169). I am not
sure what to make of this example or Julien’s analysis of it at this time, though I think that experimentation
would be the best route to take next to untangle the problems it poses.
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the time of the occurrence of an attitudinal object is accidental whereas it forms a key part
of understanding a referring to an event; an event does not have satisfaction conditions in
contrast to the inherent satisfaction conditions of an attitudinal object, namely that the
attitude holder (often represented in a possessive DP structure) must hold or engage in the
relevant attitude with a specific attitudinal or illocutionary force (Moltmann 2013, pp.133-
134). This last point is parallel to the differences in satisfaction conditions of direct speech
reports compared with EIQs; where the direct speech report requires a specific preceding
speech act of a specific type, EIQs require that a particular QUD have been engaged with
overtly by the relevant discourse participants.
On the basis of these considerations it is proposed that the null nominal is not a specific
cognate noun but is an attitudinal object that can be overtly pronounced as an overt
content noun depending on whether an appropriate lexical item exists and is compatible
with the selectional properties of the matrix verb. Crucially, lexical considerations do not
dictate which predicates may occur with EIQs or which languages may have EIQs.
6.3.2.2 Illocutionary force is in the embedded clause
A strong example to support the argument that it is not the nominal, but the properties of
the embedded clause alone that carry illocutionary force, is the following attested example
from a speaker of Canadian English, in which indirect, direct and quasi-quotational speech
reports all co-occur:
(117) He mentioned [that there was another club opening across town], and [would I
like to go with him], and I said “Sure, I’d love to go with you.”
Canadian Eng., The Graham Norton Show, 15th Jan 2016
In (117) the matrix verb mentioned is followed by a standard clausal complement headed
by that. However, this complement is conjoined with the EIQ would I like to join him. The
standard clausal complement and EIQ have matching intonation contours. That section is
then followed by another matrix predicate preceding an example of direct speech (in the
original speech act, the portion of (117) between quotation marks was marked by a change
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in intonation pattern and pitch).
With respect to the EIQ [would I like to go with him], it cannot be conjoined at the
level of the matrix clause because it cannot be a matrix clause on its own. It is unlikely
that there is a silent ask matrix predicate preceding the EIQ as the identity condition
required to license such ellipsis is not met. The EIQ must therefore be embedded under
(though not selected by) the matrix predicate mention. However, though mention does
not seem to convey much meaning independently of expressing a communicative act, it is
notable that mention is not typically compatible with EIQs; examples (118a)-(118d) sound
completely unacceptable to this author with an EIQ dialect and only (118e) with the overt
DP complement to mention sounds marginally possible:
(118) a. *I mentioned what did he want to eat.
b. *I mentioned would he like to join me.
c. *He mentioned who did I eat with.
d. *He mentioned would I like to join him.
e. ??He mentioned an invitation, namely would I like to join him.
Note that mention does not typically select for standard embedded questions under if
either, though it may be compatible with the kind of unselected embedded questions ex-
amined in Adger & Quer (2001):39
(120) a. *I mentioned if Bill was coming to the party.
b. Did John mention if Bill was coming to the party?
c. John didn’t mention if Bill was coming to the party
39Adger and Quer do not have any examples of mention combining with unselected embedded questions
in English, but gloss some Basque and Catalan examples as doing so:
(119) a. [Hemen
here
gaude-nik]
be.1pl.A-comp
aipatu
mentioned
dute?
aux.3pl.E.3sg.A
“Did they mention about us being here?”
Basque, Uribe-Etxebarria (1994) in Adger & Quer (2001, p.116)
b. Han
have.3pl
comentat
mentioned
si
him
el
think.ind.3pl
pensen
to-invite
convidar?
“Did they mention if they are planning to invite him?”
Catalan, Adger & Quer (2001, p.127)
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What then is the status of the EIQ in (117)? I argue that it is still an EIQ like any other
in that it is identified with a null attitudinal object, and that its use under mention is
ameliorated by the presence of the first conjunct.
Mention, like many other verbs of communication, can take DP complements as well
as CP complements. It can also conjoin CP complements with such DP complements:
(121) a. He mentioned DP[something].
b. He mentioned CP[that there was another club opening across town] and
DP[something else].
c. ?He mentioned CP[that there was another club opening across town] and DP[an
invitation [namely IAP[would I like to join him]]].
Hence the proposed structure of the EIQ is perfectly possible under mention. How then
does the first conjunct ameliorate mention? This is because it provides some context as to
the fact that a questioning act occurred and why. Similarly, using the overt DP object [an
invitation] as in (118e) slightly improves the use of the EIQ under mention because [an
invitation] provides an appropriate context for something carrying the illocutionary force
of a request or question.
More concretely, the overt DP [an invitation] can introduce into the QUD stack ques-
tions like Would you like to take up this invitation? that provoke conversational moves to
which the EIQ can refer. Similarly, the embedded clausal complement [that there was an-
other club opening across town] introduces into the stack QUDs such as What is happening
there? as ways of structuring the discourse to resolve all propositions and questions in it.
Ultimately, given a context compatible with there being a relevant QUD, EIQs like
that in (117) are possible because they contain their own illocutionary force and introduce
their own modal domain against which the embedded question can be evaluated, and the
matrix predicate in this case in interpreted simply as a light verb of communication. This
is reminiscent of Bogal-Allbritten’s (2016) account of attitude complements in Navajo. It
also explains why EIQs and embedded imperatives can be conjoined, as each contributes
its own illocutionary force below the level of the matrix clause:
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(122) He said [what the hell did I think I was doing] and [leave him the hell alone].
6.3.3 Languages that don’t embed speech act phenomena
Having considered the cross-linguistic picture, it is also worth taking time to consider lan-
guages that do not seem to permit the embedding of any illocutionary material at all, in
particular the famous cases of Mandarin (Li & Thompson 1981, Paul 2014), Cantonese
(Sybesma & Li 2007, Lam 2014) and Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2002, 2003, 2014). Other less
well-known cases exist, for example Greek evidential particles, which seem to morphologi-
cally mark speakers and addressees (Tsoulas in preparation).
What is particularly interesting about these cases is that they display a wide array of il-
locutionary material in the matrix clause—they are clearly languages that are sympathetic
to encoding not-at-issue information such as evidentiality and speaker attitude morpholog-
ically, yet items like evidential morphemes and sentence final particles are not embeddable.
Moreover, similar items—or at least, items that convey similar types of information—are
embeddable in other languages, for example evidential markers in Tibetan (Garrett 2001)
and St’a`t’cimets (Matthewson et al. 2007).
So what is the difference in these languages? It is often the case that particles and other
expressive material in languages that do not embed illocution are sentence-peripheral,
in particular sentence-final, whereas embeddable particles in other languages are often
sentence-internal, such as the second-position St’a`t’cimets and Tibetan evidentials. This is
not always the case, however, as Cuzco Quechua evidentials can be quite deeply embedded
in the verbal complex, and a number of the English discourse markers surveyed in this
dissertation have been sentence-peripheral, such as please, then and again.
It cannot be linked to whether or not a language is topic-oriented, as Japanese and
German are both considered to be topic-oriented languages, yet embed orientation phe-
nomena. Nor does it appear to be a typological phenomenon in the sense that it is linked
to language families; Indo-European and Japanese data may have made up the bulk of this
thesis, but surveys like Aikhenvald (2008) have found similar constructions in a range of
Bantu and Papuan languages.
Faller’s work on Cuzco Quechua (Faller 2002, 2003, 2014) already suggests that high
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left-peripheral projections are not the only places that illocutionary meaning can be ex-
pressed. She suggests that perhaps there are sentential-spine evidentials and then other
higher evidentials whose embeddability (or lack thereof) is not based not on core meaning,
but on other syntactic behaviour (M. Faller, p.c.). Bavarian German data has also shown
that sentence-peripheral particles were not as readily embeddable as Mittelfeld particles
(S. Thoma, p.c.). Yet other syntactic operations can render these particles more readily
embeddable: S. Thoma (p.c.) suggests that the particle ga¨, which was not embeddable
in typical Bavarian German embedded clauses, can receive an embedded interpretation in
weil clauses, which are the only embedded clauses in Bavarian German that permit V2:
(123) A: Mia
we
miassn
must
ned
neg
in’d
in.det
Schui. . .
school
“We don’t have to go to school. . . ”
B: Wei
because
do
there
scho
already
Ferien
holidays
san
are
ga¨?
prt
because we’re already on holidays then, right?”
S. Thoma, p.c.
Thoma reports that ga¨ is interpreted as scoping over the weil clause in B’s fragment answer
in (123) rather than over the (elided) main clause.
It is difficult to identify a language-level reason why illocutionary material should not
be embeddable—which of course does not mean that one does not exist, but that I have
not been able to find one here. An alternative option then is that the reason is language-
internal. This is the approach taken by Faller (2014); she suggests that certain Cuzco
Quechua morphemes, in particular those that overtly morphologically represent speaker
and hearer, are non-shiftable indexicals and as such cannot receive an embedded interpre-
tation. This is in line with the analysis above that only covert morphemes shift perspectives
in quasi-quotational contexts. A similar analysis could also fit Greek evidential particles,
in which the vowel of the particle indicates whether it is evaluated with respect to the
speaker or the addressee (Tsoulas in preparation), and that cannot be embedded.
Perhaps, then, crosslinguistic differences in the embeddability of illocutionary material
are not simply related to the position of the relevant element in the clause or the precise
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meaning of that element, but to whether or not the particles are indexicals. Particles and
morphemes that explicitly encode one of the current discourse participants cannot shift to
be interpreted with respect to the IAP; only covert perspectival elements can.
6.4 Conclusions and wider consequences for linguistic the-
ory
In this chapter I have followed recent scholarship in suggesting that both DP-like and
non-DP-like clausal complements exist in natural language. I have examined the concept
of referentiality with respect to clauses and presented two types of referential CPs: one
is a FinP selected by a determiner that refers to a proposition that has been accepted
into the common ground (a factive complement), and the other is an IAP that refers to a
conversational move in the relevant discourse (a quasi-quotational construction).
I also examined the relationship between quasi-quotational constructions and the ma-
trix clause, determining that it is not a relationship of selection. There are many reasons
for this, most importantly the effect of scopal operators in the matrix clause such as nega-
tion, modality and interrogation and the way in which discourse factors such as the MPU
and modifiers like ‘just’ can improve the acceptability of quasi-quotational constructions
under, for example, semifactive verbs. I showed that quasi-quotational constructions are
modifiers that specify the content of and expressive elements associated with an attitudinal
object (Moltmann 2013) such as the NP “question”.
Finally, I showed that there are a number of similarities between contexts in Indo-
European languages that permit embedded root phenomena that extend beyond this
potentially circular diagnostic and beyond the similarities in their distribution. Ger-
man/Mainland Scandinavian EV2, English EIQs and Romance recomplementation are
all limited to post-verbal position, contain non-presupposed information, and have simi-
lar interpretative characteristics with respect to requiring a suitable conversational move
as referent and the need for some contextual connection between the reporting and the
original context. This not only provides strong support for attempting a unified analysis
of these constructions, but also that there is a real link between phenomena traditionally
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assumed to be root phenomena, such as speech act adverbs, discourse markers and hanging
topics.40 A completely unified analysis of the Indo-European quasi-quotational construc-
tions was not possible due to differences in perspective in German EV2 compared with
English EIQs and Romance recomplementation. Where the embedded clause determiner
in the latter group effects a perspective shift to the original context, in the former group
it reaffirms the perspective of the matrix speaker, even if the matrix subject is disjoint
in reference. This difference is reflected in the interpretation of embedded imperatives in
these languages, which are split along the same lines. This difference in perspective was
suggested to be responsible for the differences in distribution between the two groups of
quasi-quotational phenomena; the German EV2 type of determiner was proposed to be
incompatible with interrogatives that require a coherent perspectival interpretation, hence
German EV2 languages do not permit embedded interrogative illocutionary acts. Main-
land Scandinavian EV2 shows both kinds of perspective disambiguation and embedded
inverted questions were seen to be possible. The importance of overt marking was also
highlighted; English can embed assertions, but only if they are marked through processes
such as verb movement, as seen in fuck -inversion.
It was also shown that the distribution of quasi-quotational phenomena is not a ques-
tion of assertion tout court ; this is made clear by the similarities that English EIQs share
with German/Mainland Scandinavian EV2, and the presence of interrogative recomple-
mentation in Spanish. Instead quasi-quotational phenomena are analysed as referential
CPs that pick out a specific conversational move in the relevant discourse that contributes
towards the resolution of a question under discussion. This is a more fine-grained dis-
tinction that the Main Point of Utterance framework because the QUD framework does
not entail that the quasi-quotational construction is interpreted as the main point of the
utterance but that it constitutes engagement with a question under discussion. It also tells
40This is not to say that there is no crosslinguistic variation in the “basic” size of a standard complement
clause; it is clear that Italian and Spanish complement clauses are larger than English complement clauses as
they routinely permit topicalisation of arguments, for example. There are also languages such as Mandarin
Chinese that completely exclude discourse-related elements such as discourse markers, while permitting
other CP-level elements such as epistemic adverbs, epistemic marker le and experiential markers such
as guo (Biggs 2014). This goes to show that there is still a lot of work to be done to determine how
standard complement clauses are structured, including how the two pioneering analyses of left periphery in
cartography, Rizzi (1997) and Cinque (1999), relate to each other.
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us more about how the interlocutors are expected to commit to the resolution of the open
question or proposition proposed by the quasi-quotational construction. In the case of Ger-
man EV2, which links the embedded clause to the speaker’s perspective, this means that
the embedded clause is put forward to be engaged with by the addressee and, if accepted,
added to the common ground. Ultimately, therefore, the distribution of quasi-quotational
constructions is dependent on whether it can be interpreted as new, unresolved informa-
tion in the context it is evaluated with respect to—a refinement of the proposal by Green
(1976).
The work above has wider implications for both linguistic theory and linguistic typology.
In terms of linguistic theory, it has been shown here that clauses can be referential and the
concept of what referential means in this context has been refined. In terms of linguistic
typology, we can use the work in this chapter to work towards filling some gaps identified by
Cook (2014). In her examination of Plains Cree, Cook notes that indexical clause types—
clause types that are strongly connected to the speaker and the current speech act and
that are morphologically marked as such—are strictly limited to matrix contexts, and she
raises the question of whether other languages have the logically possible option of indexical
clause types occurring in embedded position. This is related to Faller’s (2014) examination
of what it means for speaker-oriented elements to appear in embedded clauses. I propose
that the EV2 clauses in German represent a type of speaker-oriented embedded clause that
cannot exist independently of its matrix clause, and that, unlike the Cuzco Quechua cases
looked at by Faller (2014), speaker-oriented elements in German EV2 can scope solely over
the embedded clause and reinforce the embedded clause, as well as potentially the whole
sentence, as an unresolved proposition in the current discourse. It is important to restate
the fact that these clauses must be overtly marked as such, just as indexical clauses are
overtly marked using independent clause-typers in Plains Cree. However, the Mainland
Scandinavian facts also show that perspective shifting per se is not the key to embedded
illocutionary acts, but that perspective disambiguation is.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this dissertation it has been shown that an intermediate point on the indirect-direct
quotation continuum is well attested, namely quasi-quotational clauses which contain em-
bedded root phenomena such as topicalisation, speech act adverbs, expressive elements
and (certain) discourse markers despite not showing full direct-speech-like indexical shift,
independent temporal deixis, any verbatim requirement or independence of movement
relative to the matrix clause. It was proposed that these clauses are nominalised by a
determiner-like element which heads them. This element, in conjunction with the operator
in its left periphery, licenses the root phenomena in the left periphery, provides a centre
for evaluation for discourse-oriented elements and covert pronominals and accounts for the
islandhood of these quasi-quotational constructions.
To this degree it was possible to unify German/Mainland Scandinavian EV2, English
EIQs and Romance recomplementation. However, there are two groups within this class
of quasi-quotational constructions; German and some Mainland Scandinavian EV2 clauses
show reaffirmation of orientation towards the speaker where English EIQs, Romance recom-
plementation and other Mainland Scandinavian EV2 clauses show perspective shifting to
the original discourse context. However, the important point is that illocutionary acts are
not ambiguous as to their orientation in the way that indirect speech reports can be. How a
given language disambiguates between perspectives in quasi-quotational constructions was
also suggested to be the root of the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions across
clause-types in that language; it was claimed that embedded interrogative illocutionary
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acts are unavailable in German because questioning acts and their effect on discourse are
not compatible with the ‘mixed’ interpretation across the current and original discourses
that obtains in German EV2 and embedded imperatives.
Moreover, it was shown that quasi-quotational constructions in complement position
are not selected by the matrix verb but are syntactic modifiers; specifically, they are in close
apposition with and provide information about both the content and the form of the true
complement to the matrix verb, which is an nominal attitudinal object. Quasi-quotational
constructions are also available in certain contexts more typically identified as peripheral
adverbial clauses (Haegeman 2006) such as reason clauses, in which they are interpreted
as giving the motivations behind the matrix speech act. EIQs qua quasi-quotational con-
structions were shown to be widely available in reason clauses yet are restricted to certain
dialects in complement position; this was proposed to be due to the variation in availability
of null functional linking heads in different dialects of English. EIQs in general are more
marginal than alternative forms of speech report such as indirect and direct speech. It
was proposed that this is due to the tension of representing two illocutionary acts in one
speech act without using other aids, such as prosody, to disambiguate between the shifts
in perspective.
The proposal laid out here that the orientation of expressive and covert pronominal
elements is determined by a perspectival monster operator combining with a situation
pronoun is not uncontentious. However, by postulating the presence of the IAP projec-
tion (the projection containing the monster operator) we can explain other syntactic ef-
fects in quasi-quotational constructions, for example the strength of the islandhood of the
quasi-quotational constructions in comparison with the (otherwise quite similar in struc-
ture) factive complements, for which an analysis along the lines of Kastner (2015) was
espoused. Moreover, further evidence for differences in interpretation between covert and
overt pronominal elements was provided in the form of Kaufmann’s (2015) data on em-
bedded imperatives, augmented with some new data on Castilian Spanish. More work on
a wider range of languages and more careful information-gathering techniques are needed,
but there seems to be a compelling line of enquiry into the similarities and differences
between determining overt indexicality and covert perspective anchoring.
263
With regards to the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions, it was shown that
neither assertion nor referentiality (as conceived of by de Cuba & U¨ro¨gdi (2010) and others)
can account for the distribution of quasi-quotational constructions. Instead a new defini-
tion of referentiality was proposed whereby quasi-quotational constructions are identified
as referential clauses which refer to a conversational move in the relevant discourse. This
was presented using the Question Under Discussion framework as conceived of by Farkas
& Bruce (2010), with some amendments. This provides a more accurate characterisation
of the denotation of a quasi-quotational construction than an MPU-led analysis because
factors external to the quasi-quotational construction contribute to determining the MPU
such that the MPU does not accurately predict the distribution of quasi-quotational con-
structions or effectively distinguish between quasi-quotational constructions and indirect
speech reports. Moreover, it was shown that the MPU can be forced under factive verbs
even where embedded verb movement—the key diagnostic of quasi-quotational construc-
tions in English, German and Mainland Scandinavian—is blocked. The use of the QUD
framework elucidates what it means for quasi-quotational constructions to be at-issue be-
cause it models an engagement on the part of the discourse participants to answer the
question under discussion and a commitment to answering it. The QUD framework also
captures a key characteristic of the quasi-quotational constructions qua nominals that is
not dealt with by the concept of being at-issue and that differentiates quasi-quotational
constructions from propositions (selected clausal complements): they can cease to exist
when they are accepted, resolved and removed from the Table.
On a broader level it has been shown that speaker-oriented clauses are embeddable
and that illocutionary force can be embedded, though in some sense “less” of it may be
embedded than is available in the matrix clause. What this means is that the holder of
responsibility for the embedded clause is clearly communicated, but any requirements for
the current addressee to respond to the quasi-quotational construction do not hold in the
embedded report of the original speech act.
The future directions for this research are several; firstly, more non-Indo-European lan-
guages should be considered with the aim ultimately of better understanding why quasi-
quotational constructions seem to be absent from some languages, such as Mandarin Chi-
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nese and Cuzco Quechua, or from dialects such as “Standard English”. There is also work
to pursue in terms of better understanding exactly how quasi-quotational constructions,
particularly those under semifactives, pick out the conversational move that they refer to.
Finally, the consequences of quasi-quotational constructions for acquisition is a rich vein
of work to pursue; there is evidence that children acquiring English dialects with EIQs
are more adult-like in interpreting standard indirect questions than those who do not have
EIQs in their dialect. Further work is required to better understand whether this relates
to the perspective shifting property of EIQs, their structural properties, or a mixture of
the two.
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Chapter 8
Appendix
8.1 Study 1: question-answer task I
8.1.1 Participants and items
The first study took the form of a Google Form posted on Facebook. The spread of
participants was therefore quite wide; of 73 respondents, 6 identified themselves as being
from Northern Ireland, 56 from England (of which 21 from the North West region), 5 from
the United States, 3 from Canada, 2 from South Africa and 1 from Scotland. Participation
was entirely self-selecting and given the demographics of my Facebook page and those of
the people who ‘shared’ it, most of the participants will have at least a bachelor’s degree.
The form contained 16 test items in the form of questions, each with an accompanying
scenario. Participants answered the question in the free text box and were free to include
as much or as little detail as they wished. The conditions were as follows: the embedded
question was either a polar or a wh-question, either with or without subject-auxiliary
inversion. There were four examples of each condition and the questions were randomised
once so the same order was presented to all participants. Sample questions are shown
below with polar questions in (1) and wh-questions in (2). All questions had the same
form, in which the participants is one of the actors in the scenario:
(1) Your friend Olly works for a charity encouraging people to take on big challenges to
raise funds. 2013 was a really hard year for the charity, so he spent the last months
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of 2013 trying extra hard to recruit people. He knows you’re a good swimmer, so he
tried to sign you up for a challenge to be performed in 2014. He asked you if you
would give swimming the Channel a go in 2014.
a. When did Olly ask if you would swim the Channel?
b. When did Olly ask would you swim the Channel?
(2) Your friend Olly works for a charity encouraging people to take on big challenges to
raise funds. 2013 was a really hard year for the charity, so he spent the last months
of 2013 trying extra hard to recruit people. He knows you’re a good swimmer, so
he tried to sign you up for a challenge to be performed in 2014. He doesn’t know
whether you’d prefer to swim the Channel or the Thames, so he asked you what
kind of challenge you would give a go in 2014.
a. When did Olly ask what you would swim?
b. When did Olly ask what would you swim?
8.1.2 Results
The free text results were coded as follows (using example responses to the polar sample
items in (1):
(3) Short-distance: (At the end of) 2013.
Long-distance: 2014.
Both: He asked in 2013 if you would swim the Channel in 2014.
Quote: Olly asked “Will you swim the Channel?”
Other: To raise funds for charity.
The majority of answers overall were short-distance construals of the wh-adjunct, as ex-
pected, given the wh-island status of the embedded clause. However, one of the four
conditions received notably more long-distance construals than the others, namely the po-
lar non-inverted condition. The proportions of long-distance and both answers to the polar
non-inverted condition are displayed in table 8.1.
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Inversion No inversion
Polar 7.67 24.20
Wh 4.11 4.45
Table 8.1: Total long-distance answers (long-distance + ‘both’ answers) by Question Type
x Inversion (%)
8.1.3 Discussion
Long-distance construals of the wh-adjunct are more likely in polar questions regardless of
inversion. Again, this is not surprising given that there is no overt wh-item to cross in these
conditions. However, the fact that subject-auxiliary inversion seems to create almost as
strong a barrier as the overt wh-item was a surprising finding. Furthermore, the fact that
almost a quarter of the responses to the polar non-inverted condition are long-distance
ones suggests that wh-islands without overt wh-items are not as closely respected as is
assumed in the literature. The initial analysis of this finding was to suggest that EIQs
are strong islands compare with indirect speech reports due to the extra structure that is
assumed (and will later be motivated) for the EIQ.
There were, however, some problems with the experimental design. Firstly, all of the
stimuli were presented in text. This visual presentation allows the participant to reread or
reparse the question as much or as often as they like, without giving much or any insight
to the researcher as to the mental “intonation” they impose on the structure. For this
reason, despite the lack of punctuation indicating that the EIQ is a direct speech report,
it is possible that participants without EIQs in their dialect confused the EIQs with direct
quotation.
There was a second reason why the EIQs in this experiment may have been confused
with direct speech reports, namely that the stimulus items use second-person pronouns in
the embedded clause. Whilst the use of second-person pronouns is not indicative of direct
quotation, it means that the string used in the inverted condition is string-identical with
the corresponding direct quotation.
Finally, it was clear based on some of the answers returned that some of the pilot
items were considered too oblique and that not all possible questions in the stimulus were
necessarily answerable given the information in the accompanying scenario, in particular
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yes-no responses to the embedded polar questions. Though it was not expected that we
would get any yes-no responses, they should at least be possible if the stimulus provides
the correct information.
It was also clear that the question-answer task needed to be accompanied by a gram-
maticality judgment task in order to ascertain whether a given participant actually accepts
EIQs, in order to distinguish between “native” users of EIQs and other speakers, who might
even consider EIQs ungrammatical. These latter cases might render the data collected on
the inverted stimuli less reliable as they are not native users of the construction.
8.2 Study 2: question-answer task II
8.2.1 Improvements on question-answer task I
As a result of the confounds in the first study, a second study with amendments was
conducted. In this study, stimuli were provided auditorally as well as visually. The author
(a native user of EIQs) recorded each of the stimuli using neutral intonation so as not
to bias one reading of the question over another. The stimuli were adjusted to include
only third-person pronouns (no first- or second-person pronouns); the scenarios too were
simplified and amended to express fully self-contained stories, as well as ensuring that no
particular answer is more salient in the context than any other.1 The 22 question-answer
items (16 items plus 6 fillers) were followed by an acceptability judgment task. The new
stimulus design is illustrated below:
(4) Scenario: Sam was very excited. He likes to visit the park at the weekend, but
today was extra special - there would be lots of stands and people with things
to sell there. He bounced out of bed and shouted really loud downstairs to his
Mum, “Mum! Can we go to the park on our new bikes today?” She said, “Yes
of course! But quiet down now Sam, or you’ll wake your baby sister!”
Question: How did Sam ask could they go to the park?
1Many, many thanks are due to the Language Acquisition Research Center at UMass Amherst, along
with Peggy Speas and my child pilot study participants, for their help in the development of these items.
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Note that two different wh-words were found in initial position; in half of the test and filler
items the extracted adjunct was where, in the other half it was how. No wh-arguments were
used in initial position as they are generally considered to be more easily extractable from
wh-islands but, as shown in section 3.3, they cannot be extracted from EIQs. The filler
questions took the same form as the test questions, except that they contained the matrix
verb say. In this way they did not contain wh-islands. They were included both to avoid
perseveration and to see whether long-distance construals of the sentence-initial wh-word,
now perfectly grammatical, were more or less common than short-distance construals.
8.2.2 Participants and dissemination
57 adult participants took part in the second study. Recruitment was a little more focused
than in the first study; Facebook was again used, but the study was also disseminated
amongst students at the universities of York, Manchester and Glasgow, the University of
Central Lancashire and Queen’s University Belfast. As a result the participants remain a
little WEIRD2, but come from a wider demographic than in the first study. Participants
were entered into a draw to win a 20 Amazon voucher as compensation for their time.
Take-up of the survey was lower than in the first study due to the length of the study
and the requirement that audio equipment must be available. The breakdown of regional
identity was as follows:
Region n
Southern England 12
Midlands 7
North East England 6
North West England 5
Scotland 1
Wales 1
Northern Ireland 22
Republic of Ireland 1
USA 1
Table 8.2: Answers to the question: “What region are you from?”
The study was presented online using surveygizmo.com and participants were obliged
2White, Educated, Industrialised, Rich and Democratic.
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to listen to the audio recordings of each question as well as having access to the written
versions.
8.2.3 Results
In this study, both types of polar question showed extraction. However, polar questions
with inversion saw more long-distance extraction than those without inversion. Further-
more, Belfast English speakers only extracted out of embedded polar questions at about
two-thirds of the rate that non-Belfast English speakers did. However, while Belfast En-
glish speakers clearly extract less than non-Belfast English speakers in general, they were
almost twice as likely to extract out of polar inverted contexts than polar non-inverted con-
texts: a finding in contradiction with the results of the first question-answer task. Finally,
non-Belfast English speakers were the only group to extract out of wh-questions without
inversion, but at the very low rate of 4.4
Inversion No inversion
Polar 24 14
Wh 4.17 0
Table 8.3: Total long-distance answers by Question Type x Inversion in Belfast speakers
(%)
Inversion No inversion
Polar 33 23
Wh 3.4 4.4
Table 8.4: Total long-distance answers by Question Type x Inversion in non-Belfast speak-
ers (%)
Further to the descriptive statistics illustrated above, an item effect was found; of the
4 polar-inversion items, there were far more long-distance answers to where items than to
how items (see table 8.5) across all respondents.
8.2.4 Discussion
The results clearly show that both inverted and non-inverted polar questions may be ex-
tracted out of, contrary to the findings of the first question-answer task. Furthermore,
extraction appears to be more acceptable out of inverted questions than non-inverted
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Long-distance Short-distance Other
Where x No-inv 15.45 84.12 0.43
Where x Inv 26.05 73.53 0.42
How x No-inv 9.40 89.32 1.28
How x Inv 9.09 90.91 0
Table 8.5: Long- and short-distance answers by Matrix wh-word x Inversion in all survey
respondents (%)
questions. Once more, this may be because there is an overt and unambiguous ele-
ment in the non-inverted questions which marks the embedded clause as embedded—the
complementiser—which is not present in the inverted case. This also suggests that what-
ever the structure of the EIQ, it does not in itself prevent extraction from inside the EIQ:
the EIQ is not a strong structural island like a relative clause is, for example. Consequently,
it seems that the islandhood of EIQs is more likely to be semantic in nature, like wh-islands
and factive islands.3 I will address this question in the analysis of the EIQ below.
In this vein, there are two other effects that should be noted. Firstly, the item effect
found in the second study is suggestive of the need for a semantic account of the islandhood
of EIQs; it is similar to the extraction facts on factive islands, from which degree adjuncts
are more difficult to extract than any other element, unless the context permits. This means
that a better understanding of the extractability of different kinds of elements out of EIQs
is required, as well as an examination of the kinds of context which favour extraction.
Secondly, the Belfast English speakers extract notably less out of three types of ques-
tions than the non-Belfast English speakers; they extract slightly more freely out of non-
inverted wh-questions than non-Belfast English speakers at a rate of 4.17% to 3.4 %)
notwithstanding. This might suggest that Belfast speakers are more sensitive to the
quotation-like nature of EIQs, but this does not explain why they do extract out of inverted
polar questions in almost 1 in 4 cases. A complicating factor could be that Belfast English,
unlike other EIQ dialects, overtly marks successive cyclic movement of a wh-phrase out of
clauses embedded under verbs of saying by inverting the embedded auxiliary:
(5) a. [CP1 Whoi did John hope [CP2 ti would he see ti]]?
3See Abrusa´n (2014) for a compelling account of factive islands as semantic rather than structural
islands.
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b. [CP1 Whati did Mary claim [CP2 ti did they steal ti]]?
c. I wonder [CP1 whati did John think [CP2 ti would he get ti]]. Henry (1995)
Henry suggests that this inversion effect could be related to the effect of successive cyclic
movement of wh-phrases in Irish Gaelic, in which a different [+wh] complementiser is used
in Co if a wh-phrase has passed through SpecCP. It does however mean that extraction over
inversion more generally is licit in Belfast English, which might affect their performance
on possible examples of extraction out of EIQs.
8.2.5 Extension to question-answer task II
Due to the item effect in the second question-answer task, a small scale follow-up grammat-
icality judgement task examined extractability of arguments out of indirect speech reports,
EIQs and direct speech reports. 8 participants responded. They were given scenarios and
three ways in which a question could be asked about that scenario. They were asked to rate
each of the three questions on a 7-point Likert scale (1 being completely ungrammatical,
7 being perfectly grammatical). An example scenario and question are shown below:
(6) Scenario: Mary and David were watching their children play. Their friend Jamie
walked past. David said hello but Mary was too engrossed in watching the
kids. When David said that Jamie had walked by, Mary said, “Oh no, did I
ignore Jamie?”
A: Who did Mary ask did she ignore?
B: Who did Mary ask if she ignored?
C: Who did Mary ask, “Did I ignore?”
There were six groups of items in total: two in which the extracted element was who, two
for what and two for where.
The results of the follow-up grammaticality judgement task show that judgements on
the extractability of arguments out of EIQs fall exactly between the judgements on indirect
and direct speech reports:
There are no great differences between the Belfast and non-Belfast speakers in this
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EIQ Indirect speech report Direct speech report
4.33 5.43 2.5
Table 8.6: Grammaticality judgements on extractability of arguments from different types
of speech report (7-point Likert scale)
regard, though the Belfast speakers seem to make a slightly stronger distinction between
extraction out of direct and indirect speech. The number of Belfast speakers represented
here is very small however (just three):
Dialect EIQ Indirect speech report Direct speech report
Belfast 4.5 5.72 2.33
Non-Belfast 4.21 5.21 2.63
Table 8.7: Acceptability judgments on Extractability of Arguments from Different Types
of Speech Report x Dialect
What is notable is that all of the speakers distinguished between each of the types of
speech report, with no individual participant judging any two constructions to be equivalent
in their grammaticality. It is also notable that there is no real distinction in the judgements
of the different extracted elements; regardless of whether who, what or where is extracted,
extraction from indirect speech reports is judged better than extraction from direct speech
reports, and EIQs are intermediate.
8.3 Study 2: grammaticality judgement task
Following the question-answer task, participants took a grammaticality judgement task.
They were asked to rate sentences for their grammaticality using a 7-point Likert scale.
Nine predicates were tested: two canonical EIQ-licensing predicates, ask and wonder ; say ;
two predicates containing modality that have been attested as licensing EIQs, want to
know, want to see; one imperative that has been attested as licensing EIQs, go and see;
two predicates under interrogation that have been attested as licensing EIQs, did X ask
and did X remember ; and two factive predicates which do not license EIQs, know and find
out.
The mean results for each predicate and each type of embedded clause (non-inverted
or inverted, polar or wh) across all participants are shown in table 8.8.
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Matrix predicate No inversion/polar No inversion/WH Inversion/polar Inversion/WH
Ask 6.62 6.74 4.96 4.64
Wonder 6.78 6.89 4.93 3.92
Say 3.34 4.65 4.65 5.14
Want to know 6.75 6.23 3.94 4.76
Want to see 6.75 6.73 3.79 4.64
Go and see 6.8 6.62 3.35 2.32
Did X ask 6.44 6.46 3.86 3.35
Did X remember 6.68 6.92 2.86 2.86
Find out 5.7 6.69 1.86 1.80
Know 6.64 6.63 1.83 1.98
Table 8.8: Mean rating of sentences by Matrix Predicate x Inversion x Question Type x
Inversion in all speakers
As the table shows, participants of all dialects generally distinguish between the pred-
icates which typically license EIQs and those which do not. In particular ask, wonder,
say and predicates with modality were judged as more grammatical with an EIQ than
predicates in the imperative or interrogative. At the very least they were not judged to
be ungrammatical (in that a score of 4 is neither grammatical nor ungrammatical) apart
from wonder, which just dropped below 4. This may be because EIQs are typically used
to express overt speech acts or questions which have been overtly discussed. Moreover, ask
and the modalised predicates averaged a score of higher than 4, and say averaged a score
of higher than 5, or ‘marginally grammatical’ across all speakers.
Lower down the table, imperative and interrogative predicates were judged to be closer
to grammatical than the factive predicates. These scores support the details in section
3.2 and introduces some nuance into them; modality improves the combination of a given
predicate and an EIQ more than changing the type of the clause in which the predicate
appears.
The scores with respect to say are particularly interesting: the respondents judged say
to be more grammatical when followed with an EIQ than with a standard indirect embed-
ded question. That the latter were not considered highly grammatical is not surprising, as
say does not typically select for interrogative complements. It is more surprising, though,
that the say sentences with EIQs were judged to be marginally grammatical. The fact
that the EIQ sentences with say were not judged at ceiling suggests that they were not
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interpreted as direct quotes but as EIQs (they were not presented with typical direct quote
punctuation such as quotation marks to bias participants away from a direct quote inter-
pretation). I conclude that participants judged say with an EIQ to be a possible sentence
of English on its own merit, and that this perhaps reflects the data in (2), which shows
that EIQs under say are produced in typically non-EIQ dialects of English.
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Abbreviations
AAE African American English
abs absolutive case
acc accusative case
alloc allocutive agreement marker
aux auxiliary
Asr Assertion
att attitudinal
BNC British National Corpus
CG Common Ground
CL clitic
CLLD Clitic Left Dislocation
comp complementiser
con content
conj conjunct clause type
def definite
dem demonstrative
det determiner
dox doxastic
E projection Expressive projection (Banfield 1982)
EIQ Embedded Inverted Question
erg ergative case
EV2 Embedded Verb Second
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fem feminine gender
FID Free Indirect Discourse
form formal register
fut future tense
gen genitive case
hon honorific marking
IA Illocutionary Act (head)
IAP Illocutionary Act Phrase
ICE-GB International Corpus of English - Great Britain edition
imp imperative
impf imperfect
indep independent clause type
indir-evid indirect evidence
inf infinitive
inform informal
INFL Inflection
intrans intransitive
loc locative
masc masculine gender
MIR Main Information Request
MPU Main Point of Utterance
MSc Mainland Scandinavian
neg negation
neut neuter gender
nom nominative case
obj object marking
orig original context
p(a)st past tense
pl plural
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PM Predicate Modification
PoV Point of View
pres present tense
prf perfect
prt particle
PS Projected Set
quote quotative marker
QUD Question Under Discussion
SA Speech Act (head)
SAP Speech Act Phrase
sg singular
subj subject marking/subjunctive
top topic
val value(d)
voc vocative
V2 Verb Second
WEIRD White, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, Democratic
1 first-person
2 second-person
3 third-person
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